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Preface to ”Scenarios and Indicators for Sustainable
Development—Towards A Critical Assessment of
Achievements and Challenges”
The global ecosphere is a complex, evolving system, and the anthroposphere is another, more
rapidly evolving one. Globaliza-tion and telecoupling are enhancing their complexity, and even
more that of coupled socio-ecological systems. Sustainable development as a global normative
development concept, as defined by the UN Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable Develop-ment Goals
SDGs, adds another level of complexity. As a result, the demand for tools to identify transformative
innovations, assess future risks, and support precautionary decision making for sustainability is
growing by the day in business and poli-tics.
Scenarios and indicators are such means for simplification, reducing the real-world complexity
to a potentially high but lim-ited number of factors, analyzing and monitoring their interaction, and
supporting policy formulation. However, there are no ‘objective’ representations of reality as they
will inevitably reflect the orientations and norms held by their authors (and inter-preted by readers
based on their values and understanding).
While political or management demands can emerge rather spontaneously, the development
of new models and scenarios takes time. In particular, responding to such demands by running
new scenarios with updated data and parameter setting while the models’ structures remain largely
the same is the standard reaction, as the integrated assessment models (IAMs) used all over
the world for sustainable development strategy development are complex, combine sub-models
from different disciplines and require time, work, and funding to be structurally modified.
However, these models themselves are criticized (and, in particular, the economic computable
global equilibrium CGE sub-models most of them incorporate) for a lack of transparency, veiled
implicit assumptions, inability to capture stark and structural changes of effect driving mechanisms,
technical insufficiencies, and political bias. For instance, the IPCC’s model-based warnings are ever
more severe with every new report—is this due to a worsening situation (i.e. so far unrecognised
dynamics), or can one of the reasons be the implicit habit of scientists of avoiding type 2 errors
(claiming a relationship when it does not exist) at the expense of making type 1 errors (not finding
a relationship when it exists)? What roles do other habits and routines, and the world views of
scholars, play in the assumptions made and the interpretations given? The latest IPCC scenarios,
assuming continuous economic growth in affluent countries at the price of running into a greenhouse
gas overshoot indicate that scholarly beliefs can trump physical insights—the economists involved
refused to test any scenario analyzing how a no-growth, steady-state, or even degrowth economy
would work out on social structures, economic prospects, and community flourishing.
To fully grasp the ongoing environmental decay (biodiversity loss and nutrient cycle overload
being those where planetary boundaries have long been crossed, with climate change a rapidly
upcoming third), a biophysical perspective must be the basis of scenario development. While in
current modeling many (but far from all) social and economic impacts on the depend-ent trajectory
of the environment are calculated, the opposite effect, direct and indirect impacts on the economic and
social dimension from developments in the environmental one are hardly ever spelled out explicitly.
It would require accepting posi-tive or negative feedback loops, with social and economic variables
becoming dependent variables, significantly influenced by environmental development, and with
ix
a need to be managed politically to adapt societies to new external conditions. In par-ticular, ‘the
social’ as one of the core dimensions of sustainable development is often neglected or reduced to a
few measura-ble phenomena like income or employment quota. However, it includes much more
than that, in particular, a society’s institu-tions: The effects and dynamics of public orientations
including values and preferences, decision-making mechanisms includ-ing equity, gender issues,
power statures and democracy, and implementing organizations, their role and functions. All fac-tors
often lend themselves better to qualitative description (at best ordinal scale, semi-quantitative
measurement as used by IPCC and IPBES) rather than to quantification. That is why good scenarios
consist of a narrative which is able to incorporate these qualitative arguments, and which can be
illustrated with model calculations falling short of doing so. As a consequence, the ‘hard data’ from
modeling are not the definitive result of scenario work, but they have to be interpreted in the context
of the scenario narrative, which may lead to significant corrections.
Similar questions apply to indicators, one of the main tools to communicate scenario results,
help to monitor selected real-world trends recognized as decisive, support communication about
them, and, ultimately, decision making. However, which parameters are chosen for monitoring
and which yardsticks (indicators) are applied in doing so has often more to do with established
measurement methods and data availability—in particular, time series—and data consistency than
with which problems are currently of the highest importance, politically, ecologically, socially, or
economically. If newly emerging trends do not become an issue of reporting due to missing data
time series, this implies that no phenomenon recognized as a prob-lem worth monitoring less than
a quarter century ago can make it into the monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Similarly, if the
data collection focusses on parameters which have been considered relevant under past theoretical
assumptions, there is a risk that if such theories are falsified or recognized as outdated, the indicator
reports will point in the wrong direction. This is a particular risk if only inputs, pressures, and the
like are being monitored (as they are often easier to observe and quantify), and—assuming a largely
linear correlation—are considered to provide evidence about a system’s performance.
Reflecting these considerations, the authors of this book test established methods against new
challenges, assess the weak-nesses of prevailing innovation theories and the political-ideological
embedment of archetypical scenarios, highlight deficits in taking the physical basics into account, and
the need to understand global interactions and the stepwise process of energy transitions. However,
they not highlight the weaknesses but also possible ways to escape these dilemmas.
In a similar vein, they discuss the conceptual challenges of indicator development in a time
of “fake news” and “alternative truths”, point out technical as well as basic weaknesses in data
collection, harmonization, and indicator generation, always with a view to solving problems. As both
the rigorous analysis of weaknesses and the positive attitude to solving the prob-lems are rare in
the scenario and indicators scholarly community, we sincerely hope that this volume will stimulate
discus-sions and reflections, supporting colleagues in addressing those weaknesses and overcoming
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Abstract: As a purposive sustainability transition requires environmental innovation and innovation
policy, we discuss potentials and limitations of three dominant strands of literature in this field,
namely the multi-level perspective on socio-technical transitions (MLP), the innovation systems
approach (IS), and the long-wave theory of techno-economic paradigm shifts (LWT). All three
are epistemologically rooted in an evolutionary understanding of socio-technical change. While
these approaches are appropriate to understand market-driven processes of change, they may be
deficient as analytical tools for exploring and designing processes of purposive societal transformation.
In particular, we argue that the evolutionary mechanism of selection is the key to introducing the
strong directionality required for purposive transformative change. In all three innovation theories,
we find that the prime selection environment is constituted by the market and, thus, normative
societal goals like sustainability are sidelined. Consequently, selection is depoliticised and neither
strong directionality nor incumbent regime destabilisation are societally steered. Finally, we offer an
analytical framework that builds upon a more political conception of selection and retention and calls
for new political institutions to make normatively guided selections. Institutions for transformative
innovation need to improve the capacities of complex societies to make binding decisions in politically
contested fields.
Keywords: environmental innovation; sustainability transition; transformation; evolutionary economics;
multi-level perspective; innovation systems; long-wave theory; agency; decision-making; institutions
1. Introduction
The world is in the process of a two-fold ‘socio-ecological transition’ [1,2]. On the one hand, large
parts of the world, including the ‘emerging economies’, are enmeshed in a transition from an agrarian,
biomass-based economy to an industrial, fossil-energy-driven one. On the other hand, there are
increasing global efforts to initiate a so-called ‘sustainability transition’ [3–5] away from a fossil-energy
based economy to a post-fossil, sustainable one. While the industrial transition is by far the dominant
phenomenon to date [2], there are signs that the per-capita energy and resource use has started to level
off in the most advanced industrial countries [6]. There is a clear danger, however, that if the societal
project of a transition to sustainability fails, there will be another type of transition: one that results
from a combination of resource depletion and the violation of vital biophysical boundaries and that
may end in socio-economic collapse [7–9].
Innovation policy has played an important role in both the on-going industrial transition and the
incipient sustainability transition. However, while the industrial transition is driven by the inherent
dynamics of socio-technical evolution in a globalising world economy and by the universal quest for
economic growth and material prosperity, the incipient sustainability transition is driven by normatively
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and scientifically defined goals that are, to some extent, countervailing these dynamics. Innovation has
traditionally been at the service of the project of economic expansion, thereby contributing ”massively
to the current resource-intensive, wasteful and fossil fuel-based paradigm of mass production and mass
consumption” [10], but has now to be put at the service of a transformation toward sustainability [11,12].
Innovation policy thus needs to become instrumental to transformation policy [10]. The normative
nature of the sustainability transition, however, makes it an irreducibly political project, whose
goals and objectives will always remain contested as they challenge vested interests, established
values and deep-rooted social practices [13]. Until today, ”transition and innovation policies [have]
only [been] aligned when they stimulate innovations that contribute to both economic growth and
sustainable development”, as Alkemade et al. [11] put it. But as long as further growth continues
to stimulate further resource consumption and as long as the leakage and rebound effects inherent
to efficiency-driven innovations remain unresolved, this might not be good enough [14,15]. In this
paper, therefore, we undertake a re-examination of dominant conceptions of environmental innovation
with a view to their capacities to propel a comprehensive sustainability transition. We are particularly
interested to find out if theories of innovation and socio-technical change in the environmental domain
are adequately addressing the directionality of change required for a purposive societal transition [12].
In any truly transformative model of innovation theory and policy, directionality expresses the fact
that the socially or politically willed direction of change might differ significantly from the patterns of
change that typically drive innovation processes. Thus, the crucial question a transformative model of
innovation needs to answer is how such externally (as in: extra-economically) defined directionality
can be implemented and secured against the dominant dynamics of socio-technical progress in case
both turn out to diverge significantly. More concretely, how can a purposively defined transformative
trajectory be empowered and retained, even if the unsustainable alternatives were to promise more
growth, higher consumer utility and higher profits?
In addition, we argue that a transformative theory of innovation needs to be able to address the
problem of incumbent regime destabilisation [16] and thus of creative destruction [17] in a proactive,
effective and purposive manner. Put another way, a transformative model of innovation fit for the
purpose of a time-bound and radical transformation of industrial society toward sustainability may
not content itself with the innocent role of fostering novelty, diversity and market choice; it will
most likely have to be of a more determined, conflictive and ‘creatively destructive’ nature than its
growth-oriented predecessors.
Theories of innovation (including the three dominant strands we analyse in this article) typically
rely on evolutionary conceptions of socio-technical change. In evolutionary economic theory, change is
emerging as a pattern of interactions between processes of variation, selection and retention of novel
traits. While innovation is frequently reduced to its function of generating ‘diversity’ (variation), the
crucial functions of selection and retention in turning diversity into purposive directional change are
frequently undertheorised or left to the ‘micro-processes’ of individual choice which are conceptualised
as aggregating into ‘meso-trajectories’ of change [18,19]. While convincing as descriptive-analytical
accounts of socio-technical change in a market-mediated society under conditions of universal
economic expansion, these evolutionary models, we argue, are lacking the conceptual instruments to
capture fully the political nature of directionality and thus the political dimension of the selection and
retention functions, in particular. In analogy to its epistemic roots in biology, socio-technical evolution
is frequently portrayed as a natural and apolitical process that can be steered only by influencing
the ‘selection environment’ within which populations of consumers and entrepreneurs make their
respective choices. The idea that variation, selection and retention all can be (and usually are) subject
to political (that is, binding collective) decision-making and will-formation has not yet been sufficiently
applied to these theories of change. We argue that a theory of transformative innovation has analytically
to embrace the political dimension of selection as well as of retention and variation and propose
institutional and procedural answers to the crucial question of how to implement transformative
directionality, regime destabilisation and creative destruction.
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Against this backdrop, we discuss the contributions of three influential strands of literature in
the field of environmental innovation and transition studies. These are the multi-level perspective on
socio-technical transitions (MLP), the innovation systems approach (IS), and the long-wave theory
of techno-economic paradigm shifts (LWT). We then propose an analytical framework, based on the
distinction of so-called ‘agentic operators’, which proposes a more political conception of selection and
retention. We conclude with some concrete proposals for the conception of transformative innovation
policy and with suggestions for further research.
2. The Multi-Level Perspective (MLP)
In recent years, the multi-level perspective on socio-technical transitions has become perhaps
the most influential theoretical framework in the field of environmental innovation [20]. Combining
concepts from evolutionary economics, science and technology studies, structuration theory and
neo-institutional theory, the MLP builds on an analytical distinction of niches, regimes and landscapes
as functionally distinct but interrelated levels that shape the process of socio-technical transitions.
Niches are the locus of radical innovation; they are ‘protected spaces’ such as “R&D (research and
development) laboratories, subsidised demonstration projects or small market niches where users
have special demands and are willing to support emerging innovations”. In this perspective, “niches
are crucial for transitions, because they provide the seeds for systemic change” [21].
Such systemic change can only occur, however, when and if radical innovations manage to
pervade and restructure the level of the socio-technical regime. Since transitions are defined in
the literature as shifts from one regime to another, this is the crucial analytical level for transition
research [21]. The socio-technical regime forms the ‘deep structure’ that accounts for the stability of an
existing socio-technical system. It ”refers to the semi-coherent set of rules that orient and coordinate the
activities of the social groups that reproduce the various elements of socio-technical systems” [21], such
as ”cognitive routines and shared beliefs, capabilities and competences, lifestyles and user practices,
favourable institutional arrangements and regulations, and legally binding contracts” [21].The rules of
a regime account for the stability and lock-in of a concrete socio-technical system [22].
The landscape level, finally, ”highlights not only the technical and material backdrop that sustains
society, but also includes demographic trends, political ideologies, societal values, and macro-economic
patterns” [22]. What defines the landscape level analytically is that it presents ”an external context that
actors at niche and regime levels cannot influence in the short run” [22].
A typical pattern of a socio-technical regime transition would be that (a) niche-innovations
build up internal momentum, (b) changes at the landscape level create pressures on the regime,
and (c) destabilisation of the regime creates windows of opportunity for niche innovations [22].
Historical examples of radical innovations like the automobile show an impressive journey from
their start in a niche, through the domination of entire regimes to their structuring of the global
socio-technical landscape.
The main transformative task from the multi-level perspective is to manage the all-important
interaction between niches and regimes in a purposive and goal-oriented way. To support a
sustainability transition means to help radical environmental innovations get off the ground in
niches and pervade the socio-technical regimes. In order to do so these innovations must break
established rules and structures in the regimes, which lock them into their current state. The purposive
management of the interaction of niches and regimes has become a central concern within the MLP
literature, and led to the development of specific sub-strands like transition management (TM) [23]
and strategic niche management (SNM) [24].
Drawing on evolutionary economics, the MLP and its transition management variants apply the
Darwinian concepts of variation, selection and retention to the socio-technical evolution of modern
societies. Regimes are conceived both as retention structures and selection environments for innovations
(variation) [22,25]. In their capacity as selection environments for innovative variants regimes comprise
a number of structural features that work as selection mechanisms, including market mechanisms and
3
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dominant user practices, established industry structures, dominant technologies and infrastructures,
and public policies [25]. The aim of transition (and strategic niche) management now is to introduce a
certain measure of agency into these processes. Whereas variation in capitalist market environments is
usually driven by the profit motive (i.e., by firms’ interest to survive in the market and, ideally, to grow;
see [26]), the aim is now to introduce ‘directed variation’ that is not only driven by market interests
but also by other (sustainability-related and thus normative) intentions [22].
What the evolutionary perspective tends to neglect, however, is the fact that the evolutionary
dynamics of modern industrialism, which serve as the epistemological foundation of the MLP, could
only unfold in an environment that was characterised by an expansive (fossil) energy system. The
evolution of modern economy has been based on the availability of ever increasing quantities of cheap,
concentrated and abundant energy [27–29]. The selection mechanisms at work were and are geared
towards further expansion and growth of the system. When left to the evolutionary dynamics that
were unleashed some 250 years ago, it appears likely that the system will use up all the available energy
it can find until it runs into the landscape pressures of resource shortages, price increases and severe
environmental constraints. The MLP and its variants aim at overcoming the evolutionary selection
trap either through protecting and nurturing niches for sustainable innovations (SNM) [25] or through
designing complex governance models that try to influence both variation and selection (TM) [30].
Both strategies tend to naturalise evolutionary selection pressures, however, by taking markets
as given selection environments. Geels [31] argues that ”most transition-scholars focus on ‘green‘
niche-innovations, they pay less attention to existing regimes and incumbent actors, or conceptualize
regimes as monolithic ‘barriers to be overcome‘, which runs counter to the initial MLP-formulations and
the emphasis on multi-level alignments”. A literature review covering 386 journal articles concludes
that a reason for new ideas not diffusing rapidly through companies may be due to ”overarching
structures of markets, patterns of final consumer demand, institutional and regulatory systems and
inadequate infrastructures for change” [32]. This suggests that—despite its focus on governing the
interface between niches and regime—the MLP literature tends to regard the selection mechanisms
as naturally given, unquestionable and subject only to modification and management. Thus, TM, for
example, ”understands the relation transition initiatives adopt towards existing regimes not in political,
but in market terms” [33]. According to Kemp and Loorbach [34] TM is about ‘context control’, so as
”to orient market dynamics towards societal goals”. While this may involve regulation and economic
instruments, change itself emerges in an evolutionary manner as the aggregate of consumer choices.
In that way, Kenis et al. [33] admonish, ”transitions stay locked in a liberal market model that does not
acknowledge the need of its own transition”. In a word, MLP scholars try to insert some directionality
into the governance of selection mechanisms they consider to be naturally given, instead of challenging
the very nature of the selection mechanisms themselves. Recent attempts to unravel the political in
MLP-based transition literature [35] tend to overstate the complexity of political processes involved
when trying to give directionality to markets, thereby creating an endless field of future research that
allows the more pressing task of designing transition mechanisms beyond the market to be evaded.
We argue instead that the evolutionary selection trap may be effectively overcome only through the
purposive construction of selection mechanisms that negotiate and ultimately express societal goals. It
might, thus, be more important to focus on innovating the selection mechanisms of industrial societies
and to equip them with purposefully designed (and democratically controlled) selection criteria than
to focus on getting sustainable innovations selected by unsustainable selection environments.
A managerial approach toward the relationship between niches and the regime on the basis of
market mechanisms also raises questions about the power of the niches to ever escape the normative
force of the regime. As Bulkeley et al. [36] aptly put it, the ”key role ascribed to government actors
in creating ‘protected‘ spaces for niche development [also] raises questions as to whether niches are
established in order to maintain regimes rather than as a means of fostering change”. As long as niches
are at the mercy of the regime to protect their space from the forces of the market until they are ready
4
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to compete, they remain subjected to the dominant logic of the regime and the market, which defines
what successful competition means.
Thus, we suggest focusing on ‘selection’ instead of ‘variation’ and on regimes instead of niches.
This is not because variation or niches are unimportant, but because the limiting factor is the purposive
selection, upscaling and mainstreaming of innovations—if necessary against the regime—in order
to transform the regime. Niches may be nested within regimes, but transformative innovation
requires acknowledgement that their relationship may (or perhaps even must) at some point become
antagonistic and thus requires institutions that are not managerial but political.
3. Innovation Systems
Another influential strand of innovation research is the innovation system (IS) approach. Rooted
in evolutionary economic theorizing, it was developed as a policy concept in the mid-1980s [37–39].
In contradistinction to the MLP, the IS approach does not focus on the interaction between different
levels of socio-technical emergence, but on the interaction of actors, networks and institutions in
steering and influencing innovation dynamics. Its original aim was to make national economies more
competitive and resilient under conditions of increasing global competition and receding growth rates
after the oil crises of the 1970s [10]. According to Jacobsson and Bergek [40], innovation systems are
composed of a set of structural elements: actors in the whole supply chain, networks, institutions,
and, in some approaches, technology. While actors can be individuals or organisations, institutions
are conceived along the lines of neo-institutional theory as formal and informal rules, ”comprising
laws and regulations, socio-cultural as well as technical norms, shared expectations, etc.“ [41]. Over
the years, different types of innovation systems were analytically distinguished and conceptualised,
including national innovation systems (NIS), sectoral innovation systems (SIS), regional innovation
systems (RIS) and technological innovation systems (TIS).
With respect to sustainability transitions, the most productive approach within the innovation
systems literature so far has been the TIS approach, which focuses on the development and diffusion
of specific technologies, rather than on the general conditions of innovation in nations, regions or
industry sectors. The purpose of TIS analysis is to identify possible system weaknesses that often
result from the misalignment of system components in the sense that certain structures of the system
hinder actors at cooperating or that the institutional preconditions for entrepreneurial experimentation
are lacking. Institutional frame conditions such as funding schemes or research frameworks heavily
influence the direction of search for new technological solutions and can potentially lead a TIS into a
dead end. Similarly, there is a range of institutional and organisational preconditions for successful
(human and financial) resource mobilisation and market formation. In the absence of a specific
regulatory framework, for example, a new technology will have severe difficulties developing a market
or attracting capital. In addition, a range of institutional conditions has to be met in order for a new
technology to gain the political and cultural legitimacy to be diffused successfully [40].
In sum, the IS approach looks at the actors and institutions of specific innovation systems with
the goal of identifying points of policy intervention that would help enhance the overall performance
of the system or stimulate certain types of innovation. The focus of the IS approach is thus on the
politics (the socio-institutional setting) of innovation rather than on the economics of innovation in a
strict sense. This makes it an interesting approach in terms of addressing the purposive, normative
and goal-oriented nature of a sustainability transition. Since the prospect of such a transition is widely
believed to depend on the development, diffusion and comprehensive use of radical environmental
innovations, the IS approach can help identify the points of intervention necessary to stimulate and
support the success of such technologies. A clear focus in this literature is on the role the state plays
in the creation and transfer of knowledge within innovation systems [42,43]. The assumption is that
knowledge does not build up linearly but has to be mediated between different actors and organisations
in order to become productive in an entrepreneurial way. Particular importance is attributed to the
role of state-funded research and universities in connection with private R&D activities, implying that
5
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”universities should become more entrepreneurial, fostering new company formation through spin-offs
and licensing technology produced through university research” [10]. Recently, Mariana Mazzucato
has emphasised the role states have (and have always had) in providing the direction towards ”new
‘techno-economic paradigms‘, which do not come about spontaneously out of market forces“[44]. Past
socio-technical revolutions were decisively enabled and shaped by direct investments and funding
decisions of states, who took on the role of venture capitalists [45]. However, the approach arguably
suffers from constraints similar to those of the MLP as it grounds its ontology in an evolutionary
process that it assumes as ‘given’. Despite its acknowledgement of the state’s role in ”shaping and
creating markets” [44], it considers market diffusion as the natural goal and (venture) capital attraction
as the natural condition of innovation [44,45]. For the IS approach, ”technological change and other
kinds of innovations are the most important sources of productivity growth and increased material
welfare” [46]. That way, fostering innovation appears as a naturally beneficial goal. In subjecting its
concept of social utility to market forces, however, the IS literature risks paying insufficient attention
to the question if and how selection can be controlled by societal goals other than productivity growth
and material welfare. Put differently, the state in IS may be instrumental in strategically creating the
conditions for new markets (and thus technologies) to emerge and, therefore, has the power to insert
a certain measure of directionality into the innovation process (like promoting energy efficiency or
raising the prices of fossil energy), but success or failure of the new technologies are decided under the
‘normal’ conditions of market take-up by consuming individuals and other market participants. As in
past socio-technical revolutions, the strategically supported direction of innovation has to offer higher
(or new) consumer utility, higher profits and new growth opportunities to prevail in the market, which
remains the ultimate selection environment. To the extent that a sustainability transition requires
the primacy of societal goals that might be incompatible with the above naturalised ‘selectors’ of the
market, however, the IS approach in its current state may be ill equipped to lead societies beyond the
established trajectory of socio-technological evolution.
4. Long Wave Theory—A Sustainable 6th Kondratiev?
The theory of long waves or techno-economic paradigms (TEPs) is the third approach to
innovation thinking we want to discuss here. It combines the theory of long waves of economic
development put forward most prominently by Nikolai Kondratiev (1935) with the evolutionary
economic theory of Joseph Schumpeter that posits radical technological innovation as the “single
root cause of the cyclical behaviour of the capitalist economy” [26]. Thus, Kondratiev waves are
conceptualised as a succession of TEPs, each based on a decisive technological innovation (like the
steam engine, the automobile or microelectronics), a core input (e.g., coal, oil or silicon microchips) and
a carrier branch that drives the development (like railways, automobiles or the computer industry).
Five such long waves or TEPs have shaped capitalist development since the Industrial Revolution at the
end of the 18th century. The first was based on the water-powered mechanisation of industry and on the
iron industry and started in the 1770s. The second was relying on the steam-powered mechanisation of
industry and transport, dating back to the 1830s. The third was based on the electrification of industry,
transport and the home and started in the 1870s. The fourth TEP was constituted by the motorisation
of society, with the key innovation being Ford’s Model-T automobile from 1914. The fifth and current
TEP, finally, is based on microelectronics and started in the 1970s [26,47].
The succession of TEPs transforms societies economically and technologically in that it leads
to extended phases of economic growth but also to socio-economic crises of ‘creative destruction’.
Typically, the new wave emerges out of the crisis of the old: as profit rates decline in the application of
the incumbent paradigm, more and more ‘idle’ capital is invested in new technologies that promise
greater potential for future profits. In socio-economic terms, however, the greatest disruptions occur
when a new TEP is in its explosive growth phase competing fiercely with the established paradigm.
It is the phase where investment bubbles in the new TEP occur, leading to great financial crises, and
where societies have to adapt institutionally and organisationally to the new paradigm (reacting
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to new forms of employment, new industries, the destruction of old industries and infrastructures
and concomitant political changes). After this turbulent phase, the new TEP will continue to grow,
promising a short period of sustained growth that Perez calls the ‘Golden Age’ of a TEP [48].
The study of TEPs is interesting for scholars of socio-ecological transitions for several reasons:
Firstly, if the theory is a valid interpretation of capitalist development, it offers opportunities for
ex-ante analyses of long-term socio-technical change in that ”the recurring features of Kondratiev
waves can be used to extrapolate forward to possible future waves” [49]. An interesting question,
from a SET perspective is, then, which new technologies might qualify for constituting the next TEP
and what contribution to a sustainability transition they could offer. Secondly, if a transition towards
sustainability is our normative goal, the role of purposive agency in steering a TEP or in deciding
which technology will dominate the next half century or so is decisive: can long waves be influenced
or even purposively steered? Or are modern societies exposed to an evolutionary dynamic that is,
more or less, beyond their control? A third issue regards the energetic basis of the long waves and the
question whether a ‘post-fossil’ energy regime could sustain a sixth wave of capitalist development at
all [50].
With regard to the forecasting of the next long wave, most literature regards biotechnology and
nanotechnology to be the ‘hottest’ candidates for the role of key technologies and sees further potential
in the development of information technologies [51–53]. To what extent these technologies have the
potential to carry the burden of a sustainability transition is, for obvious reasons, difficult to establish.
However, the more important question might be whether a future low-carbon Kondratiev wave is a
plausible scenario at all. While Kondratiev waves or TEPs represent cyclical patterns of innovation,
economic growth and socio-economic crisis, the historical metabolic profile of the five historic waves
so far shows the pattern of an upwards spiral. Thus, these waves have shown cumulative metabolic
rates, which means that each wave added further energy and material consumption to the previous
one. As Köhler points out, ”the first four waves were based around intensified use of energy resources,
which increased pollution through new industrial activity” [49]. Similarly, Pearson and Foxon ([54]
p. 125) point to the fact that previous industrial revolutions were ”high carbon industrial revolutions:
[ . . . ] their success was built on the exploitation, largely unconstrained by environmental or other
regulatory concerns, of fossil fuel stocks that freed the economy from constraints it would otherwise
have faced”. Two important questions follow from these observations:
First, can a new TEP be envisaged that de-carbonises (by virtue of its technology-inherent
properties) not only the new segment of growth industries that it adds to the inherited structure
but the entire economy? The energy consumption in the Fifth Kondratiev, at least, does not suggest as
much, since all it has achieved so far in this respect is a stabilisation but not an effective reduction in
per capita energy consumption [6]. Related to this, can such a new, sustainable TEP be expected to
not only decarbonise the legacy of its predecessors but also add a further wave of capitalist growth and
expansion? It is of course difficult to make predictions about these questions but with the metabolic
profiles of the hitherto Kondratievs in mind, which were all based mainly on cheap fossil energy, it is
difficult to imagine that any technological innovation within reach today could help decarbonise the
entire economy and add further growth to the system [50].
These considerations are important when contemplating the possibility of a low-carbon industrial
revolution, as would be necessary for a sustainable next Kondratiev wave. As Pearson and Foxon point
out, such a prospect faces a range of serious challenges [54]. Firstly, while the low-carbon technologies
within reach today are good at helping decarbonise the existing economy in that they substitute ‘green’
alternatives for unsustainable ones, ”they do not offer significant private benefits to users beyond the
social benefits of lower carbon emissions” [54]. Green electricity, for example, is not better at powering
our gadgets and appliances than grey (fossil) electricity—it is just environmentally more sustainable.
What is worse, it is up to now often more expensive and, therefore, even less attractive from the
perspective of private utility. Similarly, the electric car so far is not a utility-improving innovation but
has some practical drawbacks like reduced range and long charging procedures; this might change,
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however, with the development of autonomous driving, which may add new utility, but which would
only add significantly to sustainability if it leads to an overall reduction in ownership and use of cars.
Hence, most low-carbon technologies today help save materials and energy but may, by themselves,
not contribute to a next long wave, which would require a radical expansion of economic activity and
new levels of consumption.
In the face of these challenges, Pearson and Foxon warn that ”there has been a tendency to neglect
or misunderstand the role that the availability of cheap, high quality, carbon intensive energy sources
has played in the co-evolutionary developments in technologies, related institutions and business
strategies that have underlain the unprecedented economic growth and creation of wealth in Western
countries over the past 250 years” [54]. As a consequence they suggest that ”for the low carbon
transition to really “work”, it may prove necessary to transform our energy and related systems and
institutions in more profound ways than we have yet acknowledged” [54]. In other words, a new
techno-economic paradigm alone may not do [2,50,55,56].
But it is precisely the question of political agency that the TEP framework is somewhat ill-equipped
to address. For the TEP framework, technology is the moving force behind development, and it is
difficult to influence or forecast future inventions and discoveries. In TEP, technology drives societal
change, whereas in a socio-ecological transition the required societal changes would drive the trajectory
of technological development. The ontology of the TEP framework grants explanatory priority to the
‘landscape level’, to use the MLP terminology, whereas ‘niches’ and even ‘regimes’ are of secondary
importance. Consequently, Geels and Schot admonish that long-wave theory is ”too much focused on
the macro-environment of socio-technical systems [ . . . ] and does not provide many insights into how
these transitions happen” [22]. Similarly, Köhler contends that “[t]here is no explicit treatment of agency
and this means that there is no theoretical basis for proposing ways in which society can influence the
development of a Kondratiev wave” [49]. Although some proponents of the TEP framework seem to
be aware of this shortcoming and propose to put the question of agency centre-stage on the research
agenda [57], the resulting challenge of subjecting socio-technical evolution to societal goals rather than
to the ‘natural’ forces of capitalism appears colossal.
The discussion of the three dominant paradigms in innovation studies so far has revealed
severe limitations of evolutionary economic thinking to adequately capturing and responding to
the challenges of a transition to sustainability. These limitations, however, are not inherent to
evolutionary theory as such, we argue, but result from its reified application to economic theory.
While the past socio-technical development of modern societies can be fruitfully described using
evolutionary concepts as a heuristic, it would be a mistake to conclude that future change must
necessarily be subjected to the same evolutionary patterns, that is, to grant evolutionary patterns of
change ontological status. The problem is the level at which the selection environment for processes
of innovation is conceptually defined. In economics, the market obviously constitutes a ‘natural’
selection environment for product innovation. This is all well as long as the only thing that interests
the analyst is the economy itself (as an abstract model based on monetary values) and not its relation
to the biophysical environment. As soon as we are talking about a socio-ecological transition, however,
we have to include the biophysical world and its limitations into the analysis, which constitutes the
ultimately much more relevant selection environment. Put differently, if economic development is to
be constrained by and re-embedded within scientifically defined ‘planetary boundaries’ [58], then the
mode of selection has to be different to the normal workings of a market economy, for which the market
is the natural selection environment. In evolutionary approaches technology is the independent and
socio-ecological outcomes the dependent variable, while for a socio-ecological transition the desired
outcomes are the independent and technology a dependent variable. Thus, the nature of the market
needs to be accommodated within biophysical nature in a way that can only be defined and decided
politically. The consequence of this is that a transition to sustainability requires a socially constructed,
purposively designed set of selection mechanisms that is geared to steering that transition if necessary
against the lure of consumer utility, profitability and the requirements of capital accumulation. This
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implies that a transition to sustainability is primarily about the politics of selection and only in the
second instance about technological innovation and consumer choice. A transformative politics of
socio-technical selection, however, needs to be based on robust political institutions and requires deep
democratic legitimation. In the next section, we present an analytical framework that may help to
better understand the challenge ahead and may become beneficial for the design of the institutions
required for a seriously transformative innovation policy.
5. ‘Agentic Operators’ and Transformative Innovation
The framework developed in Hausknost [59] analytically distinguishes three modes of agency
or ‘agentic operators’. We call them ‘operators’ because they do different things to reality, just like
mathematical operators do different things to numbers. The idea is that just like addition, subtraction,
division and multiplication, so decision, choice, and solution do different things to the realities they are
applied to. The concept of agentic operators offers an analytical framework to explore patterns and
strategies of change, as operators are frequently combined in certain ways that result in particular
trajectories of change. By applying the framework to evolutionary theorising we aim to show that
the latter tends to construct an agentic regime based on the recursive interaction between ‘choice’
and ‘solution’, while largely neglecting the potential of ‘decision’. There are two distinctive criteria
which define the characteristics of agentic operators and which separate them from each other. One is
the question whether or not the operator eliminates the options that are not selected in the operation.
The other is the question whether the operator selects between incommensurable options or not, that is,
whether or not it involves the need for political decision-making. Each operator combines different
answers to these two questions and, therefore, constitutes a unique way of ‘processing’ reality. Table 1
summarises the resulting typology.
Table 1. Typology of agentic operators.




There are three logically distinct operators: decision, choice and solution. According to the two
selection criteria identified, they cover all possible modes of agency. Decisions create path dependency
in that they eliminate the discarded options: if I decide for X, then Y and Z are eliminated as options.
Any future development will have X as its point of departure. Importantly, however, a decision
always selects between options that are incommensurable, that is, between options that differ at least
in one aspect for which there does not exist common rational ground. For example, a government
of a coal-rich country might decide to ban the use and export of coal, despite negative economic
consequences and some social disruption this might cause. In doing so, it would eliminate coal as an
option instead of just promoting sustainable alternatives in the energy market and hoping for change
to emerge. The decision could be based on the rationality of climate science but might make little sense
in the rationality of (mainstream) economics. The act of privileging one rationality over the other—and
thus of deciding—would ultimately have to be based on values, world views and what is sometimes
called ideology. It cannot, by itself, resort to an overarching, neutral rationality that would allow for
only this particular option.
Decisions, then, are selections between different ways to frame reality, which cannot be compared
in objective terms of measurement or calculation. That is why Jacques Derrida defined decisions
paradoxically as having to pass the field of undecidability [60]. A decision that is decidable would not
decide anything but reveal the solution to a calculable problem [61].
Solutions, therefore, are defined as selections between commensurable options, that is, between
options that can be assessed and compared within the same rational framework or paradigm. One
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of the options will be the best solution, others will be less ideal or even wrong—this ranking can be
established unambiguously by applying a common unit of measurement or rationality. The selection a
solution executes also eliminates the discarded options, just like in a decision: the wrong or second-best
options will no longer play a role as soon as the best option is established. A more energy efficient
engine, for example, will (ceteris paribus) supplant a less energy efficient one, if energy inefficiency
is the problem for which a solution was sought. The ability of solutions to create path dependency,
however, is severely restricted, since the path is implicitly pre-selected by the common frame of
rationality. The path is calculable on the basis of the common rationality. Solutions only constitute
different stages or steps of following the same path.
Choices, finally, are marked by the peculiar trait that they do not eliminate the options between
which they select. Hence, while the options are incommensurable like in decisions, the ones a choice
discards remain in the pool for further selections. A choice can be repeated at will: this time, I select
X, next time Y, and another time Z. This feature makes choice the genuine agentic operator of the
marketplace: Today I select a Mars chocolate bar, tomorrow a muesli bar, and the next day an organic
and fair-trade chocolate bar. The options are incommensurable in that they cannot be ordered according
to a one-dimensional rational framework: one day, my preference for the taste of Mars will prevail
over my ambition to lead a healthy life and my desire to contribute to the creation of a ‘better world’.
Another day, the ranking may be reversed on the basis of different moods, cravings or manipulations
by adverts [62,63].
While choice is the genuine operator of the market place, solution can be attributed to science
and technology. Decision, finally, is the operator of politics proper, by virtue of politics being the
name of the undecidability of the social: if society were a decidable structure, there would be no need
for politics in the first place [64]. The typology, it should be mentioned, presents ideal types in a
sociological sense rather than clear-cut phenomena of social life. In reality, the boundaries are often
somewhat blurry in that large investments in a market may take the form of decisions as they actually
eliminate other options for an investor, or in that ‘solutions’ are sometimes highly political when
their actual undecidability is (deliberately) disguised under the veil of scientific rationality. But this is
precisely the messy terrain we enter when talking about the steering of a purposive transition of society
toward sustainability. Such a transition will inevitably require changes in all three variants-solutions
to technological problems, choices for individuals and collective decisions to introduce and maintain
the required directionality of change. We argue, however, that the transition to sustainability so far has
largely been conceptualised as a co-evolutionary process of solutions and choices with little need for
conflictual political decision-making. We challenge this naïve conception of transformation and argue
that decision is perhaps the most important agentic operator for a societally steered transition process,
as it sets the bounds within which solutions and choices need to take place.
5.1. Socio-Technical Evolution as a Matter of Solutions and Choices Only?
As shown above, the evolutionary economics approach to socio-technical change might be
ill-equipped to design and prepare an exit strategy out of the fossil energy regime. The reason for
this is that evolution does not pursue any normative goals—it simply evolves on the basis of existing
conditions. However, once normative objectives for societal development are defined, the mechanisms
driving evolution will need to be actively designed according to the normative requirements of change.
The mechanisms driving evolutionary change are those of variation, selection and retention.
In evolutionary economics, variation is conceptualised as diversity generated through innovation.
Selection reduces diversity through acts of choice by boundedly rational individuals and groups [65].
Although selection is considered to be driven by “competition, regulation and institutions” [19], the
act of selection itself is understood as the cumulative result of choices that restructure the field of
options. Retention, finally, is conceived as the selective replication of technologies and practices
(mainly) through imitation. Here, too, retention is the result of an eventual sedimentation of patterns
of choice, which may be stimulated by policies, but has little to do with collective decision-making.
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Overall, socio-technical evolution is depicted as a co-evolutionary process of demand and supply,
which is organised through the complex interaction of solutions (technological change) and choices
(consumer preferences) [66]. When conceptualising sustainability transitions, evolutionary economics
rely on the micro-meso-macro framework that has also been adopted by the MLP. The micro-level is
constituted by individuals and their interactions. Individuals are conceived as carriers of rules, which,
in turn, are called ‘meso-units’ [18]. Rules are acquired problem-solving mechanisms. They always
originate from micro-processes on the level of individuals. The macro-level is where rule dynamics are
governed and where rules congeal to collective routines and formal regulations. The interplay between
dynamics on the micro-level (rule-generation) and macro-level (rule-coordination) creates processes of
change that play out at the decisive meso-level, where new configurations of rules may stabilise.
The upshot of all this is that change is the result of myriad individuals solving problems and
making choices. The recursive interrelation of all these solutions and choices generate patterns and
configurations of stabilised rules, routines and institutions, which, in turn, act selectively on the
option space of new choices and solutions. Directionality is thus an effect of aggregate choice. This
co-evolutionary coupling of solutions and choices may be influenced by policies aiming at individuals
and organisations, like tradeable permits and environmental taxes [19] or ”ethical consumption and
healthy habits” [67], but change remains the cumulative effect of individual action. This perspective
seems largely to neglect the idea that democratically constituted societies have the ability, in principle,
through institutionally coordinated processes of contestation, deliberation and collective will-formation
to make collectively binding decisions that restructure the very terrain on which problems are defined,
solutions sought and choices made. Put differently, by fetishizing the ‘emergent’ character of
evolutionary change, which simultaneously mystifies change as an opaque process that cannot be
willed and steered but only subtly influenced and stimulated, evolutionary thinking reifies an ontology
of the market and delegitimises the power of political decision-making. Polities can in principle
(and routinely do!)—through parliamentarian, governmental or direct democratic channels—make
decisions that delete entire segments of the option space within which choice takes place or open
up new segments; they can make decisions that render certain definitions of problems obsolete and,
therefore, discard entire categories of solutions. For example, a polity could decide that the internal
combustion engine should no longer be part of its socio-technical option-space (i.e., market) and thus
ban it. As a consequence, the entire terrain on which solutions (innovations) are sought and choices
made would shift to electric and other alternatives by virtue of a collectively willed decision. Of
course, the decision would become possible only based on pre-existing technological solutions—but
the point is to decide for a solution (or category of solutions), and thus to shift the ground of innovation
toward a societally agreed terrain. A polity could further decide that products and ingredients that
contribute to deforestation and other detrimental forms of land use change will be eliminated from the
option space—for example, palm oil and all forms of fibre and produce that do not adhere to defined
standards. Consequently, firms would be forced to search for solutions to replace these ingredients or
make sure they are produced according to the politically decided standards—and consumers would
be left with a redefined field of choice. The point is that in a purposive societal transition directionality is
necessarily a political category and selection predominantly a political function. Solution and choice play
important parts in socio-technical evolution, but it is a mistake to assign them the responsibility for
introducing the directionality of change and its long-term retention. As a coupled regime of variation
and selection, solution and choice adhere to the criteria of individual utility and commercial viability,
which have guided socio-technical evolution in the past but are the wrong criteria to steer a societal
transition toward sustainability. A transformative model of innovation will thus have to focus on the
design of political structures and institutions that empower society to make decisions for change.
5.2. Towards a Transformative Model of Innovation
There is of course a reason why decisions in the form we introduced them here are unpopular
with evolutionary models of innovation thinking. Collective decisions, some evolutionary thinkers fear,
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may insert a crude and economically inefficient type of directionality that may run into socio-technical
dead-ends. Directionality generated through political decisions rather than through the coevolution
of solutions and choices might cut off ”alternative development trajectories that may turn out to be
promising at a later stage, but which are presently unforeseen” [19]. ‘Picking winners’ through political
decisions has a bad reputation in the innovation literature, as it entails risks of ideological bias, vested
interests and corruption to prevail instead of the most rational or efficient solution [68]. The underlying
assumption is, of course, that the market-driven co-evolution of demand and supply would produce
more worthy and evolutionary ‘fit’ winners. Searching a way out of the dilemma, Stirling proposes
that a transformative model of innovation should not be about ‘picking winners’, but ”about engaging
widely across society, in order to build the most fruitful conditions for deciding what ‘winning‘ even
means” [69]. While we share the qualms about picking specific winners in specific situations, we see an
urgent need to define more concretely what a transformative model of innovation has to achieve and
what institutional and political preconditions it requires. For example, what does it mean ‘to decide
what winning means‘? Who is to decide and how? And what does it mean to ‘engage widely across
society’ in this context? What specific mechanism of participation and decision-making are required
to arrive at transformative innovation that is both effective in introducing strong directionality and
supported by the public?
Strong directionality. Given the ‘super-wicked’ [70] problem of climate change, which requires a
swift and radical correction of the established developmental trajectory, a transformative model of
innovation needs to be able not only to “create and shape markets” [44], but to insert directionality
that—at least initially—goes against the grain of capital interests and commercial viability. Commercial
viability may be an ex post effect of a transformative innovation, once the conditions for doing business
have been redefined according to societally willed standards; but it need no longer be a precondition
for successful innovation. This means that the established pattern of what it means to ‘innovate’
might need to be broken and replaced by forms of change that prioritise societal objectives over
private utility and profit accumulation. We call this the power to introduce ‘strong directionality’ as it
requires the political capacity to bend the curve beyond the scope of ‘green growth’ [71] and ‘ecological
modernisation’ [72]. This implies that innovation goes beyond questions of technology and must be
applied to the more fundamental structures of society including the role and distribution of wage
labour and other forms of work [73] and even the ways we define, use and distribute property [74].
Transformative innovation, we argue, must not respect the political-economic taboos that shield the
institutional core of contemporary capitalist societies. Without entering that core, innovation will fail
to be transformative.
Creative destruction and regime destabilisation. The second critical requirement for a transformative
model of innovation is that it needs to be both creative and destructive [16,17]. The doors to a
sustainable type of civilisation must be opened, but at the same time, doors leading back to the
highly profitable and convenient business model of unsustainability must be closed for good. This
means that a transformative model of innovation must come to terms with and have an answer
to questions of economic and political power and must be institutionally empowered as a politics
of transformation. Questions of legitimacy, democracy and inclusiveness arise when unsustainable
practices, technologies and structures of society are being negotiated and challenged. Scientific scrutiny,
public deliberation and democratic will-formation will have to be joined together in novel institutional
settings orchestrating processes of transformative innovation [75,76]. Institutions deliberately designed
for that purpose need to be equipped with the democratic power to decide, which raises complicated
questions of political legitimacy and accountability that growth-seeking industrial societies could
manage to evade for a long time. Transformation will create losers, at least in the short term (as well
as winners). Unlike in socio-technical revolutions of the past that followed the ‘natural’ evolutionary
trajectories of capitalist expansion, a purposive transformation will have to be politically negotiated to
a large extent—and its losers politically accounted for. This is why the political nature of transformative
innovation needs to be acknowledged and institutionally reflected. This constitutes a novel and
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unprecedented institutional challenge to modern states and societies. It should be clear that democratic
institutions empowered to make transformative decisions by definition cannot guarantee particular
outcomes—citizens may indeed decide for convenience and against sustainability in some cases.
The point is not to create a naïve conception of unfailing democratic transformation, but to open up
windows and mechanisms through which a purposive transformation of industrial societies becomes
part of our understanding of what democracy means.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to make concrete proposals for an institutional framework
of transformative innovation. However, there are two specific functions that institutions for
transformative innovation should fulfil in order to introduce strong directionality and incumbent
regime destabilisation: Firstly, institutions on the national or supranational level that define the
conditions of what ‘winning’ means, in the sense expressed above by Stirling [69]. These institutions
would combine scientific assessment with public deliberation and democratic decision-making to
set the parameters within which societally desirable innovation should take place and is allowed
into the field of choice. Such institutions could decide, for example, that technologies, products
and socio-technical practices that are likely to further expand the use of fossil fuels, the degradation
of natural forests or the further acidification of oceans (even if through rebound or leakage effects)
would be severely disadvantaged or even banned by public policy. These decisions would define
the bounds of a societally willed trajectory of development without resorting to a politics of picking
individual winners.
Secondly, we do believe that in some sectors of transformative innovation, societies need to
pick winners after all. This applies, for example, to the field of social and grassroots innovations,
where experimentation on the niche level has been going on for many years without much upscaling
and mainstream of successful innovations [77,78]. Numerous initiatives around the globe—from
low-carbon municipalities and eco-villages to co-operative and solidary models of economy—have
proven practicable and sustainable alternatives to the status quo. Most of these alternatives, however,
are systematically restrained from breaching the boundaries of their niches and from being normalised
and mainstreamed in the heart of modern societies due to institutional and regulatory restrictions or
lack of legal and political support. A transformative model of innovation thus needs to entail what
Hausknost et al. [79] have called transmission belt institutions. These are institutions that are designed
to negotiate and decide on the national and sub-national level, by which practicable and sustainable
alternatives to the ways ”we are doing things” (social practices, economic institutions, work, property,
housing, finance) developed in niches around the world should be tested on the regime level and then
institutionally implemented and mainstreamed. Far from promoting a planned economy, this model
of transformative innovation will require much experimentation, but also the courage to upscale
promising social innovations. Here, expert knowledge and democratic procedures of deliberation
and collective decision-making will need to be combined in novel and politically powerful ways that
enable discourses of social innovation to enter the centre of society and that lead to the implementation
of collective decisions that change the very contours of society. Transmission belt institutions have the
power to overrule market dynamics and incumbent capital interests by redefining bounds to enable
the upscaling of innovations by means of democratic deliberation and decision-making. Since the
question of demand and supply in social innovations in particular is a political one and cannot be
answered by market dynamics, an institutional transmission belt between niches and the regime is
required. Otherwise, social innovations remain in their depoliticised state of niche experimentation
forever or gradually wither away [80].
As discussed in Sections 2–4, we detect severe limitations of the three dominant paradigms
in innovation studies. While we appreciate the underlying theoretical foundations of evolutionary
thinking and their analytical capacities regarding past developments, we criticise their market-based
selection environments, which ultimately hinder transformative innovation. We think that the two
functions of the institutional framework described above could be valuable in strengthening the
political dimension of selection in the three paradigms discussed. In the case of the multi-level
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perspective, the main transformative task is to manage the all-important interaction between niches and
regimes in a purposive and goal-oriented way, while regimes play the role of selection environments
for innovations. Exactly for this purpose, institutions on a national or supranational level are needed
for constructing selection mechanisms that are ultimately guided by societal goals. Transmission belt
institutions would then be needed to implement the societally defined selection criteria by normalising
and universalising the diffusion of transformative innovation at regime level. As far as technological
innovation systems (TIS) are concerned, the state is already instrumental in strategically creating the
conditions for new markets but, still, markets act as primary selector. Here such institutions could
instead introduce the primacy of societal goals in TIS and transmission belt institutions could guide
the diffusion of new preferred technologies and the emergence of new markets, e.g., when energy
efficiency gains or even sufficiency strategies become societally favourable to mere utility gains and
accumulation interests. Finally, when discussing a sustainable next Kondratiev wave and a low-carbon
industrial revolution, we strongly believe that only carefully designed institutions that replace market
driven selection by societal selection mechanisms, would create a chance to leave behind the trajectory
of utility-guided and resource-blind socio-technical evolution and to enter a trajectory of purposive
transformation according to societally negotiated goals and standards.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we examined three dominant approaches in innovation theory on a conceptual
level with regard to their capacities to contribute to a comprehensive sustainability transition. We
analysed the multi-level perspective, the innovation systems approach and the neo-Schumpeterian
theory of long waves. All three are ontologically based in evolutionary economic theory. While
evolutionary theorising can be very helpful to understand processes of socio-technical co-evolution,
the approaches we analysed all share a crucial shortcoming in that they accept the apolitical conception
of selection mechanisms at the core of evolutionary economic theory, which defines the market as the
most important selection environment for technological (and other) innovations. As the market cannot
anticipate future external selection pressures, however, it is an improper selection environment for the
implementation of purposive changes aiming at the avoidance of future problems.
What is required, then, we argued, is the internal representation of the external pressures in
selection systems other than the market. In other words, we need powerful institutional mechanisms
of selection that substitute the mechanisms of the market to some extent and insert strong directionality
to processes of innovation. The design and implementation of the institutions necessary for a
transformative model of innovation might itself become the most important field of innovation
in years to come. The main purpose of these institutions would be to secure the main characteristics
of a purposive, normatively directed transformation of society that cannot be controlled by the
selection mechanisms of demand and supply. Key among these characteristics is the power to insert
and sustain a strong directionality of change and to destabilise the incumbent regime of structural
unsustainability. These are political characteristics, which need to be enacted through specifically
designed political institutions.
Applying the analytical framework of ‘agentic operators’ our analysis concluded that current
innovation policy is dominated by the operators choice and solution and thus tied to market selection
and incremental technological change. What is lacking are decisions that shift the entire terrain on which
solutions are being sought and that make purposive selections between alternative socio-technological
trajectories. Decisions are rare because they are irreducibly political and face inherent legitimation
problems. Nevertheless, they will be needed in the future to provide the level of steering that is
necessary to break out of our carbon economy. We propose to acknowledge the inherently political
nature of transformation and to design novel institutions that integrate expert knowledge with
processes of public deliberation and democratic decision-making. These institutions need to be
endowed with the power to make binding decisions. We identified two possible functions of an
institutional framework for transformative innovation: to set the bounds within which transformative
14
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innovation has to take place and to work as transmission belts for the upscaling of practicable (social)
innovations that would otherwise remain stuck in niche experimentation.
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Abstract: In situations of uncertainty, scenarios serve as input for scientifically informed decision
making. However, past experience shows that not all scenarios are treated equally and we hypothesise
that only those based on a world view shared by scientists and decision makers are perceived as
credible and receive full attention of the respective group of decision makers. While intuitively
plausible, this hypothesis has not been analysed by quantitative correlation analyses, so instead
of drawing on quantitative data the paper analyses the archetypical scenarios developed in the
ALARM project to substantiate the plausibility by a comparative analysis of world views, value
systems and policy orientations. Shock scenarios are identified as a means to explore the possibility
space of future developments beyond the linear developments models and most scenario storylines
suggest. The analysis shows that the typical scenarios are based on mutually exclusive assumptions.
In conclusion, a comparison of storylines and empirical data can reveal misperceptions and the need
to rethink world views as a necessary step to open up to new challenges. Deeply held beliefs will
make this transition unlikely to happen without severe crises, if not dedicated efforts to explicate the
role of world views for scenarios and policies are undertaken.
Keywords: scenarios; world views; values; policies; models and modes of science
1. Introduction
Recent forecasts predict that the world economy is set to grow by 238% by the year 2060 and
the rich OECD countries by 146%, as compared to 2014 [1]. Air transport will nearly double
by 2036 [2]. By 2030, biotechnology could contribute to 50% of primary production, 80% of
pharmaceutical production and 35% of industrial production in sectors where biotechnology has
potential applications [3]. Peter Johnson, SAP Marketing Strategy and Thought Leadership predicts
that in the future digital economy by 2020, the average person will have more conversations with bots
than with their spouse, by 2030 organs will be biologically 3D-printed on demand and the ‘Internet
of Everything’ could be worth $19 trillion over the next decade thanks to cost savings and profits
for businesses and increased revenues for the public sector. 5G data speeds will be 1000-times faster
than today, offering ubiquitous connections across the ‘Internet of Things,’ engagement across virtual
environments with only millisecond latency and whole new Big Data applications and services [3].
At the same time, we know that if the Earth warms by three degrees Celsius (which is the
trajectory under the current climate pledges), extreme events could become the normal state in the
future, with the drought regions in Europe doubling from 13% to 26% of the total area and the most
severe droughts in Europe lasting three to four times longer than in the past, affecting up to 400 million
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people. In the Mediterranean, with droughts lasting almost half of the year (in Spain up to 7 months),
water availability will be reduced by 35,000 m3 H2O/km2 of land [4], making large areas virtually
uninhabitable. Most European cities will see increases not only in heat and drought but also in river
flood risks. Over 100 cities are particularly vulnerable to two or more climate impacts while the
predicted magnitude of impacts exceeds earlier expectations [5]. In the last two decades, one-tenth of
the earth’s total wilderness areas have been lost, an estimated 3.3 million km2 [6] and today, 28.5% of
the species analysed by IUCN have been classified as in risk of extinction.
In the social domain, in the affluent countries GDP per capita has increased roughly 1000% since
the 1970s but average worker pay has increased just 11%, essentially stagnating while CEO pay has
risen 1000%. Little wonder then that only 13% of employees worldwide are engaged, meaning that the
other 87% are not involved in, enthusiastic about and committed to their work and company. This is
set to intensify: 75% of Millennials would take a pay cut to work for a socially and environmentally
responsible company while in a study of 100 variables, seeing purpose and value in work was the single
most important factor that motivated employees, more than compensation. It even makes business
sense: organizations in which employees perceive meaning at work are 21% more profitable [3].
All these prognoses are based on scenarios and they are virtually irreconcilable: rather obviously,
the rosy economic prognoses, the environmental catastrophe emerging and the social challenges
cannot occur simultaneously when taking the economic impacts of the social and environmental
developments into account. Deserted countries do not grow economically, starving populations do not
consume (and least so consumer electronics) and a bioeconomy without biodiversity is unthinkable.
Nonetheless all these scenarios are the basis for decisions being currently taken, spending scarce
human, material and financial resources on mutually exclusive visions of the future.
However, there is one big difference between these forecasts: those promising an extended and
up-graded status quo where products and consumption patterns change but limits do not exist, receive
billions of dollars, euros, yen and yuan in investments, while those calling for damage limitation
receive miniscule funding even by governments not known for their problem denial and scientific
illiteracy. Most firms fail to take the negative trends into account (except they spot a market niche
there). For instance, Renault invests billions of euro to employ virtual reality and immersive simulation
technologies to allow its design team, partners and suppliers to experience, interact with and test-drive
new car designs without any physical prototypes, while car sharing could reduce the number of cars
needed by 90% already in 2035, resulting in only 17% as many cars as there are today (Millennials are
keen to share) [3].
Given that global change scenarios represent the best available knowledge of the best informed
and educated generation in the history of humankind, how can these discrepancies be explained?
Why is the world closely following the most pessimistic of the scenarios presented by the “Limits to
Growth” report almost 50 years ago [7,8]? Why always “Late Lessons From Early Warnings” [9,10]?
Environmental ignorance of economics, sociology and development theory has been accused but
reality is more complex: if a scenario exercise offers a doomsday variant based on incremental change
and a transformation based rescue variant, both based on the same disciplines, why is the rescue
scenario lauded while the dominating practice of decision making resembles the doomsday scenario?
Why is progress measured in metrics which tell us nothing about the emerging catastrophes [11,12]?
Why do “modificationists” in science, politics and business not learn from or at least listen to
“transformationists” and take the environmental and social facts on board? Economic interests and
short-term thinking may explain part of the phenomenon, human inertia and loss aversion another
bit (the preference for the “known evil” when facing transaction cost, that is, change is long known,
see [13]). The European Environment Agency found that even well-crafted scenarios can fail to
have their intended policy impact if they present information considered irrelevant by the recipients,
lack support from relevant actors, are poorly embedded into relevant organisations or ignore key
institutional context conditions [14]. So, the core question is not what kind of scenarios are needed
to underpin a high-quality discourse between scientists and policy makers, considering the different
20
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nature of science and politics but how to avoid that some policy explorative (but not prescriptive)
gain superiority while others of the same quality are neglected. Our hypothesis is that the joint world
views held by groups of scholars and decision makers are key variable explaining which scenarios
are considered relevant. As in the political sphere gradual change is the norm, they are the context
conditions which—often unconsciously—make scenarios of deep transformations appear strange,
unreal and utopic. While scientifically sound, such scenarios would appear in the political sphere as
expressions of illusions or idealism (as was Thomas Morus’ “Utopia” in 1517 [15]—but it influenced
policies) and not as realistic policy demands. This in turn would deprive them of support from relevant
actors however good their scientific backing, the factual relevance of information and the embedment
into relevant organisations may be.
In Section 2 we briefly describe the concepts we use in this paper (scenarios, world views, welfare
regimes) and introduce the ALARM scenarios we will use to illustrate the link between scenarios and
world views in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results and draws some conclusions.
2. Method and Building Blocks
As so far analyses regarding the impact of underlying world views on the perception and appeal of
scenarios are missing, we focus on making the world views underlying scenarios, as well as their social
and economic implications explicit, using three archetypical scenarios from the ALARM project [16,17].
As adopting a world view is driven by deeply held beliefs and convictions, for scholars as well as for
decision makers, it appears plausible that the implicit basis of scenarios influences their perception,
with a similarity of world views enhancing the level of resonance. We will illustrate the plausibility
of this hypothesis by explicating the world views and their implications for different scenarios in
Section 3 to underpin out hypothesis. As there are no quantitative data regarding the correlation of
world views and the acceptance of scenarios, our approach is limited to scenario analysis and common
sense based reasoning, illustrating the plausibility of the hypothesis. First, however, we try to clarify
what “world views” are in the context of our paper, drawing on philosophical discussions, before
turning to scenarios in general and to the ALARM scenarios in particular.
2.1. World Views
World views are comprehensive systems of perceiving reality; which challenges are recognised,
issues are emphasised, policies suggested and changes endorsed in order to approach sustainable
development depends on the world views held by the respective agents in all walks of life. They have
also been described as ‘pre-analytic visons,’ for example, by Herman Daly et al. [18] and are similar to
metaphysics. A worldview can be expressed as the fundamental cognitive, affective and evaluative
presuppositions a group of people make about the nature of things and which they use to order their
lives. According to Michael Lind, a worldview is a more or less coherent understanding of the nature
of reality, which permits its holders to interpret new information in light of their preconceptions [19].
The elements constituting a world view are its ontology including an anthropology,
its epistemology and its axiology including a societal vision [20,21]. Ontology is a section of philosophy
dealing with questions concerning what entities exist or may be said to exist and how such entities
may be grouped, related within a hierarchy and subdivided according to similarities and differences.
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy dealing with the theory of knowledge; it studies the nature
of knowledge, justification and the rationality of belief. Axiology is another branch of philosophy,
encompassing a range of approaches to understanding how, why and to what degree humans should
or do value objects, whether the objects are physical (a person, a thing) or abstract (an idea, an action),
or anything else. The Dutch World Views Research Group [22] gives a slightly different definition,
including as here an ontology (and an explanation of where the world is heading), an epistemology
and values (the axiology) but adding a praxeology or theory of action and an aetiology, reflecting on
the origins and construction of the respective world view. We leave out the latter (although there are
good arguments for including it) as despite the emergence of a ‘reflexive modernity’ [23] reflecting
21
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on world views is a rare case in both scenario development and decision making—the modernity is
reflexive but not reflective [24].
Clashes among worldviews cannot be ended by a simple appeal to facts as they permit their
holders to interpret new information in light of their preconceptions: even if rival sides agree on
the facts, they may disagree on conclusions because of their different premises [19]. For instance,
different value systems shape the perception of what is important in reality: from an objective value
perspective, there are no instrumental values, only means to things which may be valuable; the means
may be valuable in themselves but not by their mean function. From an instrumental perspective,
all values can be described in instrumental terms, bequest and existence value included (instrumental
for enhancing one’s own life satisfaction—a ‘feel good’ or ‘warm glow’ effect). According to utilitarian
anthropologies, humans try to maximise their well-being in a ‘pursuit of happiness’ by accumulating as
many things as possible. A stoic anthropology holds that a fulfilled and thus good life is not necessarily
easy or pleasant but based on virtues and thus material goods can (but need not be) distractions from
what makes a life worth living. Utilitarians strive for the greatest good for the greatest number [25],
hedonists like the homo economicus for a maximum of individual satisfaction [26]. For both, satisfaction
can be reached by egoistic or altruistic actions, a distinction which makes no sense for stoics applying
deontological criteria to ‘do the right thing’ [27]. Different world views are associated with different
value systems and different political philosophies which are appealing to one audience but can be
appalling to another [28]. Accordingly, not only different decision makers but also different scholars
(and the scenarios they develop) hold and express different world views, consciously or unconsciously
which preform their perception, stance and recommendations.
However, although world views cannot be proven right or wrong, they can be assessed and
compared regarding their plausibility, based on their ‘fit’ with observations. For instance, while a world
view denying anthropogenic climate change is immune against the consensus of the scientific
community, it may lose supporters due to the contradiction between their own experience, scientific
findings and the explanations offered. Similarly, an explicit praxeology as part of a world view, offering
a theory of effective action, can be compared with past experience. For example, claims that central
planning economies are effective, or that a free market guarantees a just income distribution may
be upheld by core believers of the respective world view but will limit their appeal to others as the
explanations given for the known facts are of limited persuasive force. Such world views do not
simply collapse or disappear (as would be the case if falsification was possible, like in the case of the
pre-Copernican ontology) but tend to be gradually replaced by others which offer more convincing
explanations for undisputed facts.
2.2. What Are “Scenarios”?
First of all, it appears useful to clarify what are scenarios and how they are distinct from
predictions. The latter deal with certainty, requiring at least probabilistic knowledge about all
possible outcomes of an event. Prognoses can be exact (A determines B with no ambiguity), or fuzzy
(A determining a distribution of B) but are deterministic predictions in both cases. Scenarios are needed
when certainty is missing, which is the case for most of the phenomena relevant to economic, social
and environmental development. All scenarios are based on (necessarily subjective) assumptions:
we assume that an accident may end our ability to work and buy an insurance against the ensuing
economic impacts; that is the case of risks. Or we know the impacts of an event (nuclear war causing
global winter, greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change) but we cannot say now if the event
will be happening (the nuclear war) or if an ongoing process will continue or be terminated (the case of
climate change). This is the situation of uncertainty, requiring not insurance but prevention. Then there
is ignorance, a situation where we neither know the probability of the event, nor its potential impacts.
For instance, we do not know yet if nano-particles from plastic waste will enter the human food chain
and accumulate in our bodies and if so, which would be the resulting health impacts—this is the
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case for precaution. Under both uncertainty and ignorance probabilities of final impacts cannot be
quantified, by definition.
Forecasting scenarios are used to both better understand the probability of an event happening,
under certain assumptions and to explore the potential impacts, under even more assumptions;
backcasting scenarios start from normatively setting a desired or feared result and analyse how it
could be achieved or avoided. Thus, scenarios do not predict events and thus cannot be policy
prescriptive, they do not claim to outline the future that will be but describe different futures which
might become reality. As such they are heuristic explorative tools giving indications how, again under
certain assumptions for example, regarding the policies adopted, a system may develop. They can be
used to explore what can be done and what should be avoided to redirect the development trajectory,
always based on the assumptions made (which is why they should be explicit). Decision makers then
have the opportunity to compare different plausible development trajectories, asking “what would
happen if A or B was happening and if we did C or D?”
Building a scenario requires simplification to characterise the processes under analysis and
support understanding them. Borrowing a phrase from Albert Einstein, scenarios should be as simple
as possible but not simpler. This poses the challenge to find a level of complexity simple enough to be
comprehensible but complex enough to adequately accommodate the different options to be compared
and generate answers which are relevant in a real-world context. For this behalf, a scenario is based on
a narrative, a storyline which can accommodate values, subjective motivations and other qualitative
elements, which is often supported by computer models to illustrate certain aspects of the scenario
quantitatively. However, models are constrained to dealing with the quantifiable parameters and the
mostly linear developments their equations can handle. Thus, the quantitative results always have to
be interpreted—and sometimes corrected—by embedding them into the narrative context [29–31].
Unfortunately, both academic literature and press releases and media coverage often lack a clear
distinction between predictions, projections, probabilistic forecasts and scenarios. Predictions are often
referred to as scenarios, while certain scenarios, such as economic growth forecasts, are habitually
presented as (probabilistic) predictions. For instance, misinterpreting its scenarios as predictions was
one of the main reasons for the economists’ profession rejection of the “Limits to Growth” report
almost half a century ago. Ironically, some of its worst-case scenarios have turned out to be rather
accurate predictions, against the best hopes of their authors [7,8] and in 2014, The Guardian published
an article showing that data collected since the report’s publication supports the accuracy of the 1972
projections [32]. In the end, of course, as the world consists of different systems with different degrees
of predictability, predictions and scenarios will ultimately need to come together to guide decisions.
2.3. The ALARM Scenarios
Developing effective strategies for biodiversity preservation requires analysing all major pressures
affecting biodiversity and their interaction. Scenarios developed for this behalf must be broadly based,
addressing production, consumption and administration patterns and attitudes alike. This requires
scenarios which deal with the effects of quantitative and qualitative physical and social factors in an
integrative way. In the ALARM project [16], a number of explorative scenarios was developed; all were
based on storylines and included model simulations with a range of different models to assess the
impacts of multiple pressures on biodiversity.
The ALARM storylines represent a set of possible development directions, all starting from the
status quo but representing different policy orientations based on different world views, leading to
diverging policies and results. In doing so, they illustrate that human societies have options to minimise
biodiversity loss but that this requires political decisions now and in the future. They also show that
the recommendations derived from different scenarios grounded in different world views can be
mutually exclusive and thus choices should include opting for a world view—which will probably
not be a consensus decision. The three ALARM storylines cover social, economic, environmental,
agricultural, foreign and other policies (see Table 1 and the Supplementary Materials):
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• “Business As Might Be Usual” (BAMBU) is a policy-driven scenario, that is, a scenario
extrapolating the expected trends in EU decision making and assessing their intended
sustainability and biodiversity impacts materialise. Policy decisions already made in the EU are
implemented and enforced. However, BAMBU is no business as usual scenario, based on trend
extrapolation, since recent or upcoming changes in EU policies would have been ignored that
way. At the national level as well as in the EU, deregulation and privatisation continue except in
“strategic areas.” Internationally, there is free trade. Environmental policy is mainly perceived as
another technological challenge.
• “GRowth Applied Strategy” (GRAS) is a coherent liberal, growth-focussed policy scenario.
It includes deregulation, free trade, growth and globalisation as policy objectives actively pursued
by governments. Environmental policies will focus on damage repair and limited prevention
based on cost-benefit calculations, with no emphasis on biodiversity beyond the preservation of
ecosystem services ESS.
• “Sustainable European Development Goal” (SEDG) is a backcasting (inverse projection) scenario
and as such it is necessarily normative, designed to meet specific goals and deriving the necessary
policy measures to achieve them, for example, a stabilisation of GHG emissions. It aims
at enhancing the sustainability of societal development by integrated social, environmental
and economic policy. Policy priorities under SEDG are a competitive economy and a healthy
environment, gender equity and international co-operation. SEDG represents a precautionary
approach, taking measures under uncertainty to avoid not yet fully known future damages.
Table 1. Selected policies in the ALARM core scenarios. Starting from the same status quo conditions,
the diverging policy assumptions drive the results into diverging directions. Source: [16].
Scenario GRAS BAMBU SEDG
Climate envelope fits to the IPCC SRES-A1FI storylineand its assumptions
SRES A2 (the best fitting
available SRES scenario at
the time of calculation)
SRES-B1 scenario (lowest SRES
scenario available, 450 ppm not




production and for 2nd pillar
(rural development & environment)
Shift 1st to 2nd pillar results
in polarisation:
intensification of high
yielding locations, neglect of
low yielding ones
Spatially explicit support
structure to maintain (organic)
agriculture throughout
the landscape
(only 2nd pillar transfers)
EU Funds Phasing out, considered as subsidies
Focussed on infrastructure
development and growth in
poor regions
Focussed on local green
development and opportunities,
education and employment
Energy Policy Efficiency, some renewables basedon cost calculations
Efficiency, aiming at 20%
reduction of GHG emissions
by 2020 and 80% by 2080.
Increase nuclear
and renewables
Aiming at 3⁄4 reduction of




Increased efficiency due to market
pressure, no policy to shift the mode
of transport or reduce
transport volumes
Technological improvements
and changing the share of
different modes of mobility
(walking, biking, trains, cars,
boats, planes: modal split)
Transport reduction priority,













Trade Policy Strong support for WTO andfree trade
Promoting free trade except
in “strategic areas”
Global sourcing reduced due to
cost reasons;
phytosanitarian controls
Although all ALARM core scenarios represent attempts to reach sustainable development,
they diverge regarding how sustainability is operationalised (see Table 2). Whereas GRAS seeks
to realise what is known as weak sustainability based on substitutability between capital stocks,
BAMBU considers a minimum critical natural capital indispensable and SEDG foregoes the
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notion of capital stocks altogether. This has immediate implications for the understanding of
sustainable development.
Table 2. Diverging concepts of sustainability in the three ALARM scenarios (own compilation).
All scenarios are dedicated to reaching sustainability but with divergent definitions and tools, based on
different world views, they follow significantly different, partly mutually exclusive trajectories.
GRAS
Three to four capital stocks, non-declining sum, mutually substitutable
(weak sustainability), the economy considered as having primacy. Processes including
overshoot are reversible. Assumption that once the economy works properly, all other
parts of the puzzle will fall in place, that is, social and environmental problems will be
solved automatically (the Kuznets- and Environmental Kuznets Curve hypotheses).
Focus on adaptation (managing impact), optimal solutions by maximisation.
BAMBU
Three to four capital stocks, non-declining sum plus conservation of critical natural capital,
mostly comparable and commensurable, attempts to go “beyond GDP,” weak to
reasonable protection standards. Precautionary principle, safe minimum standards,
some ambitious protection standards set but not vigorously enforced, focus on innovation
for the market to deliver the desired goods or fully equivalent substitutes. Focus on
mitigation (reducing pressures) and restoration (stabilizing the state), optimal
solutions by optimisation.
SEDG
Co-evolution of four sub-systems, with each having its own reproduction criteria and
mechanisms, plus demands to the impacts of each other. Earth is a closed system with
limited resources, permanent growth is not possible. Precautionary principle, addressing
drivers of environmental and social crises, focus on prevention (redirecting drivers) and
mitigation (overcoming pressures) limiting human impact, long term resilient/healthy
ecosystems providing ecosystem services. Assessment is only possible by MCA/MCDS,
(socially) optimal solutions by legitimation.
Developing these three options can be considered archetypical for sustainability-related scenario
exercises: comparing a “muddling through” or business as usual scenario and one each representing
a primacy of economic or environmental—and sometimes social—criteria, is a frequently used
approach. It results in relatively similar, at least comparable scenario sets based on interpretations of
two or three ‘standard’ world views, as Table 3 illustrates. “Tools such as scenario archetypes, that is,
grouping scenarios together as classes based on similarities in underlying assumptions, storylines and
characteristics, can then be used to integrate visions, thus highlighting conflicts and convergences
across scales [33].” Thus, we consider the conclusions we will draw from analysing the ALARM
scenarios as not case specific but most probably more generally applicable.
Table 3. Comparison of ALARM scenarios with other structurally similar global scenarios (adapted
from an unpublished report for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment). It illustrates that the typology
chosen in ALARM (status quo policies, ambitious sustainability, radicalised neoliberal policies) is
indeed archetypical for a wide range of scenario exercises.
ALARM SRES GEO-3 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Roads from Rio+20
2100 2100 2032 2100 2050
GRAS A1FI Markets First Global Orchestration Global Technology
BAMBU A2 Security First Order from Strength
SEDG
B1 Policy First TechnoGarden Decentralized Solutions
B2 Sustainability First Adapting Mosaic Consumption Change
Settele et al., 2005 IPCC et al., 2000 UNEP 2002 Millennium EcosystemAssessment 2003 Kok et al., 2018
2.4. The Shocks
In illustrating the ALARM storylines, we combined, for each of them, climate scenarios from the
set used by the IPCC, selected to offer the best fit with the expected climate development under the
respective scenario [34]; a narrative-specific run of MOLLUSC [35], a spatially explicit land use scenario
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generator; and a specific set of parameters for runs of GINFORS, a highly endogenised econometric
input-output model [36]. In an iterative process, the outputs and inputs to and between the models
were harmonised, based on the narratives.
However, assuming a gradual development, that is, no surprises, is probably the most implausible
vision of the future. Thus, in ALARM a methodological innovation was introduced by developing
scenarios reflecting potential shocks, assuming disturbances with widespread consequences considered
extreme at the time of writing. A shock is any event that comes unexpectedly and has the capability to
change the development trajectory of a system. In each of the three dimensions used for sustainability
concepts, the environmental, the economic and the social one, one shock was defined. The shock
scenarios serve to illustrate that there can be a significant divergence of real-world developments from
what linear modelling suggests; consequently, the shock scenarios could only partially be simulated in
computer model runs.
The three shocks are indicated in Figure 1 together with the core scenarios from which they diverge:
• Cooling Under Thermohaline collapse (GRAS-CUT) is the environmental shock. It describes
a collapse of the Atlantic Ocean water circulation (the most familiar part of it being the Gulf
Stream) and the resulting relative cooling of Europe; indications observed by now.
• Shock in Energy price Level (BAMBU-SEL) describes the economic shock of a permanent
quadrupling of the energy price, as expected when Peak Oil, the global maximum of oil production,
occurs or political or other influences limit the supply significantly and permanently. We had
a flavour of that in 1972, 1978 and 2008.
• ContAgious Natural Epidemic (BAMBU-CANE) is the social shock, a pandemic out of control.
Again, we had a flavour of that, with the Chinese bird flu in 2006 and the Mexican swine flu in 2009
which permitted to observe the political and psychological mechanisms at work, regardless of their
relatively limited global health impacts. In 2018, the WHO and Bill Gates, as chairman of the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation, warn of such a pandemic being unavoidable if not imminent [37].
Figure 1. The ALARM core and shock scenarios. As SEDG is designed to avoid shocks, the analysis
focusses on shocks under GRAS (as this is the high greenhouse gas emission scenario) and under
BAMBU (shocks which are independent of scenario parameters).
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As a climate shock is most probable under the scenario generating the highest greenhouse gas
emissions, it is assumed to happen under GRAS. The economic shock is attributed to BAMBU as
SEDG is assuming a reduction of resource consumption which would make such a shock less plausible.
The social shock of a pandemic is essentially possible under all scenarios but probably less so under
SEDG which assumes a reduction of global exchange for cost reasons (see Figure 1).
3. Results—Comparing the Scenarios and Their Background Assumptions
The model runs, complemented by biodiversity model analyses [38] and the results from
a questionnaire survey addressing ALARM biodiversity experts showed that:
• GRAS consistently provides the least desirable outcome for biodiversity in Europe—across
different biomes and for most ecosystems and species.
• “Muddling through” along the BAMBU path, although probably slowing down biodiversity losses,
will systematically fail to meet the EU target to end the loss of biodiversity, by 2020 and beyond.
• From a biodiversity point of view, SEDG represents a significant step in the right direction,
although not sufficient in every respect (in some biomes some species and ecosystems would still
be lost).
• GRAS-CUT would reduce the average European temperatures to the level of the early 20th century.
Minor declines in harvest could be compensated by imports or incremental diet changes.
• BAMBU-SEL represents an immediate burden on the economy which however recovers after
shrinking significantly. More permanent damage is caused for the environment (by maximising
biofuels at the expense of biodiversity) and the levels of disposable income (due to money transfers
to oil exporting countries).
• BAMBU-CANE would lead to a collapse of the economy if more than 20% of the population left
their occupations to seek shelter in their countryside houses; it does not kick-start again when
they return.
3.1. The World Views in the Scenarios: Ontologies, Anthropologies, Axiologies
The reason for the divergences between the three core scenarios can be found in their different
ideological orientations (see Table 4). Ideology is here understood in the sense of Söderbaum as
praxeology [39], an understanding how means cause results and thus a core element of the respective
world views. These orientations are rarely made explicit, in ALARM as in other scenario exercises
but they are the result of and representative for the more or less conscious world views held by
their authors. The less conscious scholars are regarding their world views and the influences these
might have on their work, the more influences will affect the outcomes. This is true for the scenarios
presented here and their analysis in this paper as well—although we tried to design all scenarios as
we expected representatives of the respective world view would have done, we cannot rule out that
the scenario authors’ inclination to an ecological or ecological economics world view such as the one
underlying SEDG has influenced both.
According to the GRAS ontology, nature and society are part of an extended definition of the
economy, being described as social and environmental capital and valued as production factors.
Those parts of both domains that do not contribute to production are left aside, while those that do
deserve protection by policy measures, in particular the ecosystem services ESS. In the SEDG ontology,
the environment is not part of the economy but vice versa, the economy is a subsystem of society which
itself is embedded in the environment metasystem. One of the direct implications of the differing
ontologies is that in the first case, corresponding to the neoliberal approach, the laws of economics
apply to society and the environment, while the laws of nature do not necessarily apply to the economy.
This assumption allows ignoring the entropy law, the second law of thermodynamics, in neoclassical
schools of economics such as those utilised for GRAS.
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Table 4. Ideological orientation and institutional arrangements in the scenarios [40–42], modified.
Content GRAS BAMBU SEDG
Ideological
orientation
business as usual, sustained
growth (macro) and profits
(micro), quantitative,
monetary criteria (no qualities)
ecological modernisation,
qualitative growth, changes of
aspects but not system basics,
flexible adaptations
precaution, multi-dimensional
objectives, limited win-win options,
priority for justice, health and













IMF, World Bank, WTO
Focus on regional integration.




Subsidiarity principle. For example,
strengthening the UN, evaluating
where the EU needs more and
where it could have less
competences and similarly so on the
members state level
On the other hand, if the economy is a subsystem of society which itself is a subsystem
of the environment, not only the laws of thermodynamics apply to the economy just like the
laws of gravity but this is also true for the laws—or rather the rules—identified by sociology
and psychology. Then enterprises can be understood as social constructs, with a lot of processes,
far beyond management, shaping their functioning and outcomes, while functions and performance
are constrained by the laws of nature [21].
Regarding the anthropology, GRAS follows the neoclassical approach of assuming rational
decisions of the homo economicus (a necessary assumption in equilibrium models), complemented by
a belief in the problem-solving capabilities of technology: the market and human ingenuity, will bring
about the right solutions at the right time to permit frictionless development and growth. The humans
populating SEDG are different, with reflection, doubt, some selfishness but also concern for others and
keen to maintain the public goods and capable of sharing instead of owning.
In terms of values (axiology), in SEDG the contributions to citizens’ quality of life an enterprise
provides is an essential criterion for the ‘social license to operate’ any business requires [43,44].
However, SEDG inhabitants are open to diverse definitions of what people may consider to be
contributing to their respective quality of life. Value pluralism in implementation also characterises
the ideas of justice in SEDG, understood as enabling all inhabitants to lead a dignified life, including
fair participation in the respective society. This presupposes a needs-based distribution to achieve
more social equity (iustitia universalis and iustitia distributiva in the Aristotelian Nicomachean
Ethics). Amongst GRAS inhabitants, instrumental values dominate; they identify the value of an
object according to its contributions to one’s own wealth and well-being. Equity of outcomes is
no moral objective—justice is done when people are rewarded based upon what they contribute
(meritocratic concept, iustitia communitativa). The three shock scenarios, when motivating demands
for more ambitious precaution, philosophically draw on the ‘imperative of responsibility’ suggested
by Hans Jonas: “Never must the existence or essence of man as a whole be made a stake in the hazards
of action” [45] (p. 12). He argued: “In order to ascertain the indubitable truth, we should, according to
Descartes, equate everything doubtful with the demonstrably wrong. Here on the contrary we are
told to treat, for the purposes of decision, the doubtful but possible as if it were certain, when it is of
a certain kind,” that is, when violating the ‘imperative of responsibility’ [45] (p. 37), [46].
3.2. The World Views in the Scenarios: Economic Orientations
As a result of the different value orientations, the economic orientations listed in Table 5 also differ.
GRAS is a market and competition society imaginary representing a typical liberal capitalism approach
while SEDG—including markets and competition but embedding them into a social frame—pictures
a postmodern, sustainability oriented society. Nonetheless it incorporates many elements of the
more traditional model of “Rhenish Capitalism,” which is in line with the welfare state to etatistic
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socio-economic type underlying the scenario. BAMBU is not discussed here as it follows no coherent
orientation but, representing EU policies, is a compromise between different approaches (with the
balance changing from time to time).
Table 5. The economic orientations result from the values pursued and the ontologies (including
praxeologies) prevailing in the respective world views as described in Section 3.1.
Orientation GRAS SEDG
Source of profit Share value, speculation Dividend, payment to owners
Ownership Temporary, share-based Permanent, individual
Level of profit Fixed management objective, predetermined Residual, after material, labourand finance costs
Perception of
corporate success
Achievement of management and providers of finance
(shareholders), at the expense of jobs and salaries
Achievement of partners, sharing
of results
Salaries Residual after material and finance costs, plus profit





Management increasing with profit or more, salaries
stagnate or decline to generate profit Increasing in line
Industrial relation Exploitation Partnership
Sustainability ethics Utilitarism Fairness, procedural justice
Stakeholders in GRAS rely on the market to deliver environmentally optimal solutions once
externalities have been internalised. They trust in solutions to environmental problems and scarcity
through better and more efficient technologies necessarily emerging in a competitive and growing
market economy. Opposed to that, SEDG citizens call for sufficiency to complement efficiency
(and make it effective by skimming off rebound gains), for respecting nature’s limits and for fair
distribution of access to societal participation including to nature’s contributions to people. In SEDG the
assumption prevails that economic instruments can offer incentives complementing and dynamising
regulations but that the market as such is not a reliable means to achieve environmental sustainability.
Consequently, substituting regulation for green taxation (the Pigouvian approach) and
privatisation, definition of unambiguous property rights and deregulation (the Coasean approach) are
both part of GRAS. Such instruments play a secondary role in SEDG and are only used on a case by
case basis—here no silver bullet exists and each ‘bullet’ is considered as potentially causing damages to
vulnerable groups, target or not [47]. Mobilising private capital is important in both scenarios but the
means of doing so differ: while in GRAS public seed money and Public—Private—Partnerships PPP
dominate, in SEDG private investment is mobilised by the necessity to comply with legal standards,
for example, regarding emissions, waste treatment and product recyclability. As a result, investment
in GRAS follows profit maximising criteria, while the obligation driven investment in SEDG can be
oriented towards investment into public goods.
3.3. The World Views in the Scenarios: Social Models and Welfare Regimes
As social policies are part of the narratives and where appropriate the modelling, the attitudes
towards social justice used in the scenarios have been based on those present in the EU. According to
Opielka at the time of developing the scenarios three attitudes were dominant [41]:
• The liberal model: if interview partners supported state responsibility for securing individual
income levels in at least two of the three cases “illness,” “old age” and “unemployment” but not
beyond. These preferences were implemented in GRAS.
• The welfare state model: if in addition interviewees saw state responsibility for “reduction of income
disparities,” or “provision of jobs,” or both. This corresponds to the BAMBU scenario assumptions.
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• The etatistic model: if in addition they supported the control of salaries by law (implying
a redistributive tax system), or a legally guaranteed general, tax financed basic income. Not all
but some elements were included in SEDG.
Table 6 illustrates that the three models indeed represent the attitudes of the vast majority of
the European population (which are significantly different from the USA, calling for caution before
applying conclusions drawn from US empirical data to Europe).
Table 6. Attitudes towards social justice in Europe. Data source: [41].
No. State Responsibility Liberal Welfare State Etatistic Unclassified
Average EU 15 member states 0.5 8.9 29.8 56.5 4.4
Sweden 0.7 20.2 40.9 34.5 3.7
UK 0.2 15.1 32.5 46.7 5.6
France 1.9 8.5 23.9 56.0 9.7
W.-Germany 0.8 13.7 46.8 34.0 4.7
Average CEE EU member states 0.5 4.7 21.8 69.1 3.9
E.-Germany 0.0 2.8 13.9 80.7 2.6
Czech Republic 2.2 12.1 24.2 54.8 6.8
Poland 0.4 3.1 17.2 76.7 2.6
Hungary 0.1 5.1 30.8 61.0 2.9
Bulgaria 0.0 6.7 12.1 76.7 4.6
Despite significant differences between old and new EU member states and within each group,
there is still a broad consensus that either the welfare state or the etatistic approach are what citizens
want, across the political spectrum. The differences between West and East Germany were rather
pronounced in the polls but there were also important commonalities. For instance, the statement
“The state must take care that everybody has a good livelihood/a decent life (“ein gutes Auskommen”)
in cases of illness, need, unemployment and old age” was supported by more than 77 resp. 86% of
citizens in West resp. East Germany, across all party preferences, with the liberal party FDP scoring
lowest [41]. Today, with more than decade of economic development, neoliberal policy and migration,
the data might be different, although the basic patterns probably still prevail. Gerhards and Hölscher,
in their analysis of the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) results identified the same pattern,
calling the three models European Commission, social-democratic and socialist [48].
The world views and their values shape the ways societies self-organise themselves, in particular
their societal and political institutions, understood in the political sciences sense of being the rules
by which political decision-making and implementation is structured (Table 7). Systems of rules
shaping behaviour include formal and informal value-based orientations, mechanisms to realise them
and including the mechanisms for rule enforcement [49,50]. Political organisations encompass both:
they are social entities, appearing as actors in political processes, as well as systems of rules, structuring
political behaviour and facilitating societal orientations.
While GRAS and SEDG are characterised by specific institutional settings shaped by the respective
world views, BAMBU again exhibits a mix of views due to its character as reflecting the real-world
political compromises. When the at least partially mutually exclusive suggestions derived from
different world views have to be reconciled in international governance processes, this inevitably leads
to either incoherent or vague policy formulations. This was already the case for the Brundtland Report
and the Agenda 21 adopted in Rio 1992 and is still true for the 2030 Agenda adopted 2016 [51,52].
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Equity based upon what
people contribute
(Iustitia Communitativa)
Market Instrumentalassociation, exchange Performance Robert Nozick
BAMBU Equity of opportunity(no clear relation)
State (often
serving business) Citizenship Equity John Rawls
SEDG
Equity based on distribution,
needs based
(Iustitia Distributiva)
Community Community Solidarity,Communicative action
Need satisfaction,
equality Amitai Etzoni













The attitudes to social justice have also shaped the welfare regimes which emerged in
different parts of Europe. Esping-Andersen identified three different political economies of
the welfare state (liberal, social-democratic and conservative), with complex patterns of social
policy including labour market, community system, family policy and the mode of state
regulation itself [53]. We used his systematique to specify the social dimension in the scenario
narratives (see Table 8). GRAS was designed to correlate to the liberal regime and SEDG with
some—mainly environmental—modifications to the (traditional) social-democratic (the naming chosen
by Esping-Andersen pre-dates the New Labour version of social democracy). No scenario is directly
related to the conservative regime as traditional conservatism has largely given way to liberal policies.
BAMBU as a political compromise is again characterised by a mix of elements from different regimes.
Table 8. Welfare regimes and social justice in Europe and their representation in the ALARM
scenarios [41] (p. 330), based on [53], modified. As BAMBU is a mix of several components,
the conservative welfare regime is added to make the comparison of sources easier.
Variable Indicators Liberal = GRAS Social = SEDG BAMBU Conservative
Decommodification:
protection against market




Weak Strong Medium Medium
Share of
individual financing High Low Medium Medium




and old age as share of
total





Weak Medium Medium Strong
Share of expenditures for
life-long employed
government staff
Minimised Increasing Medium Medium
Redistribution
Progression in (income)
tax structure Weak Strong Medium Weak
Equality of
transfers received Weak Strong Medium Weak to medium
Full employment guaranty
Expenditures for active




Medium Low Medium Medium
Role of market in social
security provision
Shares of transfers
and recipients Central Marginal Medium Strong
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Table 8. Cont.
Variable Indicators Liberal = GRAS Social = SEDG BAMBU Conservative
Role of state in social
security provision
Shares of transfers




in social security provision
Shares of transfers
and recipients Subsidiary Subsidiary
Marginal
to subsidiary Central
Role of human rights
Beyond legal status,
respect in social life
and employment
Medium High Medium to high Medium
Dominant form of welfare






























Archetypical countries Switzerland USA Sweden EU Italy, Germany
As one result of all these divergences, some of the most politically relevant factors also diverge,
such as the target groups of policy recommendations and the justifications of the recommendations
themselves, in particular the assumed resilience resp. vulnerability of the system and the calculation of
future costs and benefits (Table 9). The difference in economic valuation mechanisms can be expected
to contribute to and legitimate diverging policy priorities. The different ideas about dynamics, that is,
whether or not social and environmental developments are reversible, lead to different levels of
precaution and thus different policy recommendations. These are expected to appeal to different
stakeholder groups—agents with a neoclassical economic background are expected to be more open
for recommendations based on a similar world view and the same applies for proponents of other
world views which are—other than the GRAS world view—today not hegemonic.
Table 9. Additional policy shaping implications of the world views in GRAS and SEDG,
compiled from [54–58].
GRAS SEDG
Future value Exponential discounting, positivediscount rates




deviations, series of equilibria,
largely predictable,
high inherent resilience
Nature and society are processes of continuous
irreversible change, path dependent but
unpredictable, with medium to high vulnerability
Resonance group of
policy recommendations
Economic and fiscal policy
makers, business Policy makers, civil society
3.4. The World Views in the Scenarios: Epistemologies and Science Implications
Just like ontologies and axiologies, the epistemologies are different between the archetypical
scenarios, with BAMBU an uneasy mixture of elements. Both SEDG and GRAS come with a specific
philosophy of science related to the overall philosophical basis of the respective world view and this
defines their epistemologies.
While critical realism based assessments searching for answers are dominant in SEDG, in GRAS
positivism prevails, allowing scientists to claim knowing a superior truth and communicate that to
decision makers (‘truth speaks to power’). In SEDG, uncertainty and ignorance are acknowledged,
as well as the plurality of legitimate knowledge sources including their potential contradictions,
legitimacy plays an important role. Hence the focus on participatory processes, discourses and
knowledge co-production (see Table 10).
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Table 10. Science and science-society relationships in the scenarios. Mode 1 and mode 2 are terms
from the sociology of science, coined by Gibbons et al., referring to the way (scientific) knowledge
is produced [59]. Mode 1 is characterised by a co-operation between science and society without
any change in working methods of either while mode 2 is defined as a partly descriptive and
partly normative way to operationalise sustainability science. Funtowicz and Strand suggested
a systematique of science-society relationship distinguishing five models [40]: 1. The initial ‘modern’
model (perfection/perfectibility), 2. The precautionary model (uncertain and inconclusive information),
3. The model of framing (arbitrariness of choice and possible misuse), 4. The model of science/policy
demarcation (possibility of abuse of science), 5. The model of extended participation (working
deliberatively within imperfections). Post-normal science is a discursive model developed by Funtowicz
and Ravetz [60].
GRAS BAMBU SEDG






The initial ‘modern’ model:
perfection/perfectibility
The precautionary model, the model
of framing & the model of
science/policy demarcation
The model of extended participation:
working deliberatively
within imperfections
Role of scientists Outside, truth speaksto power
different attitudes, scepticism about
truth and power
Citizen scientist, post-normal science,
sustainability science, discourse based.
Participatory, multi-criteria and
multi-perspective assessments
In science the mode of working, the choice of methods, the composition of teams and the selection
of research questions is not an individual free choice of each scholar based on her world views
(determining which questions are regarded interesting and relevant), the theories and models of
science held by her (of course not independent from the world views but not fully determined by
them) and her education, skills and experience (determining the methods and concepts available to
each scholar) as the claim of ‘independent science’ would like to have it. Value free science is even
less on the books as already the world views held by each scholar infuse values into the decision
making. Instead choices are co-determined by external factors such as the calls and funding conditions,
the preferences of journal editors and the reviewers they choose and other institutional settings
determining careers in science. Thus, the world views of decision makers in different functions and on
different levels—and not only those of the scholars themselves—are crucial for the course the scientific
endeavour takes, the information it generates and the advice it offers to inform and support decision
making processes.
Besides the implications for our research hypothesis formulated in Section 1, in Section 4 we will
point to some additional policy relevant conclusions that can be drawn from the conceptual analysis
and its comparison to the empirical data upon which the scenario designs have been based.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
Scenarios are scientific tools to inform political and economic decision making. Consequently,
having undertaken a deeper look into their fundamentals than usual, we can draw some conclusions
regarding both, the role of science and decision making.
4.1. The Role of Science
That the world views of decision makers in different functions influences the course the scientific
endeavour takes has positive and negative effects: on the positive side, according to our hypothesis,
an alignment of world views (and thus of relevance criteria) will make it easier for scientific information
and advice to be recognised, acknowledged and actively used in decision making. The potentially
negative effects result from the character of the political process as interest-driven, which could make it
difficult if not impossible for researchers to produce knowledge which may be used in policy processes
by opposition parties and counter-hegemonial forces in civil society. The founding of autonomous
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universities in Spain and other countries in the 1960s and the establishment of ecological research
institutes in Germany in the 1970s and the Science Shops (‘Wetenschapswinkel’) in The Netherlands
and elsewhere in the 1980s have been the result of such situations in earlier phases.
Currently however, while civil society complains about the lack of research on sustainability
transition processes and other politically relevant issues while criticising the dominant influence of
business interests on research spending, it appears to be the outside world, pressure groups and donors
beyond the ivory tower, which pressurises the scientific establishment to open up to new thinking and
methods developed by heterodox scientists over the last decades [61,62].
4.2. World View Based Science—Policy Resonance: Support for the Research Hypothesis
The GRAS scenario and those similar to it in other scenario exercises is based on a world view
related to neoclassical economics, a view shared by many decision makers. While its perception of
sustainability as a constant sum of capital stocks (‘weak sustainability’) has provoked criticism from
environmental scientists for the insufficient reflection of complexity and path dependency and the
assumption of reversibility of changes, it is considered as a suitable basis for sustainability policies by
many decision makers holding a related world view. The result is the wide-spread endorsement of
“green growth policies” and their implementation in national policies and international agreements.
Not only that, it is also changing environmental science as its terminology (and this its epistemology)
are taken up by scholars seeking political attention and scientific bodies in charge of providing
information for policy preparation processes such as the European Environment Agency, the IPCC or
IPBES which phrase their advice using terms like natural capital and the internalisation of external
cost. While the results offered by SEDG-like scenarios are consistently more promising regarding their
sustainability effects and endorsed by governance agreements such as the 2030 Agenda, the means to
achieve such effects are rejected as unrealistic, resulting in a cognitive dissonance: what is considered
realistic is known to be of limited effectiveness (like the EU Biodiversity Strategy assessed by the
European Commission itself to be on the brink of failing again) and what is effective is considered to
be unrealistic. This is like being between a rock and a hard place—at least one of the two has to give
in. In the case assessed here, either the imagination of “realistic instruments” has to be broadened to
accommodate more radical measures, or the ambitious targets have to be given up in EU sustainability
and climate policy (as it is the trend of the last decade in Germany). Thus, our hypothesis seems to be
supported by the findings and offers policy relevant insights.
What is evidence in ‘evidence based decision making’? The mechanistic thinking in equilibria inherent
in GRAS has been criticised for its low level of complexity which allows for making predictions.
This makes it virtually impossible to generate recommendations suitable as the basis for decisions
in managing such complex systems as the economy, society or the environment [30]. However,
the GRAS world view and the neoclassical economic thinking it supports are widely spread amongst
decision makers and the resonance scientific policy proposals based on it find amongst them supports
our hypothesis. Such proposals are effective despite the qualified scientific criticism regarding the
proposals made, for instance in the cases of geo-engineering or GMO food. World views can be a kind
of dangerous Procrustean bed; as Julie “Nelson said “Economists seeking to disguise their value
judgements under a veneer of Cartesian objectivism [ . . . ] are dangerous” [63]. The reason is not
least that deriving policy advice from linear extrapolation of past events in mechanistic systems can
be described metaphorically as being like driving a car not looking for the road ahead but trying to
determine the course to set by extrapolating from what can be seen in the rear mirror. Unfortunately
(for this approach), in evolving systems past evidence is no reliable guide to conclusions regarding
future events. Instead of promising evidence, the best available scientific information should be the
basis of decision making and as uncertainty and ignorance necessarily remain, science has no “truth”
to tell to “power.” So, what scholars and decision makers alike can realistically strive for is scientifically
informed decision making, not evidence.
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Explaining communication failures: While in the ALARM scenarios, every inhabitant in one of them
shares her scenario’s world view and interacts with other agents on this basis, in the real world of
course different groups endorse different world views, or, more precisely, different individuals do,
strongly influenced in their decision process by their social environment (family, household, peers,
colleagues, friends, role models, . . . ). Reading the scenarios against this background also illustrates
why real-world agents, despite articulating similar goals, cannot agree and sometimes even enter
fierce conflicts about the definition of the shared goals (rarely discussed openly) and the way and
means to get there—the latter dominating the public debate. The scenarios, read as mental maps
of different agents, illustrate that what one agent may consider essential, another may perceive as
effective betrayal of the common goal and as utterly obstructive. The UK discussion about the meaning
of Brexit provides ample examples of such controversies.
4.3. Policies and World Views—The Probably Most Prominent Example
Limits to growth, the 1972 report of the Club of Rome [7], was perceived differently in the USA,
where politicians and the economics profession immediately and fiercely rejected it, while in much of
Western Europe it struck a chord with the public opinion and a part of the decision makers. The most
prominent endorsement of a new world view, stimulated by the report, was probably the one of the
then President of the Commission of the European Communities, Sicco Mansholt, who said in a round
table statement on 14 October 1973 [64]:
“To me, the most important question seems to be: how can we achieve zero growth in
this society? It is beyond doubt for me, that this zero growth must be achieved in our
industrial societies, in America, Western Europe and Japan. ... Should we not succeed
in doing so, then the distance, the tensions between arm and rich nations will become
bigger and bigger. ... It would be an illusion and even a lie to pretend there could be no
growth for the Third World economies unless we were performing growth as well. I am
worried however whether we will manage to get those powers under control, which strive
for a permanent growth. Our whole societal system insists on growth—not only single
companies, big business, multinational giants.” (own translation)
However, in the meantime decision makers holding the SEDG-like world view of Mansholt have
become a rare exemption, while the GRAS world view has become hegemonic. To Mansholt, a GRAS
scenario, its objectives and policies would have been anathema due to its focus on GDP growth,
with a secondary role for environmental concerns and even less dedication to overcome the tensions
between the rich and the poor nationally and internationally. Opposed to that, all presidents of the
European Commission after Jaques Delors held a GRAS world view, unshakable by environmental
failures (biodiversity, climate) and social hardships (Greece, Portugal, . . . ). To all of them, an etatistic
development trajectory, let alone economic degrowth, were a priori unacceptable, even unthinkable.
Instead “We need growth” describes the prevailing policy orientation [65], in line with a GRAS world
view which expects the solution of social and environmental problems from sufficient economic growth.
However, policies based on this world view are confronted with a number of policy failures and public
scepticism which are increasingly hard to ignore. For instance:
Social aspiration discrepancy: As far as BAMBU is a realistic reflection of the current EU policies,
this comparison demonstrates the divergence of EU policies and EU citizen preferences as they
are obvious from table A1. Already this is an important result for European policy making
and it underscores the preference of European citizens for a rather BAMBU-to-SEDG kind of
policy priorities—which of course has impacts beyond the social domain, for both economic and
environmental policies. Current policies tend to follow populist impulses towards a BAMBU-to-GRAS
policy with some additional elements like migration controls, an issue dominating political discourses
and media but not public concerns. The world views of decision makers and lay people appear to
diverge, making communicative processes in decision preparation and mobilising public support
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for policies based on the GRAS world view ever more challenging; the conflicts around free trade
agreements and the unwillingness of the Commission to make substantive concessions are just one
point in case.
Biodiversity conservation failure: For EU policies, the ALARM scenario results imply that although
certain species and eco-systems may be stabilised under the EU policies as modelled in the BAMBU
scenario, current policies will not be able to deliver on the 2020 target, not even with delay. The shock
scenarios indicate both the resilience of the socio-environmental system and its vulnerability beyond
certain tipping points; currently the EU institutions are not well prepared for such shocks.
Cognitive dissonance: While a reconceptualization of progress is already under way as “targets for
human development are increasingly connected with targets for nature, such as in the United Nations’
Sustainable Development Goals” [33] (p. 1416), many decision makers suffer from the cognitive
dissonance mentioned, an unpleasant and unstable state of mind caused by the political dilemma that
while time-tested instruments fail (again), few alternatives exist in the world view held so dear for so
long. Bill Rees describes the situation saying that “the ecologically necessary is politically infeasible
but what is politically feasible is ecologically irrelevant” (pers. comm). Thus, as mentioned, the current
pursuit of Green Growth by the EU but also by the OECD and UNEP can be understood as an attempt
to reconcile the incommensurable [66–68]—a political approach which can succeed in conference
resolutions and conventions but is bound to fail already in the medium term when the real-world
implementation does not allow for the vagueness of paper work anymore [69]. Some of the erratic and
inconsistent policy making can be plausibly explained by this constellation.
In a similar fashion, when the Great Recession hit the world’s economies in 2008, neoclassical
economists—after an initial shock period as the crisis hit them unprepared—modified their stance,
endorsing selected elements of the long-condemned Keynesianism but embedding it into their own
world view. While reactivating the policy instrument of deficit spending, countercyclical policies
were not on the table, let alone the improvement of purchasing power by increasing salaries, both
core elements of Keynesian policies. Instead the Keynesian theory was declared to be a valid receipt
in times of crisis, justifying the use of heterodox instruments while declaring the own, just failed
approach as being the right one for ‘normal times.’ That following their prescriptions in such normal
times had led to the disaster was fiercely denied, saving the world view from critical reflection.
4.4. Conclusions
World views do not manifest themselves as sets of axioms or deep analyses but as the stories
which are the means by which we navigate the world. They allow us to interpret its complex and
contradictory signals. We all hold a world view and we all possess a narrative instinct: an innate
disposition to listen for an account of who we are and where we stand. When we encounter a complex
issue and try to understand it, what we look for instantaneously is not consistent and reliable facts but
a consistent and comprehensible story. When we ask ourselves whether something “makes sense,”
the “sense” we seek is not primarily rationality, as scientists and philosophers perceive it but narrative
fidelity. Does what we are hearing reflect the way we expect humans and the world to behave? Does it
fit together? Does it progress as stories should progress? A string of facts, however well attested,
will not correct or dislodge a powerful story and the world view it represents. The response it is
likely to provoke is indignation: people often angrily deny facts that clash with the narrative “truth”
established in their minds (they reject the epistemology to protect their ontology). The only thing that
can displace a story is a story—a world view which is not able to present a comprehensive story is on
the losing side of societal battles for influence.
Thus, as their core worldview shapes how they frame their arguments, people chose one scenario
not for its outcomes but for the world view it represents and the story told about it. While not being
a proof, we have presented a number of analyses of the archetypical scenarios which make it more
than plausible that switching the decision basis from one to another world view requires a change
against deeply held beliefs and established and time-tested routines, habits and practices—an almost
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impossible step as long as the world view held does not clash with reality (as is the situation today) and
a difficult one even then. This is probably a suitable explanation for the failure of so many sustainability
scenarios ever since the “Limits to Growth” to motivate the policy changes the recommended. If even
the Great Recession was not a shock significant enough to enforce rethinking (austerity policies were
reactivated soon after the first symptoms of crisis began to recede), it is hard to imagine what could
cause the shift to a different world view, except a change of leadership to people holding different
world views from the outset. Populists have proven that this is possible but so far ‘sustainablists’
have not achieved similar results—not least as they fail telling a story which has the flavour of being
both desirable and realistic (i.e., not ignoring the downsides of a sustainability transition). Scenarios
as a combination of narratives and modelling can be a means of developing such stories but have
not been exploited to that end sufficiently to make a difference so far. However, while scenarios will
most probably not have the power to initiate a real change of course by the incumbents (as they will
interpret any new facts in the context of the world views they hold) they may stimulate reflections by
the agnostic and empower those critical of the state of policies and searching for better solutions.
As far as a GREEN GRAS scenario is a contradiction in terms (as it is according to the author’s
world view), unearthing the hidden world views behind different policies and exposing them to
the scrutiny of public discourses in the glare facts and figures may be the only chance to enable the
public at large to rethink its acceptance of policies not in line with their own world view and support
alternative positions differing from the GRAS thinking in more than individual strategies and policy
instruments. However, this requires that scientists as well make their world views and the assumptions
derived from them explicit, to permit the public to identify those sources of information they consider
trustworthy. Telling good stories about scientific findings, beyond the scientific publications, is an art
most scientists do not command but which should be part of the curriculum in all disciplines, as step
to truly public science for the common good.
Supplementary Materials: A detailed, yet unpublished description of the ALARM scenarios is available online
at www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/7/2556/s1.
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Abstract: In light of climate change and security concerns, decarbonisation has become a priority for
industrialised countries. In the European Union (EU), decarbonisation scenarios used to support
decision-making predict a steady decrease in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, mostly driven by
changes in production mixes and improvements in efficiency. In the EU’s decarbonisation pathways,
the power sector plays a large role, reaching zero emissions by 2050. From a biophysical perspective,
decarbonisation becomes not just a matter of replacing carbon-intensive with carbon-neutral electricity
flows, but also a matter of building and maintaining new infrastructure (funds) which, in turn,
is associated with GHG emissions. By not accounting for the emissions associated with funds,
particularly those required to increase grid flexibility, scenarios used to inform decarbonisation
narratives in the EU are missing a key part of the picture. We show that a rapid and deep
decarbonisation of the EU’s power sector through a production-side transition between the years
2020 and 2050 leads to cumulative emissions of the order of 21–25 Gt of CO2 equivalent, within a
range of approximately 35–45%. The results are obtained by modelling two decarbonisation pathways
where grid flexibility increases either through storage or through curtailment. The analysis suggests
that scenarios informing decarbonisation policies in the EU are optimistic and may lead to a narrow
focus on sustainable production transformations. This minimises the perceived urgency of reducing
overall energy consumption to stay within safe carbon budgets.
Keywords: modelling; science-policy interface; grid flexibility; bio-economics; energy transition;
storage; curtailment
1. Introduction
The type of primary energy sources (PES) used by societies to generate a given mix of energy
carriers (ECs) is central in shaping their organisation, pace and activities [1,2]. Industrial societies have
developed through a heavy reliance on fossil fuels, characterised by their high density. In addition,
fossil fuels can be stored and transported across borders, bypassing local natural resource limitations.
The exploitation of fossil fuels, while shaping industrial societies’ activities and allowing for a high
living standard and rapid rates of urbanisation [3], has also led to unbearable environmental effects,
locally and globally. As a consequence, moving away from fossil-based energy systems has become a
priority for industrialised economies. In addition to environmental concerns, in the EU, a renewable
transformation of the energy system is also desirable from a security of supply perspective, given the
lack of indigenous fossil fuels on local territory [4–6].
Thus, it has become progressively pressing in the EU to shift to alternative (local) energy sources
resulting in lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions throughout their lifetime [6]. However, the shift
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itself has not been easy to initiate, model or govern. The Energiewende is an example of this, having
led overall to higher electricity prices and higher emissions, despite strong efforts to shift production
patterns of energy carriers [7].
Depending on the chosen problem framing, barriers to a renewable energy transition may be
conceived as being of a political, economic, social, institutional or biophysical nature. We borrow
the term biophysical from the field of bio-economics, where the economic process is viewed not only
through the lens of monetary flows, but most importantly through the lens of flows of biological
and physical resources that are produced, distributed, consumed and exchanged [8]. In this sense,
the amount of water, emissions and labour associated with a certain energy system, for example,
may be categorised as biophysical variables, in opposition to economic ones such as energy prices.
Within the field of bio-economics, the term energy metabolism is used to describe the way in which
societies extract, process and distribute flows of energy in order to carry out tasks that are crucial to
the survival of their identity [9].
Taking a biophysical perspective of the energy system, in this paper we focus on the decarbonisation
of the EU’s power sector. Our aim is to provide an alternative narrative to those underpinning EU
decarbonisation pathways, where barriers to energy transformations are mostly relegated to the domain
of finance and investments [6]. To do this, we model alternative decarbonisation pathways that include
the GHG emissions associated with the lifetime of funds. We borrow the distinction between funds and
flows from Georgescu-Roegen [8]. Within Georgescu-Roegen’s flow-fund model, given a chosen spatial
and temporal scale of analysis, funds are those elements whose identity remains intact, while flows are
elements either entering the system without exiting it or exiting it without entering it. From a metabolic
perspective, funds are the elements metabolising flows—land, for example, is a fund to be maintained,
while the food it grows is a flow. Considering an energy system over a yearly timescale, the electricity and
fuels produced and consumed are flows. The infrastructure and human time invested in the production
and consumption of flows are the funds of the system.
This distinction is important to study the implications of infrastructural changes in the energy
system. The magnitude of infrastructural changes required on the production and consumption side
for a decarbonisation of the energy system are not unknown to policymakers [10]. However, there is a
tendency within scenarios at the EU’s science-policy interface to use biophysical variables to describes
changes in flows (e.g., the amount of electricity consumed over a year) and to adopt a monetary
perspective to account for changes in infrastructure (e.g., the investments required to build new
transmission and distribution lines). When considering changes associated with funds, a biophysical
perspective (e.g., the amount of labour, emissions, water and waste associated with infrastructural
changes) is often neglected. This is the case, for example, in the EU 2016 Reference Scenario, where
capital investments linked to infrastructure are estimated [11].
Building on data available through existing studies, we developed a scenario singling out
the EU power sector up to 2050 and hypothesized two different pathways for its decarbonisation.
Increasing grid flexibility is central to ensuring that high levels of variable renewable energy (VRE)
can be managed by the grid [12]. In the first pathway, grid flexibility was increased through high rates
of curtailment of renewable generation and low storage; in the second, lower levels of curtailment
were paired with storage technologies. In each pathway, the emissions associated with the cultivation,
construction and fabrication (CFC) of funds were calculated at yearly intervals up to the year 2050,
in addition to the operational emissions associated with electricity generation (flows). The approach
is meta-analytical and adjusts data available in literature, rather than modelling the behaviour of
the grid.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the decarbonisation
pathways currently modelled to support EU decision-making and places them within the wider
academic discourses of energy and GHG payback time; Section 3 introduces alternative pathways,
with an overview of the underpinning assumptions (Section 3.1) and modelling equations (Section 3.2).
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The results and discussion are presented in Section 4, split into yearly and cumulative GHG emissions
(Section 4.1), variational ranges in results (Section 4.2) and discussion of results (Section 4.3).
2. Background
2.1. Decarbonisation in EU Policy
In the EU, the energy sector accounted for approximately 30% of total emissions in 2016. It was the
sector with the highest share of emissions, followed by transport and by manufacturing (accounting
for approximately 20% each) [13]. EU decarbonisation policies fall under the 2050 low-carbon economy
package [14], as part of the EU’s wider climate strategy. The low-carbon economy roadmap calls for
GHG emissions to be cut by 80% below the 1990 levels by 2050, with two intermediate milestones of
40% by 2030 and 60% by 2040. The strategy is currently being renewed in order to reflect the Paris
Agreement and is expected to be updated by early 2019 [15].
The EU Energy Roadmap 2050, published in 2011, highlights four strategic directions for
decarbonisation: energy efficiency, renewable energy sources (RES), nuclear and carbon capture and
storage (CCS). The four directions are explored through six scenarios: current policies, high efficiency,
high RES, delayed CCS, low nuclear and diversified supply technologies. Since the publication
of the Energy Roadmap 2050, significant events such as the Paris Agreement and the release of
the Clean Energy for all Europeans package have impacted EU energy discourses. In light of this,
new scenarios have been developed to inform the EU’s mid-century strategy, to be released by fall this
year (2018). The scenarios included in the Clean Energy for all Europeans package model pathways to
decarbonisation based on efficiency, integration of renewable energy sources and the functioning of the
internal energy market [16]. The main trends, which are an increased share of RES, a linear decrease of
GHG and an increased electrification, have persisted across the two generations of scenarios.
In the six decarbonisation scenarios of the Energy Roadmap 2050, RES rise significantly, to a
minimum of 55% of gross consumption of energy carriers in 2050 and 60–80% of gross electricity
production by the same year. Absolute electricity production increases steadily between 20 and
40% by 2050 across the six scenarios, despite an overall reduction in total energy consumption.
This reflects trends in mitigation scenarios, where a gradual electrification of the energy system is
seen as a key element for its decarbonisation [17]. Emissions across all sectors decrease steadily and
monotonically—that is, there is no increase in emissions associated with infrastructural change and
there are no relative peaks of GHG emissions throughout the years. Figure 1 shows an example of
projected sectoral emission reduction in the high RES pathway.
The power sector, in particular, is seen to reach zero or almost zero emissions by 2050 for all pathways,
as further indicated by the low-carbon strategy: “The power sector has the biggest potential for cutting
emissions. It can almost totally eliminate CO2 emissions by 2050” [14]. Similarly, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) highlights the decarbonisation of the power sector as one of the three
main components of mitigation scenario studies, together with a gradual electrification of the energy sector
and a reduction in energy demand through technology and other substitutions [17].
The scenarios developed to support the Energy Roadmap 2050 build on the PRIMES
(Price-Induced Market Equilibrium System) energy model, “a partial equilibrium modelling system
that simulates an energy market equilibrium in the European Union and each of its Member States” [18].
For the accounting of GHG emissions, the model simulates the operational emissions associated
with electricity production (a flow) but neglects the emissions associated with the construction of
infrastructure (a fund). This omission is linked to the fact that grid flexibility requirements are not
modelled. A small but growing body of literature in academia, as highlighted in the next sub-section,
points towards the emissions associated with renewable infrastructure and with storage, and to how
they may impact future decarbonisation pathways. Additionally, the need to increase grid flexibility at
high renewable energy penetrations has been stressed and modelled for specific case studies, including
Europe [19], Japan [20], Texas [21] and California [22].
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Figure 1. CO2 emission projections, in megatons (Mt) of CO2, under the EU high RES decarbonisation
pathway. Source: Own elaboration from the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 [10].
However, EU energy policy discourses uphold the narrative that the main barrier to a high integration
of RES into the energy system is financial rather than biophysical. The renewable energy package [6],
for example, highlights a number of barriers envisioned on the path to a fully renewable energy system,
including administrative hurdles, cost-effectiveness, loss of citizen buy-in and uncertainty for investors.
Grid stability is also mentioned as an issue, with the electricity system needing to “adapt to an increasingly
decentralized and variable production” [6]. Despite this mention, the issue is not framed as being central
and no concrete targets for adaptation have been set, nor have the (biophysical) implications of increasing
grid flexibility been included in the EU decarbonisation pathways.
2.2. Energy and GHG Payback Time
The biophysical investments (such as energy and land) associated with the construction of energy
systems have been the subject of a prolific field of energy analysis. The widely used concept of
Energy Returned on Energy Invested (EROI) accounts for the amount of net energy generated by an
energy system, when the fixed capital and variable operational energy investments required for its
construction and maintenance are discounted [23,24]. EROI is particularly relevant for the assessment
of alternative energy carriers, such as biofuels, requiring a high energetic investment throughout their
production chain [25]. A parallel concept to EROI is the Energy Payback Time (EPBT), accounting for
the amount of time it takes for an energy system to break even in terms of the production of energy
carriers (in relation to those consumed in its construction). So far, EPBT has been mostly applied to
the analysis of solar panels [26,27]. Similar to EPBT, the emissions associated with the construction
and operation of energy systems can be accounted for in what is known as the GHG, carbon or
environmental payback time (GHGPBT). The GHGPBT indicates the time it takes for a system to
become carbon neutral following an initial emission investment due to material extraction, transport
and construction [28,29]. Figure 2 shows a schematic view of the concepts of energy and GHG payback
time, central to the biophysical accounting of energy systems.
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Figure 2. Schematic representation of EPBT (a) and GHGPBT (b).
The concepts of energy and GHG payback time can be applied to storage systems. A high
penetration of intermittent energy sources into the electricity grid is likely to require a combination of
demand-side management, storage infrastructure and improvement of transmission and distribution
lines to ensure that intermittent electricity is dispatchable at all times [12]. Studies on storage
estimations for a 100% renewable electricity system present high doses of uncertainty, however,
the most thorough reviews point towards storage needs greatly beyond what is currently operational
at the global scale [20–22]. Thus, the importance of being able to assess and compare the performance
of storage systems has become evident. Building on the idea of EROI, Barnhart and Benson [30]
introduced the concept of Energy Stored on Energy Invested (ESOI), accounting for the amount
of net energy output provided by storage technologies compared to the energy invested in their
construction and operation. Battery technologies show a performance approximately 20 times lower
(in terms of ESOI) than compressed air energy storage (CAES) and pumped hydroelectric storage
(PHS). However, due to the invasive nature of CAES and PHS and due to the strong limitations to
their expansion brought by geographic configurations, batteries have become a popular option in the
discussion of storage futures [31].
In a biophysical framing, the GHG emissions of storage technologies throughout their lifetime
are a key element in the assessment of future energy scenarios. A thorough review by Denholm [31]
showed how PHS is associated with the lowest amount of emissions over its lifetime, while batteries
are associated with non-negligible lifetime emissions. In its present form, CAES relies on the use of
natural gas and therefore also presents non-negligible lifetime emissions.
Similar to the emissions of storage infrastructure, the GHG emissions associated with the lifecycle
of renewable infrastructure have been studied—see Nugent and Sovacool [32] for a thorough review
of the topic. The emissions associated with renewable electricity generation over its lifetime are
considerably lower than those associated with fossil electricity. As a consequence, not much attention
has been placed in exploring the nuances of different pathways and storage options in terms of their
associated emissions. Crucial questions regarding the best pathways to decarbonisation in relation to
emission curves, thus, remain underexplored [32].
3. Alternative Decarbonisation Pathways
When dealing with complex systems, such as the social-ecological one, modelling may have
two purposes: To predict and control future states of the system or to better understand the current
one [33]. As the high doses of uncertainty attached to the prediction of future states of the complex
social-ecological system become apparent, scenarios used to support decision-making are framed more
and more as tools for deliberation, rather than prediction. The EU webpage on energy modelling,
for example, states that the EU Reference Scenario, “one of the European Commission’s key analysis
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tools in the areas of energy, transport and climate action”, ( . . . ), “is not designed as a forecast of what
is likely to happen in the future but it provides a benchmark against which new policy proposals can
be assessed” [34]. In a similar spirit, the aim of the alternative decarbonisation pathways is not to
predict the behaviour of future decarbonisation pathways in the EU. Rather, the aim is to flag the need
to include emissions associated with the construction of infrastructure in decarbonisation discourses.
This is particularly relevant for intermittent sources of energy and their grid flexibility requirements.
We explored two decarbonisation pathways of the EU’s power sector for the years 2020–2050, each
dealing differently with grid flexibility requirements. Focus was given to the integration of renewable
energy into the grid as a means to decrease GHG emissions, in line with the high RES scenario of the
EU’s Energy Roadmap 2050, on which the two pathways were based. The values of gross electricity
consumption up to 2050, in fact, were taken from the high RES scenario, as well as the share of nuclear
electricity at each year. Hydropower was assumed to remain unchanged over the years, while solar
power and wind power were assumed to increase until producing 90% of electricity, entirely phasing
out fossil power plants. Adjusting data from existing studies, we calculated the emissions associated
with the construction and operation of funds (renewable and storage infrastructure) with respect to
the reduction in emissions due to the substitution of fossil with alternative energy systems (associated
with the electricity generated by the systems—flows).
3.1. Modelling Assumptions
Any model informing the future behaviour of energy systems necessarily relies on heavy sets of
assumptions regarding technology, consumption and production patterns. Modelling assumptions
of the alternative decarbonisation pathways are split into two sections: grid flexibility and
GHG emissions.
3.1.1. Grid Flexibility
Integrating high levels of variable renewable energy (VRE), such as the electricity produced by
wind turbines or solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, into the grid requires an increase in the flexibility of
the grid. Grid flexibility can be achieved in various ways. Kondziella and Bruckner [12] identified
seven possible measures on the production and on the consumption side: highly flexible power
plants, large-scale energy storage, curtailment of renewable surplus, demand-side management, grid
extension, virtual power plants and linkage of energy markets. These measures, either individually
or in unison, can ensure that electricity demand is met at all times. Here, focus was given to the
production-side measures of large-scale energy storage and of the curtailment of renewable surplus.
Existing studies [12,19–22,35,36] show that increasing grid flexibility becomes essential when the
share of VRE fed into the grid reaches levels of 40 to 50%. Grid flexibility can be increased through
large-scale energy storage. In this case, surplus electricity generated by VRE when production is higher
than demand can be converted into gravitational, thermal or electrochemical energy and fed back
into the system when production is lower than demand. Curtailment of renewable surplus, on the
other hand, relies on the installation of more renewable infrastructure than what is needed to cover
average yearly demand (also known as backup power plants). When the combined electrical output of
the renewable infrastructure is higher than the demand at a given point in time, the output of VRE
plants is curtailed. As a result, curtailment of renewable surplus as a means to improve grid flexibility
has an impact on the utilisation factor (UF) of renewable plants. The review paper by Kondziella and
Bruckner [12] provided a thorough overview of existing studies assessing grid flexibility requirements
for high renewable integration.
Steinke [19] examined the interplay between storage, curtailment and grid extensions for a 100%
renewable electricity system in Europe. Denholm and Hand [21] and Denholm and Margolis [22]
modelled, respectively, the electricity grids of Texas and California to provide an assessment of how
grid flexibility can be achieved in low and high storage scenarios. The models of US case studies,
produced for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), have not been replicated in the EU
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to this level of detail and are the most comprehensive reference points for assessments of grid flexibility.
Building on these studies [21,22], we hypothesised two pathways for decarbonisation: a low storage
high curtailment (LSHC) pathway and a high storage low curtailment (HSLC) one. In the former,
we assumed that no extra storage technologies were added to the EU’s electricity system, therefore the
only storage services available up to 2050 were those produced by current PHS facilities (at a storage
capacity of approximately 600 GWh [37]). To ensure grid flexibility, renewable back up power was
added and renewable generation was assumed to be curtailed. In the latter, curtailment was greatly
decreased by the addition of storage services. Both scenarios adapted the curtailment and flexibility
rates from the comprehensive model of the Texas grid [21]. The relations between curtailment and
flexibility in the EU depend on specific geographies and grid configurations. However, for the purpose
of these pathways—i.e., to point towards a problem in GHG accounting rather than to provide accurate
predictions—this approximation was considered satisficing.
The total amount of storage required by 2050 was calculated following Steinke [19] and Renner
and Giampietro [35]. Assuming that grid expansions were limited to the national scale and that no
backup generation was provided, Steinke estimated that the EU would require between 7 and 30 days
of storage to accommodate shares of 90% or more of VRE. Analysing data for Germany and Spain over
an 84 months and 132 months, with a resolution of 60 minutes and 10 minutes respectively, Renner and
Giampietro estimated that the two countries would require approximately one week of storage capacity
in a 100% intermittent penetration scenario. The study used the comprehensive datasets available
for the two countries to check “the extent of the predicted worst annual hypothetical ‘failure event’
(where the guaranteed level of intermittently sourced electricity is not met)”. The results by Renner
and Giampietro for Germany are in line with the analysis by Kuhn [36], predicting a requirement of
installed storage charging power in Germany of the order of 53 GW by 2050. Similar values apply to
the case of Japan [20], where, despite a different energy mix and configuration, it was also found that
storage requirements are on the order of a week of average electricity supply.
Thus, storage capacity requirements for 2050, where gross electricity production is assumed to
grow to approximately 5140 TWh, were assumed to be on the order of a week of average daily demand.
It was then assumed that PHS, the most implemented and mature storage technology in the EU and
worldwide, increased up to its viable potential in the EU, following the analysis by Gimeno-Gutiérrez
and Lacal-Arántegui [38]. Then, battery energy storage (BES) was introduced to cover the gap between
the maximum PHS potential and the total storage capacity needed. The relevant assumptions shared
across pathways and those differing for each pathway are collected in Tables 1 and 2 respectively,
at ten-year snapshots between 2020 and 2050.
Table 1. Assumptions on the evolution of the energy system shared for the two decarbonisation
pathways (low storage high curtailment—LSCH, and high storage low curtailment—HSLC).
Variable 2020 2030 2040 2050
Gross electricity consumption (GWh) 3,665,400 3,666,000 4,357,600 5,140,600
Daily electricity consumption (GWh) 10,042 10,043 11,939 14,084
Hydropower (%) 10 10 9 7
Nuclear (%) 24 16 8 3
Fossil plants (%) 40 27 14 0
Wind power (%) 14 29 46 62
Solar power (%) 6 12 20 27
Other renewables (%) 5 5 5 0
Following the EU high RES pathway, gross electricity consumption increased in both
pathways, despite an overall reduction in energy consumption—mirroring the trend of electrification.
Hydropower (excluding PHS) was assumed to remain unchanged throughout the years, therefore as
electricity generation increased its share in the electricity mix decreased. Nuclear power was assumed
to gradually decrease in absolute and relative terms. All other non-renewable power plants were
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grouped under the umbrella term fossil plants and eliminated by 2050. The share of wind and solar
power rose gradually until reaching 90% of the total generation share in 2050. The relative contribution
of wind and solar power remained fixed at 70 and 30% respectively, mirroring their 2016 relative
contribution in the EU. This was also in line with what was identified by Denholm and Hand [21] as
the optimal balance between the two types of generation technologies to ensure minimum curtailment.
Table 2. Relevant characteristics of two decarbonisation pathways: low storage high curtailment
(LSHC) and high storage low curtailment (HSLC).
Variable Alternative Pathway 2020 2030 2040 2050
Gross electricity consumption (GWh) LSHC 3,665,400 3,666,000 4,357,600 5,140,600
HSLC 3,665,400 3,666,000 4,357,600 5,140,600
Gross production from wind power (GWh) LSHC 505,270 1,057,690 2,228,440 5,110,500
HSLC 505,270 1,057,690 2,049,370 3,194,070
Gross production from solar PV (GWh) LSHC 216,540 453,300 955,040 2,190,220
HSLC 216,540 453,300 878,300 1,587,910
Curtailment rate (%)
LSHC 0 0 10 60
HSLC 0 0 0 20
Storage capacity (GWh) LSHC 600 600 600 600
HSLC 600 14,570 51,100 87,630
Wind power UF (%) LSHC 24 24 21 15
HSLC 24 24 23 21
Solar PV UF (%)
LSHC 13 13 12 8
HSLC 13 13 13 11
Wind power capacity (GW) LSHC 240 500 1060 2430
HSLC 240 500 980 1760
Solar PV capacity (GW) LSHC 190 400 840 1920
HSLC 190 400 770 1390
Given the higher curtailment rate in the LSHC scenario, although the gross electricity consumption
was the same as in the HSLC scenario, a higher amount of wind and solar power were assumed to
be generated (see the second and third row of Table 2). The surplus generation was not assumed to
enter the grid but was curtailed. The curtailment rates, also included in Table 2, were taken from
Denholm and Hand [21], by assuming that curtailment rates as a function of VRE penetration can be
generalised. Contrary to storage requirements, which tend to increase linearly as VRE integration
increases, curtailment increases exponentially, meaning that it becomes less and less favourable to rely
on curtailment at higher rates. The amount of storage capacity, in GWh of installed capacity, did not
increase throughout the years for the LSHC scenario. Eurostat does not provide statistics on storage
capacity, and the value of 600 GWh of PHS in the EU was taken from Kougias and Szabó [37]. In the
HSLC scenario, the storage capacity increased up to a week of average demand. The curtailment rates
in both scenarios led to a gradual decrease in the utilisation factors (UF) of wind and solar power,
calculated as the amount of time throughout the year when electricity generated by wind and solar







where GWinstalled is the installed power capacity, and 8760 is the number of hours in a year.
3.1.2. GHG Emissions of Renewable Infrastructure, Storage and Fossil Plants
The values of lifetime GHG emissions of renewable infrastructure, and their associated ranges,
were adjusted from the comprehensive meta-review by Nugent and Sovacool [32]. For GHG emissions
of storage technologies, values were taken from Denholm and Kulcinski [39]. Table 3 summarises the
main technological assumptions of both studies. For renewable infrastructure, Nugent and Sovacool
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provide intensive data derived from a number of studies, each with different technical specifications.
Therefore, the values do not refer to specific technological characteristics. This enlarges the range
of the estimated values, but also their robustness. Storage infrastructure values, similarly, refer to a
review of various existing plants, with the range of technological characteristics included in Table 3.
As the GHG emissions associated with battery energy storage (BES) were an important variable for
the results, the values of Denholm and Kulcinski, dating to 2004, were cross-checked against a recent
study referring specifically to lithium-ion batteries [40]. and were found to be consistent. Since the
scenarios were modelled at the EU level, they did not take into account differences across member
states. The values taken from literature, associated with a range of technological characteristics, reflect
the heterogeneity of infrastructure required across the EU.
Table 3. Ranges of technological assumptions of infrastructure: (a) Renewable infrastructure, adjusted
from Nugent and Sovacool [32]; (b) storage infrastructure, adjusted from Denholm and Kulcinski [39].
(a)
Variable Wind Power Solar PV
Number of studies 41 23
Hub height (m) 10–108 N/A
Rotor diameter (m) 2–116 N/A
Technology N/A Ribbon-Si, Multi-Si, Mono-Si, CdTe
Irradiance (kWh/m2) N/A 1600–1800
Mounting N/A roof, ground, single axis
Lifetime (years) 20–30 15–30
GHG cultivation and fabrication (mean) (g CO2 eq./kWh) 42.98 33.67
GHG construction (mean) (g CO2 eq./kWh) 14.43 8.98
GHG operation (mean) (g CO2 eq./kWh) 14.36 6.15
(b)
Variable PHS BES
Number of facilities 9 N/A
Completion date 1978–1995 N/A
Power (MW) 31–2100 15
Storage capacity (MWh) 279–184,000 120
Energy/power ratio (hours) 13 8
The GHG emissions from the review studies were adjusted as the renewable share of the electricity
mix in the pathways increased, since the electricity mix strongly affects GHG emissions. As we were
singling out the power sector, emissions associated with the use of fuels and other forms of thermal
energy remained invariant. To adjust the values throughout the years, the carbon intensity of the
EU’s electricity mix was estimated each year, starting from 320 g/kWh in 2016 [41] and reaching
almost zero in 2050. The contribution of the electricity mix to the overall GHG emissions of wind
power infrastructure was estimated by comparing existing studies which made a direct link between
the carbon intensity of the electricity production system and the GHG emissions associated with
infrastructure (see Reference [42] for a comparison of Germany and China, Reference [43] for Brazil
and Reference [44] for different values of carbon intensities). The effect of different electricity mixes on
the construction on the lifetime of solar panels was assessed directly by Reich [45] in relation to the
CO2 emission factor of electricity supply. Varying GHG emissions for CFC and Operation are included
in Table 4.
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Table 4. Varying GHG emissions for the cultivation, fabrication and construction (CFC) and operation
of renewable and storage infrastructure.
Variable 2020 2030 2040 2050
CFC, wind infrastructure (t CO2 eq./GW) 906,700 766,020 617,000 470,000
CFC, solar infrastructure (t CO2 eq./GW) 1,418,000 1,199,000 965,000 735,000
CFC, PHS (t CO2 eq./GWh.inst *) 33,800 28,500 23,000 17,500
CFC, BES (t CO2 eq./GWh.inst *) 123,500 104,400 84,000 64,000
Operation, wind turbines (t CO2 eq./GWh) 5 5 5 5
Operation, solar PV (t CO2 eq./GWh) 6 6 6 6
Operation, fossil plants (t CO2 eq./GWh) 450 450 450 450
Operation, PHS (t CO2 eq./GWh) 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Operation, BES (t CO2 eq./GWh) 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
* GWh.inst: amount of storage capacity installed.
3.2. Modelling Equations
The values of GHG emissions at a given year were calculated from the secondary data, adjusted
to the EU’s electricity mix for each year, through the following equations:
GHG_stn = GWPV,n × GHG_stPV,n + GWwind,n × GHG_stwind,n + GWPHS,n × GHG_stPHS,n + GWBES,n
× GHG_stBES (2)
GHG_opn = GWhPV,n × GHG_opPV,n + GWhwind,n × GHG_opwind,n + GWhPHS,n × GHG_opPHS,n +
GWhBES,n × GHG_opBES + GWhfossil,n × GHG_opfossil,n
(3)
where:
• GHG_stn are the GHG emissions, in tons of CO2 equivalent, emitted at year n due to the
cultivation, fabrication and construction (CFC) of infrastructure;
• GWPV and GWwind are the amounts of extra solar PV and wind power capacity installed each year;
• GWhPHS and GWhBES are the amounts of extra storage capacity, PHS and BES, added each year;
• GHG_opn are the varying infrastructure emissions at each year n, depending, in turn, on the
electricity mix and expressed in tons of CO2 equivalent/GW for renewable infrastructure and
tons of CO2 equivalent/GWh for renewable infrastructure;
• GWhn is the electricity generation at year n by each technology.
Similarly, the emissions due to the operation of power plants were calculated at each year as the
total amount of electricity generated by each type of power plant (including curtailed electricity) times
the associated operational emissions. The total GHG emissions at year n, thus (GHGtotal,n) were a
combination of multiple factors varying across the years. What we refer to as cumulative emissions,
finally, is the sum of the emissions over the 2020–2050 time period:
GHGtotal = ∑2050n = 2020 GHGtotal,n (4)
4. Results and Discussion
The results and discussion are structured in three sections. Firstly, the yearly and cumulative
emissions of the decarbonisation pathways are presented and linked to EU decarbonisation scenarios,
and carbon budgets (Section 4.1); then, variational ranges of the results are discussed (Section 4.2).
Section 4.3, finally, discusses the role played by biophysical variables at the science-policy interface.
4.1. GHG Emission Curves and Cumulative Emissions
To discuss the results of the two decarbonisation scenarios, emissions can be viewed from
three perspectives:
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1. Emission curves at a yearly resolution, useful to comment on the temporal behaviour of emissions
and their possible non-linear evolution;
2. Cumulative emissions up to the year 2050, i.e., the sum of the yearly emissions, which can be
related to carbon budgets;
3. Yearly emissions at the target year 2050, currently the only view used to inform EU
decision-making processes (with different targets set for different years).
Starting with the emission curves provided throughout the years, Figures 3 and 4 show the
behaviour of the GHG emissions of the EU power sector (including cultivation, fabrication and
construction of infrastructure) under the low storage high curtailment (LSHC) scenario. The total
emissions are shown in Figure 3, while Figure 4 breaks the emissions down into those linked to
the operation of power plants (associated with electricity flows) and those linked to the cultivation,
































Figure 4. GHG emissions in the LSHC scenario, broken down into operational (flows, green line) and
infrastructural (funds, blue line).
In the LSHC scenario, while the amount of wind and solar infrastructure installed each year
increased exponentially (see Table 2), the GHG emissions associated with the cultivation, fabrication
and construction phases of the infrastructure were mitigated by the steady reduction in operational
emissions, which dropped to almost 0 by 2050. The initial steady decrease in emissions became less
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linear from the year 2030, i.e., when curtailment of renewable electricity started. As curtailment
increased, emissions due to an infrastructure rise led to relative peaks in emissions between the years
2030 and 2050, with overall emissions associated with infrastructure increasing despite the increased
renewable penetration into the system. The behaviour of the curve depended on the rate that renewable
infrastructure was installed.
With high levels of emissions associated with the installation of both PHS and BES storage
technologies (see Table 3), the yearly emission curve for the low curtailment high storage (LCHS)
































Figure 6. GHG emissions in the HSLC scenario, broken down into operational (flows, green line) and
infrastructural (funds, blue line).
Emissions were strongly dependent on the type of storage infrastructure and on when it was
integrated into the system. Emissions gradually decreased up to the year 2027, when the amount of
installed PHS started to increase considerably. The biggest peak, however, was visible at the year 2035,
when BES technologies were introduced, as PHS reached its maximum capacity. The peak can be
softened if BES is gradually installed from the start, however, in this case, cumulative emissions would
be higher as the manufacturing process would rely more heavily on fossil fuels. Thus, different timing
options should be carefully considered from a biophysical perspective.
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The behaviour of the curves of Figures 3 and 5, and the presence or absence of relative GHG
emission peaks, can be varied by varying assumptions on timings and introduction of technologies.
This would also vary cumulative emissions, as the emissions associated with the construction of
infrastructure also depend on the yearly electricity mix. Cumulative emissions are a useful indicator as
they can give us an idea of how much is being emitted by the EU’s power sector during its transitional
phase towards deep decarbonisation. It is expected that, on average, the EU has a carbon budget on
the order of 90 Gt in order to remain within a 2◦ temperature range for the period between 2020 and
2100 [46]. Cumulative emissions associated with the power sector and to the manufacturing of
infrastructure were of the order of 20,830 Mt of CO2 eq. and 25,150 Mt of CO2 eq. respectively, for the
HCLS and LCHS scenarios. Thus, under deep decarbonisation pathways, between the years 2020 and
2050 alone the power sector and its associated manufacturing would emit 23–28% of the total budget
available to the whole society up to the year 2100. As we discuss in Section 4.3, this suggests that
efforts on the production side of the energy system are not enough to stay within safe carbon budgets.
4.2. Analysis of Variational Ranges in the Results
The scenarios presented in this paper build on secondary data collected and adjusted at different
levels of the energy system, from individual technologies to systemic production and consumption
patterns, expressed in the form of estimate ranges. Table 5 collects the estimate ranges associated
with the main variables in the analysis, for the years 2020 and 2050. Table 6 shows how much each
variable contributes to the cumulative emissions at the years 2020 and 2050, reflecting the weight that
the variable’s estimate range holds in the final interval.
The interval associated with the assessments of yearly operational and infrastructural GHG
emissions is determined by a combination of estimate ranges associated with GHG emissions in the base
year from which the data is taken and the estimate range associated with the adjustment of emissions
as renewable penetration increases, using the squaring method for error propagation. At a higher level,
the interval associated with the assessment of consumption patterns can be checked by calculating the
lowest and highest values of electricity consumption present in the six EU decarbonisation scenarios.
The factors playing the largest impact on the final cumulative GHG emission assessments are the GHG
emissions associated with storage infrastructure, curtailment rates and the maximum PHS potential
in the EU. Combining the various ranges into the final assessment of cumulative emissions leads to
intervals on the order of 35% for the high curtailment scenario and 45% for the high storage scenario.
This value is high, especially when it comes to storage GHG emissions and estimations of storage
requirements, however, it does not weaken the main message of the analysis.
Table 5. Variational ranges of the variables.
Category Variable Unit
2020 2050
Average +/− Average +/−
Carbon intensity of
technologies
CFC wind power t CO2 eq./GW 906,700 165,000 470,000 108,100
CFC solar PV t CO2 eq./GW 1,418,000 985,000 735,000 514,500
CFC PHS t CO2 eq./GWh 33,800 4600 17,500 2800
CFC BES t CO2 eq./GWh 123,500 18,000 64,000 11,500
Operation wind power t CO2 eq./GWh 5 1 5 1
Operation solar PV t CO2 eq./GWh 6 1 6 1
Operation PHS t CO2 eq./GWh 2 1 2 1
Operation BES t CO2 eq./GWh 4 1 4 1
Storage
Total storage requirement GWh 0 0 98,600 32,500
Efficiency of PHS and BES % 80 20 80 20




consumption GWh 3,665,380 146,615 5,140,565 668,273
Curtailment rate (LSHC) % 0 0 60 15
Curtailment rate (HSLC) % 0 0 20 5
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Table 6. Relative contribution of each variable (%) to yearly GHG emissions, 2020 and 2050.
Variable
2020 2050
LSHC HSLC LSHC HSLC
Mt of CO2 eq. % Mt of CO2 eq. % Mt of CO2 eq. % Mt of CO2 eq. %
Solar PV
infrastructure 29.5 3 29.5 3 135.6 48 60 16
Wind infrastructure 23.8 2 23.8 2 109.6 39 48.5 13
PHS infrastructure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BES infrastructure 0 0 0 0 0 0 233.8 63
Fossil operation 1064.7 95 1064.7 95 0 0 0 0
Solar operation 1.3 0 1.3 0 13.1 5 9.5 3
Wind operation 2.5 0 2.5 0 25.6 9 18.5 5
PHS operation 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.7 0
BES operation 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.1 1
Total 1122 1122 284 373
4.3. Discussion
To inform decision-making, the type of GHG accounting proposed here is incomplete, as it needs
to be associated with economic analyses and with the assessment of other biophysical variables such
as land and water. While the high curtailment scenario results in overall lower emissions than the high
storage one, it would lead to other trade-offs in different domains, including higher electricity prices
and large areas of land occupied by renewable infrastructure. On the other hand, the high storage
scenario would also be associated with high levels of lithium requirements (to be imported), which may
not be desirable from a security perspective. Additionally, increasing PHS to its maximum potential
may have important consequences for natural water cycles. Synergies and trade-offs also emerge
within and outside EU borders. A part of the emissions derived in the scenarios would necessarily
be located outside of EU borders, such as those for the extraction of primary materials. This points
towards the need of discussing the impact of EU climate targets at different geographical scales.
When it comes to the integration of renewable energy, differences across countries are also
important and should be modelled in relation to grid flexibility and associated GHG emissions.
The Netherlands, for example, is mostly flat and does not have any PHS potential, therefore in an
increased flexibility scenario, it would either require high rates of curtailment (which may interfere
with current land use patterns) or high interconnections to neighbouring countries. Utilisation factors
of technologies also vary across countries, depending on weather conditions. In addition to differences
across spatial scales, the temporal scale is also important when considering decarbonisation scenarios:
different types of storage services, in fact, are useful for fluctuations occurring at different scales [47].
Current statistics do not allow for this type of analysis. Therefore, it would be advisable for
supra-national statistical bodies such as Eurostat to include data across shorter timescales.
The results presented are considered to be conservative, as two elements which have not
been included in the model may increase GHG emissions substantially: (i) the change in end-use
infrastructure required by an increased electrification of the energy sector (such as the manufacturing
of electric cars); and (ii) the turnover of funds. There is uncertainty associated with the possible lifetime
of grid-scale batteries [47], however, it is likely that within the 30-year timeframe considered in the
study some turnover will be necessary, by either producing new batteries or recycling existing ones.
Accounting for the emission flows associated with funds leads to higher emissions than those
envisioned by current scenarios. Thus, results suggest that sustainable production narratives cannot
alone lead to a decarbonisation of the energy sector. To be effective, sustainable production efforts
must be paired with strong efforts for sustainable consumption [48]. These should not only be
spurred by mechanisms such as efficiency and technology but also, and crucially, by radical changes
in consumption patterns. This is line with the metabolic view of society [49], which draws a clear
connection between production and consumption patterns: changes in the way in which energy
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carriers are produced inevitably require changes in the way in which they are consumed. This may
entail a shift not only in how things are done (structural changes, e.g., technology and efficiency) but
also in what is done and why (functional changes, e.g., who is consuming what energy, to do what).
5. Conclusions
Fighting climate change, reducing air pollution and increasing security are three entangled
priorities of the EU. Decarbonisation has become a central strategy to deal simultaneously with
these disparate targets. However, governing a shift to a decarbonised economy has not been simple.
We suggest that this difficulty is partly due to the framing of models used to inform deliberative
processes. A focus on the monetary aspects of funds, particularly infrastructure, rather than on the
biophysical ones, such as GHG emissions, has minimised discourses linked to the magnitude of the
material transformations required to restructure the energy system.
Focusing on the EU power sector in the years 2020–2050, we modelled two decarbonisation
pathways in relation to GHG emissions. The scenarios consider operational GHG emissions
of electricity generation, as well as those associated with the lifetime of renewable and storage
infrastructure. Contrary to the decarbonisation pathways used to inform EU decision-making,
the alternative decarbonisation pathways take into account grid flexibility requirements from a
biophysical perspective. For the chosen pathways, this entails accounting for the GHG emissions
associated either with high rates of curtailment or with storage infrastructure. The results show how
emission curves behave differently under different flexibility pathways, and relative peaks of GHG
emissions across the years, as well as overall higher cumulative emissions, may emerge depending on
the set of assumptions.
Many questions arise from a biophysical problem framing of decarbonisation, for example: What
is the best timing to implement technologies? What are the trade-offs among different technological
pathways and storage solutions? What trade-offs may emerge between local and global environmental
effects? By suggesting that a rapid decarbonisation of the EU power sector by 2050 is “feasible
and viable” [14], and therefore glossing over biophysical obstacles to renewable transformations,
the scientific tools informing EU decision-making do not open up a space to discuss these crucial issues.
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Abstract: The global energy system subsumes both extreme wealth (and waste) and extreme poverty.
A minority of the global population is consuming the majority of the fossil fuel-based energy and
causing global warming. While the mature industrialized economies maintain their high levels of
energy consumption, the emerging economies are rapidly expanding their fossil energy systems,
emulating traditional patterns of industrialization. We take a global, socio-metabolic perspective on
the energy transition phases—take-off, maturation, and completion—of 142 countries between 1971
and 2015. Even within our global fossil energy system, the transition to fossil energy is still ongoing;
many countries are in the process of replacing renewable energy with fossil energy. However, due
to globally limited supplies and sinks, continuing the fossil energy transition is not an indefinite
option. Rather than a “Big Push” for renewable energy within pockets of the fossil energy system,
a sustainability transformation is required that would change far more than patterns of energy supply
and use. Where this far-reaching change requires pushing back against the fossil energy system,
the energy underdogs—the latecomers to the fossil energy transition—just might come out on top.
Keywords: energy supply; international inequality; renewable energy; fossil energy system
1. The Fossil Energy Transition
“ . . . the capital city became the victim of repeated visitations of a thick, yellow, sulphurous
vapour that plunged the streets into darkness, choked the lungs, and turned day into
night.” [1]
“ . . . as the sun rose, still the fog didn’t disappear, and the visibility was even less then.
Everyone around has an uneasiness in their throat due to this kind of smog. Our next step
is to keep ourselves inside and step outside only when it is important.” [2]
Anthropogenic climate change may not have been on the mind of 19th century Londoners, but the
local impacts of fossil fuel combustion certainly were. Today, the deadly smog for which London was
renowned hangs over New Delhi (described above) or Beijing [3]. We know that—due to the physical
limits to supply—our fossil energy systems have an expiration date [4–6] until which they will have
detrimental environmental impacts [7,8]. However, none of this has deterred high and growing reliance
on fossil fuels—such as oil, coal, and natural gas—for societies’ energy supply [9]. The development of
capital-intensive infrastructures and the power-infused institutions of the fossil energy system [10,11]
have ushered in “the age of oil” [12] with its “fossil economies” [13].
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Under intensified globalization and a rigorous international division of labor, it is no contradiction
that this global system subsumes both extreme wealth (and waste) and extreme poverty when it
comes to energy. At the turn of the century, 15% of the world population in the Global North
used approximately the same amount of energy as the 85% of the population living in the Global
South [14]. In 2013, one-tenth of the population caused more than half of the global greenhouse
gas emissions [15]. While the mature industrialized economies maintain their high levels of energy
consumption, the emerging economies are rapidly expanding their fossil energy systems, emulating
traditional patterns of industrialization [16]. Technologies for (renewable) energy are now available that
did not exist when the industrialized countries embarked on their energy transitions. But these are not
enough of a springboard to leapfrog the colossal fossil energy system [17]. Alternative energy technologies
themselves require a boost over the critical barriers posed by the infrastructures and institutions of the
fossil energy system [18,19] and the inertia of the fossil energy transition [20]. To enable an alternative
energy system, the built infrastructures—predetermining energy demand for decades to come [21]—and
the vested, institutionalized interests of powerful political and economic actors [12,13,22] of the fossil
energy system would have to be abandoned [10].
Instead, the fossil energy system is solidified by investments and subsidies, and the politics that
favor these transactions. Trillions of dollars are globally being earmarked for energy infrastructures in
Europe and the United States of America, as well as in countries with much lower energy access [23].
Development banks and private sector companies identify investment opportunities wherever the fossil
energy transition has not yet been completed [24,25], and even economies diversifying domestic energy
supply favor the fossil energy system in their investment choices. Chinese banks, for example, have
surpassed the World Bank in their investments into the infrastructures of coal-fired power plants [26].
High subsidies for fossil energy supply and consumption and the tit-for-tat between mines and power
plants maintain a cheap energy source [11,27], despite the associated social and environmental ‘costs’,
and often make it difficult for renewable energy to compete. Despite the unsustainability of the fossil
energy system, it is increasingly being bartered politically, in fully industrialized [28] as well as emerging
economies [29].
1.1. Renewable Energy in the Pockets of the Fossil Energy System
Compared to the urgency with which a fundamental change to the energy system is now
required [7,30,31], the formidable fossil energy system has had a long time to develop. The take-off
phase of historical fossil energy transitions alone lasted 58 years on average, and was not systematically
shorter for the countries that began their transition later. Only the very early development of fossil
infrastructures in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands took longer and provided all other countries
with a bit of a piggy-back ride on their innovations [32]. The transition to a fossil energy system is
pursued not as a goal in itself, but was and is the by-product of political and economic development
enabled by technological innovation and motivated by opportunities to make a profit [33]. In contrast, a
transition away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy would in itself constitute a goal, allowing
for big challenges such as climate change and energy security to be met [34,35]. So far, this difference
has not materialized as the rapid adoption of renewable energy that might have been hoped for [36].
In the mature industrialized economies, it has taken strong, continuous political and economic support
alongside country-specific cultural attitudes and/or resource endowment to allow for renewable energy
to develop in pockets of the fossil energy system. By 2015, the German effort to change the tide with an
Energiewende [37] had amounted to 12% renewable energy in the total primary energy supply (TPES).
Higher shares were achieved by countries boasting a unique combination of resource endowment and
political will (Sweden: 42%, Iceland: 88%). However, none of these countries have renewable energy
systems. What they do have are renewable energy projects within a fossil energy system. The state-owned
Swedish power company Vattenfall owns and operates almost 100 hydroelectric plants in Sweden, but
hydropower only accounts for 30% of the “Waterfall’s” electricity generation [38], in which coal and gas
play an important role. Iceland has the world’s highest electricity generation per capita, which is almost
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exclusively from geothermal and hydro power plants [39], and mostly used in aluminum smelters [40].
After buildings, the bulk of aluminum is globally engaged in transportation [41], such as in automobiles
and airplanes, for example, guzzling fossil fuel.
Countries in which traditional biomass (mainly fuelwood) plays an important role in energy supply
have high renewable shares at very low levels of total energy supply per capita; these include Ethiopia
(93% renewable in 2015), Tanzania (84%), and Ghana (43%) [40]. The high share of fuelwood limits
the possible total energy supply [42] and access to energy is low, especially in sparsely populated rural
areas [43–45]. Decentralized electricity generation from renewable sources has been championed as a
safe, sustainable, and even cost-effective way to address energy poverty [29,46–48]. However, within the
global fossil energy system, renewable energy has had to fall in line with existing power grids and energy
use patterns and established institutions and interests [49–52].
1.2. A “Big Push”—But Where?
In 2017, the US–American Energy Information Administration released its International Energy
Outlook. One of the major sights on its horizon was how growing Chinese energy consumption would
dominate increases in global energy consumption [53]. For many, it was and is a terrifying trifecta:
An energy-“hungry” China [54] on the prowl [55], peak oil [5,31], and anthropogenic climate change [8].
The projections according to which population—as an important driver of energy demand—would
grow in (energy poor) countries not members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development [53], conjured a question with unthinkable consequences: billions of people aspiring to
US–American levels of energy consumption?
The narrative of the “Big Push”—large-scale, foreign-financed investment to grow countries out of
their “poverty trap”—had been making a convenient comeback [56] and was brought into play against
energy hunger: Could a “’Big Push’ [ . . . ] to scale up renewable energy in the developing world”
prevent countries “get[ing] locked into cheaper, dirtier fossil fuels, [with] no chance of meeting global
CO2 reduction targets”? The article from which this question stems [57] is illustrated by an image of
a modern-day Sisyphus (cf. Figure 1) in a business suit pushing a boulder up a steep incline. In the
world of Greek mythology, that boulder would never reach the top of the hill, but would present our
businessman with an afterlife of work and frustration—punishment for having bested the gods. And in
the modern-day world? Can a “Big Push” transform our energy system?
Figure 1. “With mighty labour” Sisyphus rolls a millstone up a hill. As soon as he reaches the
top, the stone rolls back down, providing him with the opportunity “to keep imployed his afflicted
soul” [58].
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Energy transitions—from the passive use of solar energy by hunters and gatherers to the active
harnessing of that solar energy in agrarian society and the use of fossil fuels in the industrial
society—involve fundamental societal transformations of how people live and work, the communities
they form, societal values and norms, power relations and hierarchies, and societies’ relation to
nature [59]. As part of a sustainability transformation, transitions to renewable energy systems will
entail equally fundamental societal change, including how much energy we use and for what and how
we live and work and organize our societies. Limited to an existence in pockets of the fossil energy
system, a “Big Push” for renewable energy might well be a Sisyphusian endeavor.
Push as we may, there is no “quick fix” [60] to the inherent unsustainability of our global
resource use patterns. In order to produce knowledge for sustainability transformations, science
must address the underlying causes, not only the symptoms, of unsustainability [61]. What we have
to offer is a socio-metabolic reading of currently ongoing energy transitions with the motivation that
better understanding the symptoms of unsustainable development may help in the identification of
possibilities for intervention [62]. It seems imperative to have a better idea of what we are up against
before we push for change. While it may be clear that the energy system will have to fundamentally
change in a sustainability transformation, it is essential to be pushing for change in the right direction.
The boulder we’re pushing shouldn’t roll back to crush those at the bottom of the hill and everyone
along the way; renewable energy development shouldn’t solidify the fossil energy system.
In that sense, we have our eye not on the transition to renewable energy, but rather on the
transition to fossil energy. For the period between 1971 and 2015, we examine energy supply patterns
for three major country groupings: (1) those countries for which the take-off period of their fossil
energy transition falls within this period; (2) those accelerating their transition and maturing their
fossil energy systems; and (3) those that have completed this transition. These three groups are in
themselves highly heterogeneous, and it is not our aim to provide a definitive analysis of the energy
transitions at the national level, much less the subnational, level. The socio-metabolic perspective
that we take allows us to show that while we may be eyeing renewable energy, the currently ongoing
transition is one to fossil fuels. This seems important in determining where we need to push (back).
We focus on the latecomers to the fossil energy transition, referring to them as the ‘underdogs’ to
indicate that in the uphill struggle for a sustainable transformation of not only the energy system, our
support lies with the people of these countries. It appears to us that in the deliberation of sustainability
transformations, the role of these countries—with their extremely low per capita energy supply—is
crucial but often overlooked.
2. Materials and Methods
For our socio-metabolic analysis of energy transitions, we required quantitative data on the
amount and composition of primary energy supply per country. We were able to include 142 countries
in our sample, achieving good representation of the world population for all of the years between
1971 and 2015 (see Section 2.2). We grouped these countries according to quantitative data on energy
supply [40] and on the corresponding phase of their energy transition (see Section 2.1).
2.1. Energy Transition Phases
Following Rotmans et al. [63], we assume that the energy transition, similar to other societal
transitions, has four phases of development: (1) predevelopment; (2) take-off; (3) acceleration,
and (4) stabilization. The take-off period for the transition to fossil fuels (and later also other
modern energy sources, including nuclear) tends to occur at levels of domestic modern energy
use between 0.47–7.71 Gigajoules per capita (GJ/cap). This range was identified in the analysis of
a large country sample (representing approximately two-thirds of the global population) in a long
time series (beginning as early as the 15th and as late as the 18th century) [32]. During the following
phase of acceleration of modern energy use and maturation of the energy transition, domestic energy
consumption increased up to 50 GJ/cap. In the 20th century, the fossil energy transition in the
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industrialized economies was largely completed, and modern energy consumption was stabilized.
The fossil energy system is global [12,13], but this does not mean that all of countries have concluded
their energy transition. In particular, we identified the countries that are latecomers to the transition
to fossil fuels, i.e., those for which the take-off period has not yet been concluded by 1970. In this
grouping, we included all of the countries with fossil TPES below 8 GJ/cap in 1971. Other countries are
still maturing their energy transition, with energy supply above 8 GJ/cap (but below 50 GJ/cap). In this
grouping, we included all of the countries in which the fossil TPES grew continuously from above
8 GJ/cap. This acceleration phase applies to many of the successor states of the Soviet Union which
had high energy supply from fossil fuels (above 50 GJ/cap) in 1991—indicating a completed energy
transition—but then experienced a collapse of their energy systems, and have been accelerating again
since and subsequently re-building these energy systems. Countries appearing to be at the precipice
between take-off and acceleration with energy supply clearly above 8 GJ/cap but not (yet) continuously
growing were classified as maturing energy transition if an energy supply above 8 GJ/cap dominated
the time period between 1970 and 2015. Those countries were considered as having completed their
fossil energy transition that had fossil TPES above 50 GJ/cap. Table 1 provides an overview of the
three country groupings.
Table 1. Between 1970 and 2015, most people lived in countries that either were latecomers to the fossil
energy transition or were in the process of maturing that transition, based on their fossil total primary
energy supply (TPES). Very high fossil energy consumption following the completion of the energy
transition was experienced by only one-fifth of the global population.
Group Description N Population 2015
Late energy transition,
energy underdogs
Take-off phase of per capita
fossil TPES (0.4–8.0 GJ/cap)







Transition from above 8.0 to








Above 50 GJ/cap fossil TPES




In order to identify the latecomers to the fossil energy transition, it was necessary to define this
grouping according to whether the countries were below 8 GJ/cap fossil TPES at any point during
the period. For the other two country groupings, we included five countries (Algeria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, China, Iraq, and Mongolia) that did not reach 50 GJ/cap until the 2000s in the maturing
energy transition and five countries (Cyprus, Greece, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, and Libya) that
reached above 50 GJ/cap during the 1970s in the completed energy transition. With the exception of
China, the individual or collective re-assignment of these countries to the respective other possible
grouping would not have a significant impact on our results. Which grouping China belongs to
significantly affects the per capita results. Since China did not supply more than 50 GJ/cap of TPES
from fossil sources until 2005, and 88 GJ/cap in 2015 (compared to 147 GJ/cap in the completed energy
transition grouping without China), we considered the maturing period to clearly dominate our period
of investigation. This affects the interpretability of our results.
We present and discuss the very heterogeneous energy transition groupings as wholes throughout
the article. To make the lack of homogeneity more transparent for our focus on the energy underdogs,
we also provide information on ranges of variables within the group. Although the energy underdogs
share the trait of still being in the early transition phase to a fossil energy system in the period between
1970 and 2015, their transitions are by no means synchronized.
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2.2. Data
Data on national TPES from fossil (coal, oil, natural gas), renewable, and other (mainly nuclear)
sources were extracted from the International Energy Agency’s World Indicators [40]. These data
were available in time series for a sample of 142 countries, accounting for more than 90% of the world
population at all points in time between 1970 and 2015 (and until 2050 in the United Nations’ low
variant population growth projection [64]).
Throughout the article, we refer to the shares of the three country groupings in the total sample
as global shares, and ask the reader to bear in mind that—because approximately 10% of the global
population is missing from our sample—true global shares would be slightly lower than the sample
shares that we discuss (Table 1).
3. Fossil Energy: A Global System that Cannot Be Universal
An energy transition to lower energy use increasingly met from renewable sources must form
part of a sustainability transformation. And yet, the fossil energy system is solidified rather than
challenged through the combination of sustained high levels of fossil energy supply in the mature
industrialized economies, the rapid growth of fossil fuel use in the maturation of the energy transition,
and decreasing shares of renewable energy in the transition latecomers.
3.1. Low Energy Supply in Fast-Growing Underdogs
More than 3 billion people—44% of the world’s population—live in countries with a late take-off
phase of the fossil energy transition and only 10% of global fossil energy supply. Half as many
(1.5 billion) live in countries with a complete transition to fossil fuels supplying five times as much
primary fossil energy (Figure 2). Per person, fossil TPES in the energy underdogs amounts to one-tenth
of that in the countries with a completed energy transition. These international disparities challenge
us to identify barriers to more equitable resource distribution: if energy supply in the countries with a
completed energy transition could be reduced to half its current level, supply in the energy underdogs
could be increased by a factor of 3.5 without increasing global supply, all else remaining equal.
Figure 2. In 2015, the energy underdogs had the lowest share in global total primary energy supply
(TPES) from fossil fuels and the highest share in population, while the 21% of the global population
that was living in countries that had completed their fossil energy transition accounted for 50% of
global fossil TPES. Source of data: International Energy Agency [40].
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International inequality in energy supply persists despite gradual reductions since the 1970s of
per capita fossil fuel supply in the countries with a completed energy transition and an increasing
per capita supply in the underdogs (Figure 3). At only 3.8 GJ/cap in 1971, fossil TPES in the energy
underdogs was at a very low level (compared to 14.9 GJ/cap for the maturing and 170.9 GJ/cap for
the completed energy transition). At an average of 2.2% per year, population in the energy underdogs
grew more strongly than in either of the other two country groupings (1.4% and 1.3% per year).
Growth in fossil TPES (averaging 5.5% per year), however, was comparable to that in the countries
with a maturing energy transition (5.2%). Only in those countries that had already completed their
energy transition did population growth surpass growth in fossil TPES on average, causing a slight
decline in the per capita values.
Figure 3. Between 1971 and 2015, fossil total primary energy supply (TPES) in Gigajoules per capita
(GJ/cap) stagnated at a very high level in the countries that had completed their energy transition by
1970. The countries in the maturation phase of the energy transition were characterized by high fossil
TPES and low population growth, causing per capita values to increase strongly. While fossil TPES
growth was even slightly higher in the energy underdogs, their higher population growth and very low
initial values did not translate this into the same high per capita gains. Source of data: International
Energy Agency [40].
Fossil energy supply beyond 20 GJ/cap is not systematically related to improved access to
electricity, but rather to higher levels of consumption [65]. While even well below 20 GJ/cap, countries
may provide high levels of access to electricity (in 2015: Tajikistan at 7 GJ/cap, Paraguay at 12 GJ/cap,
and Pakistan at 13 GJ/cap, for example), rates of access below 50% are common among the energy
underdogs (in Angola at 10 GJ/cap and the Republic of the Congo at 13 GJ/cap, for example).
Especially in rural areas and at the fringes of urban areas, unreliable or a lack of access to electricity
represents energy poverty with its many implications for the education, health, nutrition, and safety of
the population [44,45]. This is not to say that increased energy supply would automatically translate
into better energy access and associated improvements for the population. In countries that are
integrated into the global economy as suppliers of cheap raw materials and/or labor, the opposite may
be true, with gains in energy supply representing increased industrial production for export.
3.2. From Renewable to Fossil Energy and Back? Composition of Energy Supply
Not only the level of fossil energy supply, but also the role it plays in overall energy supply
is telling in terms of energy transition phases. Despite the considerable development of renewable
energy sources and the increased use of nuclear energy, the energy system in the countries that have
completed their transition to the fossil energy system remains dominated by fossil fuels (83% of TPES
in 2015; Figure 4). The energy underdogs were characterized by high shares of renewable and low
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shares of fossil energy in their (comparatively very low) total primary energy supply, especially at the
beginning of the period under investigation here. By 2015, the composition and per capita level of
energy supply in the underdogs were comparable to the 1971 values for the countries maturing their
energy transition.
Can we expect the energy underdogs to do in the next 50 years what the maturing transition
countries did in the last half century? Given the biophysical constraints on supply and sinks, this
appears increasingly unlikely. As those countries with a maturing energy transition add claims to
fossil resources for which demand is already high from the countries with a completed transition,
reserves are depleted, and anthropogenic climate change is exacerbated. Between 1971 and 2015,
the maturation phase of the energy transition consisted of increasing the energy supply by 64 GJ/cap.
The contribution of fossil energy to this growth was almost 15 times as high as the contribution of
renewable energy. The completion of the energy transition has—thus far—been characterized by very
high levels of energy supply that keep up with low population growth mainly through increased
fossil energy use with small contributions from renewable and nuclear energy. Individual countries
that strongly decreased the share of fossil energy in their supply were generally able to do so based
on a combination of renewable and nuclear energy sources (e.g., France, Switzerland, and Sweden).
Only three countries (Iceland, New Zealand, and Norway), representing 0.7% of the population in
the grouping with a completed energy transition, currently feature very high levels of renewable
energy. Not only is this a small pocket of the world, it is also a pocket of the global fossil energy
system. All three countries use hydro and/or geothermal power to generate electricity. Iceland and
New Zealand rely on extensive fossil energy systems elsewhere (of which Norway is an example)
as sources of their imports of petroleum and natural gas [39]. Neither the economic trajectories nor
the resource endowment of these countries can be generalized, not even amongst the high-income
industrialized economies. For the majority of the countries in our sample, representing over 90% of
the global population in 2015, high shares of renewable energy and high levels of energy supply are
incompatible. There is no blueprint for the underdogs to follow.
Figure 4. Between 1971 and 2015, the share of renewable sources in the total primary energy supply
(TPES) increased only in the countries with a completed energy transition. Here, other energy sources
(almost exclusively nuclear energy) have also become relevant. The energy underdogs are characterized
by high shares of renewable energy, while the maturing energy transition was marked by renewable
energy shares displaced by fossil fuels. In absolute terms, growth in renewable energy supply (in 1018
Joules or Exajoules EJ) was most substantial in the energy underdogs, while fossil energy supply
increased most strongly during the energy transition maturation phase. Source of data: International
Energy Agency [40].
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Far be it from us to cite the inherently bad example of the fossil energy transition as pursued by
the world’s wealthy and wealthier countries as grounds on which the world’s poorest countries must
not pursue the same path. However, it does appear that the patterns of fossil energy use until today
have strained and drained our global environment and its resources to the extent that the option of
completing the fossil energy transition will not present itself to all countries [4–6].
3.3. What Would it Take? Thoughts on Completing or Abandoning the Fossil Energy Transition
If the underdogs’ fossil energy supply were to continue growing by 3.3% per year as it has done
on average since 1971, these countries would embark on the maturation period of their fossil energy
transition by 2050, reaching an average of approximately 50 GJ/cap of fossil TPES. Even if the countries
with a completed energy transition continue to gradually reduce their fossil TPES and the countries
now in the transition maturation follow suit, two things would have happened by 2050:
(1) The energy underdogs would still be global underdogs, with half of the per capita fossil energy
supply of the transition maturation countries, and one-third of the supply of the countries with a
completed energy transition.
(2) Limited reserves and dire environmental consequences of the continued fossil energy transition
would—if they had not precluded this development altogether—mean that this transition would
occur under conditions of extreme competition in a hazardous, toxic environment.
If the phases of the fossil energy transition were to play out globally, fossil TPES would reach just
below 700 EJ/a in 2050 (Figure 5), and would be twice as high as the 350 EJ that have been determined
as not altogether eliminating the chances of curbing anthropogenic global warming to two degrees [7].
Our very rough, conservative estimation is based on the United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs [64] low variant population forecast until 2050, and would be even higher if we had
assumed stronger population growth. What it would take, only in terms of fossil fuel supply, in order
for countries to continue along the path of the fossil energy transition, will not realistically be given, or,
if so, it will be given under highly adverse conditions.
Figure 5. In order for the fossil energy transition to continue (left-hand side), almost 700 Exajoules
(EJ) of fossil total primary energy supply (TPES) would be globally required by 2050, which is twice
as much as would allow for the possibility of limiting global warming to two degrees [7]. The energy
underdogs would barely reach the maturation phase of the transition by 2050. In order to supply an
average of 50 Gigajoules (GJ) of fossil energy per person (right-hand side), regardless of the countries’
transition phases, just over 400 EJ of fossil TPES would be globally required. All but the energy
underdogs would have to drastically reduce their fossil fuel supply. Sources of underlying data:
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [64] population forecast and International
Energy Agency [40] World Indicators.
For the energy underdogs to increase their fossil TPES to 50 GJ/cap by 2050 while all other
countries reduce their energy supply to this level would take approximately 400 EJ of fossil TPES in
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2050 (Figure 5), and generally fall within the overall consumption for a chance at the two-degree target.
“50 by 50” is not a target for a more equitable and efficient fossil energy system. It is a generalized
outcome that would require the transformation of the global energy system. At 50 GJ/cap, the emerging
economies could not continue being the mines, the factories, and the sweatshops of wealthy industrial
countries. At 50 GJ/cap, the wealthy industrial countries could not replace the fossil energy reductions
with renewable energy. At 50 GJ/cap, the energy underdogs would never develop full-fledged fossil
energy systems. If continuing the fossil energy transition is not an option, then alternatives must be
sought out and rapidly pursued. The world over, these alternatives require pushing back against the
fossil energy system. Maybe this is indeed the chance for the energy underdogs to come out on top,
simply because they have less to dismantle and repurpose, less capital tied up in roads and buildings
and factories and machines and gadgets that would largely become obsolete at 50 GJ/cap (or less) of
fossil energy supply.
4. The Challenge for Change
“50 by 50” (Figure 5) would require transformative change to the global energy system, including
the concerted international redistribution and reduction of fossil fuel-based energy. In the current
trajectory of the energy transition, we do not find sufficient evidence for the global cooperation,
prudence, and willingness to change that would have to precede such transformation.
If the change that might lead us to “50 by 50” is unrealistic, then sustaining the fossil energy
transition is just as unrealistic, if not more so. It is already clear that in order to even have a chance
of limiting global warming (to two degrees), the combustion of fossil energy carriers will have to be
drastically limited, leaving most of the known reserves untouched [7] and accepting the demands of
social movements to “leave the coal in the hole, the oil in the soil, and the tar sand in the land” [30,31].
However, the fossil energy transition depends on the unlimited availability of limited energy carriers,
the combustion of which threatens the inhabitability of our planet, and the distribution of which is
already and will increasingly be controlled violently.
A “Big Push” for renewables [57] that consists in harnessing wind and water to protect fossil
capital from shortages in coal and gas or as an investment opportunity for fossil profits may be a more
detrimental route up the hill than Sisyphus’. Renewable energy used to maintain the institutions on
which the fossil energy system is built further solidifies the fossil energy transition, as exemplified by
mega-projects based on large-scale investments and land deals that require access to massive electricity
grids with their established issues of access, control, and power [12,49,50,52].
For the energy underdogs to—in the words of our quantitative analysis—succeed in transitioning
from traditional to modern renewables at low but sufficient levels of supply and high levels of access
would constitute not only transformational but revolutionary change. Abandoning the fossil energy
transition is a direct challenge to existing political and economic institutions, both domestically and
internationally. Energy supply would focus on households rather than the industry and military.
A renewable energy system might not only enable but also necessitate leaving fossil fuels in the ground.
The direct [66] and indirect [13,67] provision of energy via trade from the Global South to the Global
North and from the hinterland to urban areas [68] would not be maintained. The oil supply crisis
that almost all of the mature industrialized and emerging economies are facing [4] might be further
exacerbated unless these countries, too, transform their energy systems.
It may not feel like we are on the precipice of established power relations toppling in such a
transformation. However, why should an energy system failing in a spectacular way to provide
“a good life for all within planetary boundaries” [36] even exist? Efforts to systematically reduce
and prioritize energy use in order to strengthen decentralized energy systems based on renewable
sources to meet people’s needs are strategically vital in breaking the momentum of the fossil energy
transition [11]. Where established institutions can be challenged to the extent that the fossil energy
transition can be abandoned, the global energy underdogs may come out on top. However, the battle
to this top—like any—is an uphill one.
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Abstract: This paper discusses the current state of thought amongst the Sustainability Indicator (SI)
community, what has been achieved and where we are succeeding and failing. Recent years have
witnessed the rise of “alternative facts” and “fake news” and this paper discusses how SIs fit into this
maelstrom, especially as they are themselves designed to encapsulate complexity into condensed
signals and it has long been known that SIs can be selectively used to support polarized sides of
a debate. This paper draws from chapters in a new edited volume, the “Routledge Handbook of
Sustainability Indicators and Indices”, edited by the authors. The book has 34 chapters written by a
total of 59 SI experts from a wide range of backgrounds, and attempts to provide a picture of the past
and present, strengths and weaknesses of SI development today. This paper is an “analysis of those
analyses”—a mindful reflection on reflection, and an assessment of the malign and benign forces
at work in 2018 within the SI arena. Finally, we seek to identify where SIs may be going over the
coming, unpredictable years.
Keywords: sustainability indicators; gross domestic product; GDP; fake news; tweets
1. Introduction
“The moment we begin to fear the opinions of others and hesitate to tell the truth that is in
us, and from motives of policy are silent when we should speak, the divine floods of light
and life no longer flow into our souls”.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton
We argue in this paper, without trying to be alarmist, that a truly existential issue faces all of us in
the sustainable development community and, in this crisis of truth, Sustainability Indicators (SIs) are at
the epicentre, especially as given the breadth of concerns within sustainable development the variety
of what can be an SI is understandably immense. Here, we use the term “Sustainability Indicator”
to encompass indices (amalgams of indicators). We have also taken a liberal view of what could
be considered to be an “SI” given that sustainability spans the three pillars of social, economic and
environmental dimensions. Similarly, there is “no one SI to rule them all” (although some agencies have
arguably exhibited a Mordor-esqe attitude to SIs on occasion) but a wide diversity of approaches and
indicators, each emerging in their own time and space and designed to meet a defined set of objectives.
Thus, we have seen indices such as the Human Development Index (HDI), Ecological Footprint (EF)
and Environmental Performance Index (EPI) becoming popular and, at the time of writing, we have
the emergence of the targets and indicators linked to the Planetary Boundaries concept [1] as well
as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Indices (aggregations of indicators) such as the HDI
and EPI have evolved over time in response to feedback from researchers and practitioners, and the
ever-increasing availability of data (albeit of varying qualities and arguably still not enough) also acts
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as a spur to change. However, at their heart, we all know that indicators and indices are simplifying
tools designed to capture complexity and help convey information to specialists and non-specialists
alike. This is, of course, well known and there are many published examples spanning decades as
to how this process of simplification results in trade-offs; decisions to exclude and include; and to
manipulate data (for an early review, please see [2]). These are human decisions and, while they are
rationalized by their “owners”, they are nonetheless inherently subjective. It is acknowledged that
not all will agree with those decisions and the reader need look no further than the numerous debates
that have resonated over the years regarding the HDI let alone the EPI and its precursor called the
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI). Morse [2] provided a summary of the debates surrounding
indices such as the HDI and EPI/ESI. We must accept that SIs are not “laws of nature” but human
constructs that reflect the biases, failings, intentions and worldview of their creators. In that sense,
because of the inherent subjectivity all indicators and indices can be labelled as “fake” by at least
someone and they can provide “evidence” (based on different biases, intentions, assumptions and
worldviews) to back it up. Needless to say, this “home truth” may be uncomfortable reading for those
of us in the indicator business.
The SI landscape is certainly a constantly shifting one, and, while much of what we have said in
the previous paragraph is well known, there are still many questions that need answers. Amongst
them are:
• What is the current state of thought amongst the SI community?
• What has been achieved and where were we succeeding and failing?
• What challenges and threats face the informing agency at the heart of the SI process?
• Most seriously and existentially for the indicator oeuvre, is there evidence of a fight on-going for
what we might call “the soul of facts”?
These were questions we had been asking ourselves, especially with the recent rise of “alternative
facts” and “fake news” [3], which take highly selective stances on what are “facts” and the Twitter
phenomenon where complexity is condensed into tweets of just a few hundred characters. “Fake news”
can be believed as “truth” by many people; it can indeed become “realer than real” [4]. At one level,
the rise of the fake news phenomenon in the 2000s is but a recent manifestation of the hoaxes portrayed
by writers such as Edgar Allan Poe in the 19th century. For example, Poe published a short story
(called the “Balloon Hoax”) in the form of a newspaper article that purported to describe the first
crossing of the Atlantic by a manned balloon. The story was very detailed and had a ring of plausibility
about it, hence it was believed by many who first read it in the Sun newspaper published in New York.
It was only later revealed to be a hoax. While Poe certainly did not invent hoaxes, he was one of the
first writers of science fiction and clearly had a fertile mind, even if some have since suggested that the
balloon hoax was derived from other written and contemporary sources [5]. What is different about
the fake news of today compared to the 19th century is its rapid spread and indeed democratization
via social media such as Facebook and Twitter [6]. Anyone with a Twitter account can now make up
their own news and the system facilitates its rapid spread via “re-tweeting”. Re-tweeting has a cascade,
even domino effect which means that a news item can literally be spread to millions of Twitter users
in seconds. How do SIs fit into all of this, especially as they are themselves designed to encapsulate
complexity into condensed signals and it has long been known that SIs can be selectively used to
support polarized sides of a debate? Indeed, are SIs the sustainability equivalent of “tweets”, fulfilling
an innate human thirst for rapid information that simplifies complexity? In addition, do SIs under
certain circumstances play into a desire amongst some for “alternative facts” which can be in some way
customized, even weaponized, to create “formations of terror” in receiving communities [7]? Are we
in a fight about the nature of facts without even knowing it? This post-truth debate has been going on
for a while now. In 2006, Steven Poole [8] and Anthony O’Hear [9] anticipated the rise of trivialization
and the demise of “truth” in public discourse in their respective books. The debates contained in these
books could now be said to have matured. An apparent “easy” answer to these questions rests with
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motivation. Those of us in the “indicator business” think of ourselves as having a good motive; we
want to help bring about a positive change. Hence, the indicators we develop and encourage others to
use are there with the very best of intentions. Poe knew he was writing a hoax and while the offices of
the Sun were besieged with people looking to get the “news” about the balloon crossing, Poe would
no doubt argue that he did not set out to hurt anyone. However, are the modern purveyors of fake
news purposely setting out to cause damage? Some may well, but it might surprise us how genuine
the motives are of those who create and spread such news. It should be noted here that this apparent
similarity between SIs and Twitter/Facebook domain of “quick” and “fake” news is not a similarity
the authors see as a fact, but that it is a fact that (biased) consumers in their echo chambers, and thus
significant parts of the public, may be unable to recognize the difference.
In 2014, a major publisher—Routledge—approached us and asked if we would be interested in
editing a book on SIs. With a combined experience of over 35 thirty years of effort and learning from
responses to our previous books and papers, we felt that this may well be an ideal opportunity to
reflect the history and theory of sustainability measurement, approaches and methods used, agencies
involved and critiques of where we are today and their intended use for “measuring the immeasurable”,
especially the awkward question as to whether SIs play into a desire for “alternative facts”. We begin
this paper with our analysis of the book and in particular the major points which emerged regarding
the future of SIs, and what the authors felt was needed going forward from here. Following that,
we discuss some of the thoughts regarding the point we make above about the future of SIs in
this new era of “fake news” and “tweets”. These thoughts were informed by various points made
throughout the book as well as numerous email communications we have had with contributors since
2014, especially by some authors who were clearly frustrated with what they regarded as the current
state-of-play regarding “non-use” or arguably “misuse” of SIs. As we have noted above, this raises
some uncomfortable (perhaps) issues for those of us in the SI community. Without wishing to be
overly-provocative, are we also playing the same game as those who readily use the term “fake news”
at every opportunity that suits them and use “tweets” to get their messages out? Are we not in a glass
box and perhaps should we stop throwing stones?
2. The Book: An Analysis
2.1. A Brief Tour
In the book, 59 distinguished authors, many of them with decades of experience working on the
“coal face” of SI development, have contributed to map out their past experiences of SIs and reflect
on the future. To provide a summary of the topics covered in the book is never really an adequate
exposition of the richness of the original, and here we can only really set out some brief outlines of
the material and messages. We divided the book into four sections and 34 chapters, as shown in
Figure 1. The topics spanned the theory and history of SIs through to methods, agency experiences
and critical reflections. As editors we sought to avoid a book which simply acted as a shop window
for many “favourite” SIs, but wished to include a more nuanced perspective regarding the many years
of experience the indicator community has amassed with their use. Hence, there are two sections in
the book on experience and reflection.
We should emphasize here that our intention in this paper is not to offer a kind of book editorial
or summary, but instead we have utilized the material in the book as a source of information to address
the questions we set out regarding the future of SIs. In effect, this paper is an “analysis of analyses”,
and, given the material in the book is contemporary and reflective, it does provide a unique resource
on SIs.
Authors in the collection made various and wide-ranging suggestions regarding future work on
SIs, and we have focused on those points that stood out from the various conclusions reached by the
contributors. The points span the following:
1. More case studies on the development/use of SIs
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2. Alternatives to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
3. The growing confusion around data provision
4. The essential need for a more systemic perspective
5. Top-down versus bottom-up
6. Issues around the aggregation of indicators
All of these cover long-established debates in the SI arena, of course, even if some have arguably
received more attention than others. Indeed, it should perhaps not be surprising that they emerged
again as strong points of discussion within the book. However, it was also clear from the chapters that
the debates had moved on and it is useful to set out some of the conclusions that were reached and
what we as editors can conclude from those conclusions.
Figure 1. The structure of our book set in its environment.
2.2. More Case Studies on the Development/Use of Sustainability Indicators
Pintér et al. called for a “richer selection of case studies” to help create “practical and more useful
guidance” regarding Sustainability Assessment and Measurement Principles (STAMP) [10] and the book
had several “case study” chapters which discussed the development and application of SIs; examples
are chapters on experiences with the EPI in Malta [11] and SIs in Finland [12]. There is certainly a
need for more research of this type to allow for the identification of potential generic patterns as to
what works best, or not. However, case study-based research certainly has its critics and challenges,
as those of us who have tried to publish case study-based research findings have repeatedly found.
The dilemma, and one that is so often espoused by paper reviewers and journal editors, is that case
study findings are often not readily generalizable. Hence, they can be dismissed as being “context
specific”, and linked to a specific place and time. How can we derive more universal “truths” from
such work, especially in a world of publication metrics where impact factor (at the level of the journal)
and H-Index (at the level of the individual researcher) increasingly seem to dominate? Competition
for space in the best journals is increasingly intense and journal editors are looking for those papers
that will amplify the journal itself (often by promoting those who are already successful and therefore
less risky) and boost ratings? Given this competition for space, it is easy to appreciate how negative
comments from some reviewers can readily be seized upon and used to reject case study-based work.
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This is not the case for all case-study based papers, of course, and some reviewers and editors are more
amenable and supportive than are others, but we do nonetheless wonder how much is missed.
However, case studies have a place, and in the case of Sis, they allow us to understand much
more about that critical interface with SI users albeit, we accept, in what can be quite context-specific
spaces. Case studies can provide early examples of experiences which may become general trends,
weird results which provoke curiosity, even contradictions to the established opus of “truth”. Hence,
we agree with Pintér et al that a case-study based body of knowledge regarding SIs can allow for
new patterns to emerge (and old ones to be questioned) and that is why we were keen to include case
study experiences in the book [10]. What we perhaps need is a meta-analysis of SI use experiences,
but, to do this, we need the case studies to be peer reviewed and placed in the public domain. This is
very challenging work, as we note later in this paper, but also very valuable. The dilemma, of course,
is how to get such case study-based material on SIs reviewed and published. Maybe there is a need for
a new journal devoted to case studies in sustainability.
2.3. Alternatives to Gross Domestic Product
Dahl, in his chapter on the Contributions to the “Evolving Theory and Practice of Indicators
of Sustainability” [13], reiterated the need for alternative indicators to GDP and suggests material
flow analysis as an integrating approach in sustainability assessment. There are echoes here with
an intriguing call for a “New Bretton Woods” to help achieve a broad consensus regarding alternative
indicators to allow us to move beyond GDP and achieve “measures of what we really want and to achieve
these goals” [14]. However, while the “New Bretton Woods” idea is tantalizing, these calls to explore
alternatives to GDP have been with us for some years with little obvious success to date. Indeed,
one of the rationales for the HDI was as a counter-weight to the economic-based indicators that were
perceived by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to be so dominant in assessing
development. Nonetheless, economic-based indicators still dominate in a world desperate to see the
return of economic growth and prosperity. We flag this issue to contribute to the amassing weight of
evidence that GDP does not provide the necessary or sufficient resilience for twenty first century needs.
However, the question is arguably not whether other indicators are needed but what they should be
and how to get them accepted in the light of experience to date.
2.4. Confusions in Data Provision
Some contributors to the book note the potential of indicators to help support environmental
decision-making but point to continuing problems of data limitation, even if there has been much
improvement and data are no longer as scarce as they once were [15–17]. We very much agree,
as without an adequate availability of good quality indicators there is a likelihood that indicators may
be deeply flawed and hence readily dismissed. Ulla Rosenström made the interesting observation
about how digitization has done little to improve the timeliness of data provision or it “created new
opportunities to measure sustainable development. Too much of the data is still presented on an
annual basis when more real-time databases could be created” [12].
The question, of course, is what it would take to achieve this. Collecting necessary data of the
required quality is likely to be resource-demanding and/or imagination challenging. At one level, we
have a profusion of data being collected of a good quality on a daily basis on mobile phones. However,
how do we lever this for SI purposes? It may be that what we have witnessed so far with digitization
is but a reflection of the limited capability of machines on the one hand and the creative imaginations
of researchers on the other, and as machines become more sophisticated, machine learning begins
to expand and researchers become more aware of the wealth of data incidentally collected second
by second by millions of people, then we may pass into a new age of automation, with machine
and human, digital and analogue combining to revolutionize the concept of the data needed for SIs.
Jean et al. provided an example of using machine learning to help predict poverty, using another tool
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(satellite imagery) which may well grow in importance for populating SIs especially in places where
resources to collect good quality data in the field may be lacking [18].
2.5. A systems Perspective
Walter Vermeulen suggested that “we need to build indicators and index systems based on a
clear guiding vision and key elements” [19] and, in a related vein, Rotz and Fraser called for a greater
acknowledgement that “conceptual and instrumental challenges” of sustainability and resilience are
deeply linked and that “indicators need to be nested in a broader analysis that helps to make sense
of context specific dynamics” [20]. Gilberto Gallopin also called for a more integrated approach that
considers linkages, synergies and antagonisms between goals and targets (and their associated SIs
of course) rather than simple listings under themes as we see with the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) [21]. It is hard to disagree with that or indeed his sombre conclusion that “given that
linear thinking is still dominant in most institutions (including governments), the outlook is rather
pessimistic, at least in the short and medium term”. Herein rests a significant challenge that has been
with us for some time. It has been relatively easy for us to “talk the talk” of such systems approaches
to SIs, and we have also added out voices to this over the years, but linear thinking and desires to
strict accountability over relatively short time periods can work against “walking the talk”. Clearly,
the issues involved here are proving to be far more intractable than we would have thought over
20 years ago when we first began working on SIs. Breaking out of the “linear thinking” cultural
mindset arguably dominant since the advent of the first industrial revolution and prevalent as a
knee-jerk against risky ideas in most institutions clearly requires much more analysis as to why such
thinking has become so dominant in the first place. Some of it is no doubt driven by a legacy of innate
distrust of the individual in the world of work to “deliver” and a commensurate push for an apparent
accountability that makes sure “delivery” can be assessed. In this sense, SIs could be seen to be part
of a more general drive to crudely equate measurement with outcomes relating to inputs (no matter
how spurious the measurement method applied); as if any single input were ever responsible for one
single output. This delusion propagated by the management classes to spuriously link outcomes to
expenditure has been exemplified in the past by planning frameworks such as the “logical framework”
approach [22–26]. The “square peg” mindset of the “log frame” as developed in the 1980s and 1990s
might be said to have found a refined form in the SIs of recent times.
2.6. Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up
A further point linked to the systems perspective is the role of SIs in helping to facilitate the
development of an appreciation of what sustainability and resilience are in any particular context.
Hence, it is not solely a case of SIs being created as an operational output after an understanding of
sustainability and resilience has been arrived at, but SIs as a catalytic precursor to help facilitate such
an understanding. SIs can help ground such discussions and provide tangible representations of what
is seen as relevant and important. We have often advocated such a dialectic and others in the book
have also made the point. For example, Dwi Amalia Sari and colleagues in their chapter on SIs in
complex, multi-functional forest landscapes suggested that “the role of criteria and indicator processes
in these complex and contested situations is perhaps more to allow a structuring of the debate than to
provide a set of boxes to be ticked” [27].
However, one of the dilemma’s here is what to do with the SIs that emerge out of such a dialectic.
Once the SIs have allowed an “arrival” at an understanding and have no doubt passed through a
process of discussion, sieving and modification, then it is possible that they may not necessarily match
the SIs that have been set in a more “top-down and one-way” process by government or other experts.
This is certainly not to say that “top-down and one-way” SIs are bad or irrelevant; they may well
have a strong antecedence of their own and offer advantages such as cross-country and timeline
comparison. Simon Joss and Yvonne Rydin addressed this “bottom-up and dialectic”–“top-down
and one-way” space in the context of urban sustainability and come to understandable conclusion
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that: “What constitutes an appropriate balance between the standard aspects of urban sustainability
frameworks and the local variation of particular applications remains an open discussion in need of
ongoing conceptual and practical exploration” [28].
We very much agree with this sentiment and would postulate that, while much progress has been
made with participatory methodologies and their acceptance within interventions, there does indeed
still seem to be something of an unexplored boundary between SIs developed via such approaches
and those derived “top down” by experts. The dualism implicit in this may be false and, in the
“space” between experts and “people”, emerge many of the intriguing problems which provide the
wider environment for the SI discourse and project. This is surely a space in deep need of mindful
exploration. Either by intent or accident, experts can be perceived (perhaps even presented) as callous
and unworldly, indicators as symptoms of authority and even demagoguery, and the entire SI project
as an example of an educated and liberal elites conspiracy to enforce an agenda at variance with
common sense and social/economic needs. This remains a contaminating issue for the field but maybe
one which could be most richly mined in future research. Where there is contention, there should
research cluster.
2.7. Aggregation of Indicators
One of the fascinating aspects that emerges from the book chapters is the varied views on
aggregation of indicators into indices. Many of the chapters include examples where this has been
done, for example with the EPI [15] and a derivative of the HDI called the Human Sustainable
Development Index (HSDI) [29], but there are some stark warnings as well. As Jesinghaus passionately
put it, “Aggregation is evil when it gives mediatic power to numbers that do not deserve it” [30].
However, and perhaps surprising to us, we do not detect a clear consensus amongst the authors that
more integration is required, and Dahl when summarizing the outcomes of a UN Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD) led process to identify SIs reflects this by noting that “despite repeated
requests from governments, reviews of progress, and the best efforts of the scientific community,
no consensus emerged on highly aggregated indices” [31]. This raises an interesting dilemma. On
the one hand, one of the “givens” often assumed in the indicator world is that aggregated indices
are useful tools as they help present complexity in simple ways. On the other hand, we all seem to
know the risks involved as aggregation can “hide” key decisions over what to aggregate and how
that can, in turn, significantly influence the result and any conclusions that emerge from it. Indeed,
the creators of the HDI say that they have resisted major changes to the index for that very reason
and go to great lengths to present “standardized” (in methodological terms) versions of the HDI to
allow for time-series comparisons [2]. However, it seems that the experts have yet to arrive at a clear
consensus, although this is not for the want of trying. We would argue that the work of Dahl regarding
what “consumers” of SIs want needs to be more fully developed: is there demand for aggregated
indices and are there patterns which exist in this demand between types of SI consumer?
However, the issue of aggregation takes us to the equally contentious issue of what is a fact? How
is an “aggregation of facts” contrived to be meaningful and how does meaning result in an action/
response which is in some way commensurate to the “fact” outlined in the aggregation? What is real
and what is fake in the SI world? This is a question that drives at the very heart of our interests in SIs,
and we provide some thoughts in the next section.
3. Fake Indicators?
Given that SIs occupy that nexus between developers and users, it seems almost inevitable that
there could be an element of selection-bias by the latter [32]. No matter the motives of the SI developers,
some people may indeed want to make selective use of them to convey a message. However, this is a
complex landscape. For example, in one of the first published studies of the use of SIs by government,
Herzi suggested that there are five categories of use [33]:
• Instrumental: Indicators inform decisions that have impacts
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• Conceptual: Catalyse learning and understanding
• Tactical: Substitute for action and deflect criticism
• Symbolic: Ritualistic assurance
• Political: Support a pre-determined position
The first two in the list are arguably the most “positive” uses in the sense that the SIs seemed to
be linked to a desire for genuine improvement, while the other three are arguably more “negative” in
the sense that they seem to be about deflection, false assurance and support of entrenched positions
that may not necessarily be to the benefit of society as a whole. However, while the categories
may seem to be neat, the boundaries between them are blurred, and what one user may genuinely
regard as “instrumental” use of an SI another may vigorously regard as “political”. Thus, in any one
context, and with a suite of SIs available, it is not hard to imagine that different users would select
different SIs to address any of these uses. For the researcher, this may be something of an intriguing
and bewildering minefield, and an attempt to categorize the use of an SI cherished by one group
as “political”, while others may see it as “instrumental” or “conceptual”, can leave him/her open
to the claim of spreading “fake news”. Even if the process of categorization was opened-up to a
kind of democratic decision-making where the majority view rules, it is not guaranteed that those
in the minority would accept it and it is highly likely that at least some of them would not. Even so,
we may argue that it is the majority view which counts and a minority, even if vociferous, is still a
minority. After all, science may not be based on fiat but, in the world of Sis, fiat is arguably the only
game in town. However, here is another symptom of the complexity masked by indicators. Indicator
intention and application relates to psychological choices and these are deep waters worthy and in
need of exploration. For a topical example, the reader need look no further that the June 2016 “Brexit”
referendum and heated debate in the UK associated with it that continues to the time of writing. One of
the most oft-quoted phrases by those on the “leave” campaign (those in favour of Brexit) was that
the UK was the “5th largest economy” in the world and thus, by extrapolation, well-able to flourish
outside of the EU. The phrase was often repeated and is still a key element of the Brexiteers (those who
support Brexit) lexicon. The phrase is claimed to be based on a metric and statistics but is it true?
Well, of course, much depends on the measures one uses to represent the size of the “economy”.
Economies can be measured in various ways and the World Bank has been collating such information
for many years with data readily available at https://data.worldbank.org/. Several indicators could
be employed but here we have focused on just four. In each case, the indicator is founded upon the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) where, using the World Banks definition:
GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion
and degradation of natural resources. [34]
In effect, GDP calculated on the basis of expenditure is given by:
GDP (expenditure) = C + G + I + (EX − IM) (1)
where C is the consumers’ expenditure on goods and services; G is the government expenditure on
goods and services; I is investment; EX is exports; and IM is imports.
The balance of these components will vary across economies [2]. In essence, the assumption here
is that the higher the level of GDP then the greater the “size” of the economy, with an additional
implied assumption that, the bigger the GDP, the better. Jesinghaus certainly made a good case for
treating GDP with care when it comes to sustainable development and care does need to be taken
in assuming that GDP growth is always a good thing, at least for most of a population, as much
depends on distribution [30]. As Peter Bartelmus has noted, the GDP has often been “accused of being
a misleading measure of well-being” [35]. Clearly, it is not such a measure and was never intended
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to be; unfortunately, it has become the key barometer of national economic performance and, in the
minds of many, this is very much associated with well-being. However, is GDP an SI? It does, of course,
sit within the economic domain often included in sustainable development. However, it needs to
be noted here that, while GDP may not be unanimously regarded as an SI, it has certainly found its
way into indices often considered to be part of the SI stable, such as the HDI (where GDP/capita is
regarded as a measure of “income”) and even within components of the Environmental Sustainability
Index (ESI), the precursor of the EPI. In addition, GDP is often used as an independent variable for
exploring environmental performance, as with the Environmental Kuznet Curve models [2]. It needs
to be stressed that GDP is not itself a “bad” indicator, and, as Bartelmus noted, we do need to be careful
not to discard the GDP: “There is indeed no other place where standardized measures of economic
activities can be found and presented to policy makers in a meaningful “nutshell”. Individuals,
corporations, and trade unions can compare information on their economic situation and prospects
with those of their own country and other nations” [35].
One can indeed use the GDP for international comparisons by converting local currencies to the
U.S.$ using exchange rates (GDP current U.S.$). However, a complication, of course, is that the size of
a country’s GDP expressed as U.S.$ could fluctuate over time as the exchange rate fluctuates. To allow
for fluctuations in relative currency value over time, caused by inflation for example, GDP could be
based on a single reference point and the World Bank provide an estimate of GDP using exchange
rates for 2010. A further refinement is to adjust the GDP to allow for changes in the “purchasing
power” of currencies, which is referred to as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Purchasing Power Parity
is much more than a simple adjustment for exchange rate and is based on the knowledge that one
US$ will buy different quantities of goods and services across the globe. As the World Bank define
it: “Purchasing Power Parity GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using
purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as
the U.S. dollar has in the United States.”
Purchasing Power Parity adjusted GDP could also be based on current exchange rates and
an exchange rate fixed to one particular year (as above). Table 1 provides a summary of the four
indicators. Using these four indicators of economy “size”, the ranking of the UK amongst the countries
of the globe is shown in Figure 2. The numbers of newspaper articles published each year that
mention the phrases “5th largest economy” and “fifth largest economy” in relation to the UK are
also shown. These data have come from the Nexis database of global media publications (https:
//www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/nexis.page) but specifically searching newspapers where
these phrases appears in English referring to the UK. The Nexis database has been applied in several
published studies designed to explore reporting of indicators in the media [36–39]. Unsurprisingly,
the number of “mentions” of the phrase surged in 2016, and is also higher than the 2010–2014 norm
in 2015 when speculation over the referendum was rife and in 2017 as the UK started negotiating
the terms of its exit from the EU. Prior to the 2015–2017 period, the terms appeared in the press, but
the incidence was less than 100 articles per annum. Immediately after the referendum result in 2016,
the value of the Pound Sterling fell by 10% against the U.S.$; indeed, it hit a 31 year low, and this
would have affected the value of the GDP calculation expressed in US$ and the country’s ranking in
the “size of the economy” league tables.
However, does the use of the “5th largest economy” term match the reality? Well, with GDP
(expressed as current U.S.$) and GDP (expressed as constant 2010 US$), the answer seems to be “no”
The UK tends to fluctuate between 6th and 7th between 2010 and 2016, although it did hit a peak of
5th in 2015 for the GDP (current U.S.$) indicator. Nonetheless the “5th largest economy” claim that
was so loudly proclaimed in 2016 is hardly convincing. However, let us provide some benefit of the
doubt here, as such calculations are complex and say that the GDP (current U.S.$) and GDP (constant
2010 U.S.$) are at least in the right ballpark and the ranking based on GDP (current U.S.$) is close to
being true. Nonetheless, “fifth” does obviously sound better than claims of “sixth” or “seventh”.
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Table 1. Summary of four indicators of economic “size”. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) [40] .
Indicator Name Notes (as Provided by the World Bank for Each Indicator)
GDP (constant 2010 U.S.$)
Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are
converted from domestic currencies using 2010 official exchange
rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does
not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange
transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used.
GDP (current U.S.$)
Data are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are
converted from domestic currencies using single year official
exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange
rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign
exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used.
GDP, PPP (constant 2011 international $) Data are in constant 2011 international dollars.
GDP, PPP (current international $)
Data are in current international dollars. For most economies
PPP figures are extrapolated from the 2011 International
Comparison Program (ICP) benchmark estimates or imputed
using a statistical model based on the 2011 ICP. For 47 high- and
upper middle-income economies, conversion factors are
provided by Eurostat and the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Figure 2. Four indicators of measuring the size of the UK economy and the rank of the UK in the global
“league table” using those measures [40].
However, the same cannot be said of the two GDP indicators adjusted for purchasing power,
a commonly applied technique for adjusting GDP over many years [41]. With these PPP-adjusted
measures, the UK typically ranks between 9th and 10th—some considerable distance away from
the “5th largest economy” claim. However, in fairness, it should be noted that PPP has attracted
criticism from some economists [42], although there is logic in the notion that PPP adjustments allow
for differing purchasing power across economies, and hence reduce any distortions that might arise.
However, there is little, if any, evidence to suggest that the PPP adjustment GDPs were employed
by those advocating for Brexit. Similarly, while Figure 2 does not include the figures if the GDP
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and GDP PPP are calculated on a per capita basis, the UK ranks even lower in those “league table”.
Per capita adjustments allow for the fact that the value of the GDP may be linked to population size:
the more people there are then the greater the flow of money in the system. This is not always the
case, of course, and can distort the rankings as countries with small populations and low corporate tax
regimes can rank very high purely because companies introduce processes to ensure that a lot of their
taxable income flows through them, but it is a widely used adjustment of GDP nonetheless. The HDI,
for example, uses the GDP PPP adjusted on a per capita basis and has long argued in favour of that as
an indicator of income even if the HDI engineers have sought to cap high values of GDP PPP/capita
in various ways to prevent a distorting effect on the index [37]. However, all of these adjustments
were ignored by the Brexit supporters and instead the focus was on the most “favourable” measure for
their case—the GDP based on current US$. They would regard this as an “instrumental” use of the
indicator as it was being used by them to help inform an important decision. Others, based upon the
evidence presented above, may see it as more of a symbolic or ritual use.
We as SI developers and practitioners should not be surprised by any of this, and indeed it
does have to be stressed that, while we have used the Brexit “hot house” period of intense debate to
illustrate the selective used of indicators, this is by no means an issue solely linked to that time and
place. It goes with the “indicator territory” and we must accept, whether we like it or not, that the
indicators we develop or promote may be “used” in ways that we did not intend or that users may
be highly selective in their choices [32]. Indicators do not have any special privileges in the complex,
“messy” real world of decision making where those who take the decisions are being influenced by
implicit and explicit concerns and pressures, and it would naïve to think that an SI, no matter how
well-crafted or presented, would be a sole, pure source of influence. Even efforts to develop neat
looking typologies of SI use have to contend with a multitude of interactions and forces as well as
multiple perspectives on what our apparently “well defined” categories mean. In a sense, we are part
of that mess and are playing the same game as everyone else; maybe we just do not reflect on it as much
as we should. As Rotz and Fraser noted: “we must remain focused on understanding the conditions
within which sustainability and resilience get manipulated in the interests of political-economic and
social empowerment and capital accumulation. How are these concepts deployed by different groups,
and for what possible ends?” [20].
If we wish to produce an SI that will somehow be above all of this, then maybe we would be
chasing the end of a rainbow—we would be seeking to “know” in a manner which is culturally
and ethically “neutral”. As social and psychological actors in the world with innumerable stakes in
outcomes of diverse kinds this can never be possible. In the same vein, if we are in the business of
producing indicators to help make a difference by influencing those with power then we must expect
that power to also have an impact on the uses it puts to those indicators. We cannot have it both ways.
Decision-making is a complex process and decision-makers will be subject to many influences and
motives. However, does this mean that we have to stop trying and accept that we will always be
producing and promoting “fake” indicators, at least in the eyes of some? Well no—not at all. We live in
a world where many (rapidly becoming “most”) people get their news from social media outlets such
as WhatsApp, LinkedIn, Twitter and Facebook. This context demands that complex events be reduced
to “Tweets” of just a few hundred characters. Such simplifications are pernicious and viral. They can
influence the thinking of many people. At the time of writing, Twitter has over 300 million “active”
users across most countries of the globe, and the President of the USA (perhaps the most influential
global citizen) is using it to get highly subjective points over directly to the public—presenting as
truth—and it seems will readily re-tweet “news” without necessarily checking its veracity.
There is an appetite for communication tools that seek to present complexity in ways that busy
people can interact with but with simplification come consequences. To some extent SIs are trying
to do the same thing and there is also an appetite for them, but as with Twitter there are profound
dangers to the consumers of such simplification. This brings us neatly into what we think the messages
in the book tell us about the future of SIs.
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4. Discussion and Tentative Conclusions
What conclusions can we come to regarding the future of SIs based upon material provided by
contributors to the new book on SIs? Do we see any resonance between SIs and the world of “fake
news” and “tweets”? Do SIs play into a desire amongst some for “alternative facts”? Are we in
the SI community living in a glass box and should we stop throwing stones? Indeed, what is the
future of SIs? Well, it would appear we are in something of a fight on a number of fronts, spanning
familiar battlefields such as aggregation, stakeholder participation and the need for good quality data
to less-well trodden territory such as the need for more published case studies on the use of SIs so
insights can be drawn. There is no other way of putting it. However, perhaps the front that is of
greatest concern to us is a fight of an existential nature in terms of reasonably objective and verifiable
facts as counters to the “fake news” agenda. We recognize the reality that interest groups will always
make selective and distorted use of indicators. That is the price we pay for being human beings
involved in the objective/ subjective indicator business. Thus, we would like to see a greater emphasis
in research on the space between production and use. Specifically, the uses to which SIs are put and
how that information can feed back into the development and presentation of SIs. As Giangiacomo
Bravo succinctly put it: “Any index inevitably is the product of a number of more or less arbitrary
choices (not only scientific ones, since politics often plays a major role)” [29].
From what we have seen before, clearly, there is no magic bullet or one-size-fits-all here; no SI can
ever be made immune to all manner of intended and accidental distortion and we need to be aware of
our own biases. This is a point echoed by Joachim H. Spangenberg:
Indicator users should be aware of the limitations each indicator, index or indicator system
has, partly from the method of calculation, but also from the often-hidden assumptions
inherent to the world views from which they have been derived. Practitioners should
choose and combine the indicators they use carefully, being fully aware of these biases
and their impacts on both the measurement and the messages derived from it, implicitly
or explicitly [43].
SIs are, after all, human constructs and their development and use can be subject to the same
biases that drive the “echo chambers” we see in Twitter and Facebook. However, that human fallibility
must not dissuade us for further development of SIs and seeking new ways for presenting them to
a defined group (or groups) of consumer(s). We just need to be more reflective in our assumptions,
smarter in our use and have a better sense who our consumers are, what they are looking for and how
we can best help. To date, SI development has been almost entirely “creator-led” with little, if any,
input from consumers of those SIs—those we intend to use them. That balance needs to shift so that
we as creators move towards a model of co-creation with the voices of SI consumers being part of
the process. This is not a new call, of course, and we amongst many others have been saying it for
years, including Almassy and Pinter [44], but we still feel that much more progress is required and for
us this is a key element in the future of SIs. As Ulla Rosenström has noted: “good indicators are of
little influence and importance if they are not used in any way. Although use does not guarantee the
desired influence, aiming at use is well argued for. Hence efforts to create opportunities for use and
disseminating information remain crucial” [12].
The “Indicator Policy Fact Sheets” proposed by Janoušková et.al are one tangible suggestion to
“help SI users (most often decision- and policy-makers) choose and use the most appropriate indicators
for assessing particular sustainability issues” [45]. However, maybe there is a deeper issue at the
heart of this issue. Maybe the indicator community (along with many other areas of rationalism)
were labouring under a misapprehension that we are, as Steven Pinker suggested in his opus—“The
Better Angels of our Natures” [46]—living in a more rational world. A world where instinctive and
knee jerk reactions are beginning to fade out in the on-rush of rational and objective decision making.
Of course, this has been a dream for time out of mind. Since Plato’s “Philosopher Kings” through to
Saint Simon and Auguste Comte’s concepts of a new social doctrine based on science and today’s
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algorithmic governance by global data corps such as Facebook, humankind has sought what we may
consider to be an illusion of a rational world. A world governed by clear data, un-contestable facts and
wise administration. To some extent the whole SI debate might be seen as a sub-set of this project—a
rationalizing project to save human beings from their instinctive and irrational selves.
Sadly, this does not seem to be working terribly well. Plato’s Republic remains a paper dream
only, Saint Simon and Comte’s technocracy could not dispel the terror of the French Revolution and
the power of global algorithms raise as much “1984” and “Brave New World” angst as they do hopes
for a better world. Indeed, the total transparency which Facebook might be argued and provoking,
mimicked and played to horrific levels in David Egers book “The Circle” appears only as a nightmare
of algorithm-led social engineering. Knee-jerk reactions, the denial of “evidence-based facts” with
disdain, the assumption of subjective “truth” and the trust in instinct seems to be prevalent and has
been argued to lead to more terror and even an amplification of terror based on compounding cycles
of unreasonable social fear [7].
The experiences of the authors of this book with the complexity of the indicator/indices fields,
the short comings of any statistical means to address complex truths, the uneven and evolving nature
of the field and the issues of objectivity and subjectivity remain as on-going strategic and tactical issues,
logistic complexities set against a much more troubling background—the human proclivity to the
irrational and the dupes of the sellers of snake oil. While the challenges arising from the (necessary
and intentional) simplification, and the questions of manipulation and instrumentalisation associated
with SIs are not new, they have arguably gained new urgency far beyond the statistical and policy
advisory professions in the context of the age of “fake news”.
The arguments we set out in this paper bear witness to the long, hard and arduous task of
understanding—understanding how human beings interact with social, technical and environmental
issues, and how the psychology of the human attempts to measure the immeasurable and make sense
of the world so that in the future there will be a world to make sense of. It is a testimony to the noble
attempt at the measurement of the immeasurable. They are a step towards sustainability, resilience and
what we have called elsewhere “the saving of the human project” [47]. On the road so far, great progress
has been made. Hosts of indicators and indices have been constructed to try and influence people
with power (including the public) to do wiser things. There remains important second order work to
engage with. This can be framed in terms of continuing reflection on the formulation of indicators by
experts and communities, the strategic, tactical and operational value and targeting of indicators and
the development of forms of assessment. All of these have been mulled over but the mulling is in its
infancy and has not as yet taken into account the fearsome push-back of those hostile to the sense of
the SI project. We must not forget, we are in an existential fight.
We are not at the end of the SI process, but we may be at the end of the beginning. Battle lines are
still being drawn up.
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Abstract: Sustainability assessment approaches could support all levels of decision-making and
policy processes (including strategies, policies, plans, programs, projects, and activities/operations),
thus improving the management of natural and human systems. Sustainability Indicators (SIs) have
been extensively used to assess and communicate the progress toward sustainable development.
However, despite all the SI initiatives and the well-known advantages and popularity, several risks
have been pointed out, so there is a need to rethink the current state of SIs and build visions that
could reshape the indicator reality. The main goal of this research is to develop a constructive debate
around the possible futures and paths of SIs’, by conducting a critical analysis of a set of challenges
and opportunities identified by the literature. This was explored through a critical perspective and
viewpoint article that discusses what could be some of the new frontiers and paradigms in SIs.
Exploratory research supported by a combination of methods was conducted, consisting of a search
of the literature and qualitative document analysis, followed by an assessment procedure based
upon an evaluation ranking scale. The classification scale integrated three main criteria of valuation:
Relevancy, feasibility, and societal impacts. The findings showed that most of the challenges and
opportunities analyzed are old and mainly technically oriented, with a low potential impact on
society, including end-users and practitioners. The majority of the challenges have low-to-medium
feasibility, showing that there would be difficulty in implementing them, and so they should be
improved or redesigned. A set of key questions on SIs’ futures is proposed, aiming to represent a
critical view of the relevant challenges and opportunities analyzed, but underpinned and observed
from a crosscutting angle, represented by the societal role. The SI research community should be
ready to adapt ways of thinking and doing, responding to new global and local paradigms and
using transdisciplinary collaborative scientific development and innovation as the foundations for
the change process, wherein communities and the individual have central roles to play.
Keywords: sustainable development; indicators; stakeholders; goals; challenges; opportunities;
societal impact
1. Introduction
In the monitoring, assessment, and reporting of sustainability, one of the main ends is to support
decision-making and policy processes, thus improving the management of socio-ecological systems and
achieving more sustainable outcomes with fewer negative effects, as discussed by several authors [1–3].
In addition, to support policy development and management strategies, sustainability evaluation,
reporting, and governance initiatives should integrate and reflect the uncertainty and complexities of
human and natural system interactions, and face global challenges toward sustainable development [4].
Despite the existence of several non-consensual definitions, interpretations, and methods [5], the term
”sustainability assessment” is often used to refer to ex post and forward-looking ex ante approaches [6],
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aiming to characterize the sustainability state (covering the environmental, social, economic, and
institutional/governance dimensions) of a current implemented situation or to predict the potential
effects of an activity prior to its implementation, respectively. Sustainability assessments can support
decision-making processes, playing a role in the strategic and operational levels of planning and
project processes, including policies, plans, programs, projects, and activities or operations that address
sustainable development goals and targets, independently of their specific context and mission.
There is a significant diversity of methods and tools to assess and report sustainable development
(SD). However, indicators are one of the approaches most used, playing a central role in the
sustainability assessment of every decision-making process, as noted by Sala [7] and Pope [5], in
particular to communicate sustainability performance to stakeholders [8]. Nevertheless, at the same
time, sustainability assessment theoretical approaches and practice are currently in a relative initial
phase of development [9], where early practice is being adapted to fit new situations and new contexts.
Practice has not yet reached a situation where particular methods or approaches are proven to
work well.
Despite the current importance and popularity of indicators at an international level [10,11], their
development and use is not very recent, since some of the first important references date from the 1970s,
for instance, [12–14] mainly focusing on the environmental aspects. In the last decades, there has been a
proliferation of sustainability indicator initiatives worldwide (e.g., [15–17]), often labelled and criticized
as an “indicator factory” that produces countless initiatives, which mainly serve the individuals or
organisations closely involved in designing, producing, and disseminating indicators, as discussed by
Rinne et al. [18]. They range from global to local and citizen levels, including transnational, national
(countries), regional (e.g., states, regions, provinces), local (e.g., municipalities, cities, localities),
organizational (e.g., companies, public agencies, universities, non-governmental organizations),
economic sectors (e.g., energy, transports, agriculture), households, communities/families, and
individuals, as well as ecosystems.
The massive literature and the uncoordinated and independent practice on sustainability
indicators (SIs) have brought no consensus around methodologies—not even agreements on conceptual
frameworks, or clarifications of the different terms. As noted by Bell and Morse [19], numerous books,
articles and reports have been written, attesting to the popularity and relevance of the field, and
yet very few resources exist that tell the full story of the SI phenomenon. Several authors insist
that the way forward for SIs should be stronger harmonization at different territorial/organization
levels and functions (e.g., [20,21]). Others argue that sustainability indicators must incorporate
sufficient flexibility, yet still be culturally and universally appropriate, emphasizing the need to develop
tailor-made approaches [22]. There is a will to channel diversity and at the same time standardize some
concepts and methods. SIs have also been criticized for trying to assess sustainability complexities
through quantitative and restricted indicator approaches, but mostly for being ineffective in changing
decision-making processes and outcomes [23].
Related to the specific challenges, threats, and opportunities of the past, current and future roles
for SIs are the use of different definitions of the terms sustainable development (SD), sustainability,
and indicators, which have been explored over the past decades. As discussed by Bolis et al. [24], the
conceptual complexity is significant when dealing with sustainability, since this concept means many
things to different people, and this diversity of meaning tends to increase over time. The concept of SD
is charged with uncertainties and complexities, as it involves and balances several different dimensions.
As stressed by Hussey et al. [25] and Lozano [26], SD-related terms have been considered subjective,
complex, controversial, and open-ended, and the indicator terminology is still rather confusing and not
well established [27]. Since the indicator movement and boom that started in the early 1990s [24], the
term ”indicator” has been used rather loosely to include almost any sort of quantitative information or
statistic [28].
SIs reflect the issues and paradigms that have been most studied in practice. However, as
highlighted by Ramos [17] and Viegas et al. [29], sustainability frontiers should also be built upon
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non-traditional aspects of sustainability, including immaterial values of sustainability, such as ethics,
culture, esthetics, justice, compassion, mutual help, moderation, and solidarity. Sustainability indicator
research and practical approaches have to be transdisciplinary and flexible in order to include
emerging issues and deal with aspects that have been overlooked in previous research. As explored by
Lang et al. [30], to deal with real-world problems, as well as with the goals of sustainability science as
a transformational scientific field, approaches like transdisciplinary, community-based, interactive, or
participatory research are often suggested as appropriate means.
Conventional SIs and related tools have long been used to assess sustainability, and much progress
has been achieved. However, it has become necessary to start rethinking their roles and applicability.
The approval of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at the United Nations (UN) with 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 169 targets, and 232 indicators [31] represents a paramount
opportunity for transitions to new paradigms and ways of thinking in assessing sustainability.
Despite their weaknesses and limitations (see, e.g., Spangenberg [32]), SGDs create visibility for
SIs, where indicator-based assessments are presented as key evidence-based approaches to support
SDG implementation and benchmarking [33], giving room for research, innovation, and change.
As noted by Bell and Morse [19] (pp. 1), “we have never been so much in need of indicators to
assess, in an impartial and confirmable manner, the outlines of our changing, developing, resilient, and
threatened world,” in a growing “post-truth reality.” There is a decline in official data and information
credibility, where objective facts are less influential in shaping public views. Therefore, desires and
opinions appeal to emotion and personal beliefs, calling for a sustainability assessment change of
paradigm. The official truth provided by raw data, statistics, and indicators should be able to integrate
and weight non-official inputs, such as societal values, aspirations, desires, perceptions, opinions, and
ultimately data collected by stakeholders, as explored by Coutinho et al. [34] and Domingues et al. [35],
in a balanced and trustworthy approach. Social or multi-stakeholder collaborative networks, as
presented in Kelly and Moles [36], could play an important role is these processes.
In the last 40 years, various studies have identified and discussed the strengths and weaknesses
of SIs, addressing the most relevant challenges. Some of those major challenges are related to the
use of indicators [3,37], with the need to define clear, simple, and robust frameworks for presenting
the indicators, and supported by the engagement of those who are involved in the indicator process,
including the potential users. Recent works repeated these attempts and systematized a vast array of
challenges and opportunities for SIs, e.g., [38]. However, when analyzing those lists, and despite the
value of several of the identified items noted by the international literature analyzed in the work of
Verma and Raghubanshi [38], several of them are too general, outdated, redundant, and somewhat
blurred. This is also true for the discussion around the specific challenge of SI selection criteria,
where most related indicator studies keep using and recommending a substantial number of criteria.
As demonstrated by several authors, e.g., [39–42], the vast number of SI selection criteria causes
significant complexity and ineffectiveness, and is often associated with subjectivity, redundancy, and
alienation from the reality of indicator practice. Therefore, it has been increasingly assumed that
indicator development and selection criteria should be tested and evaluated, through assessment by
the end-users and other stakeholders [41,43], for example to ascertain their importance to select SIs,
confronting their theoretical grounds and the potential relevance versus their practical effectiveness
and usefulness.
The main goal of this research was to develop a constructive debate around the possible futures
and paths of SIs’, conducting a critical analysis of a set of challenges and opportunities identified by
the literature. This was explored through a critical perspective and viewpoint article that discusses
what could be some of the new frontiers and paradigms in SIs.
This paper is organized as follows: After the introduction, which presents an overview of and
international context for the research, the research gap is presented, including the fundamentals to
discuss indicator challenges and opportunities. Then the main research goal is detailed. In Section 2,
the methods used to develop the research are outlined, followed by Section 3, with the main findings
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and discussion of new SIs frontiers and paradigms. In Section 4, final remarks are presented, and the
contribution to knowledge and the paper’s implications are highlighted.
2. Methodological Approach
Inductive-exploratory research was conducted through a combination of methods, consisting of
a search of the literature and qualitative document analysis, followed by an assessment procedure
supported by an evaluation ranking scale, as discussed by Saunders et al. [44].
The document analysis focused mainly on the scientific literature on approaches, concepts,
methods, and frameworks, or case study applications that deal with assessing and reporting
sustainability through indicator initiatives. This analysis was essentially comparative of the main SI
challenges and opportunities identified. It was explored whether and how they overcome the major
drawbacks and limitations of SIs, looking at differences, highlights, and novelties between documents.
Although the search procedure mainly followed a subjective approach, rather than systematic, it took
into consideration a minimum level of regularity in the analyzed literature that covered SIs’ challenges
and opportunities. Issues that are seldom pointed out, not clearly presented, or not well grounded
were not included in the analysis. To identify and review the selected documents, the keywords
challenges, limitations, drawbacks, opportunities, strengths, weaknesses, threats, sustainability indicators, and
sustainable development indicators were particularly considered to support this exploratory analysis.
A critical evaluation of a set of challenges and opportunities was then conducted. The criteria
used to support the analysis were Relevancy, covering technical and scientific importance, Feasibility,
covering the possibility of implementation and operability, as explored by Ramos et al. [27], and
Societal Impacts, related to the usefulness to society in terms of SD desires, aspirations, values, and
needs. Therefore, elements such as potential community added value, contribution to public policies,
and initiatives and contribution to community sustainable development objectives, as identified in
Bornmann (2012) [45], were included in the analysis of this third criterion. A ranking scale of Poor,
Moderate, and High, varying from low to high values of Relevancy, Feasibility, and Societal Impacts,
was used to evaluate each challenge and opportunity. The evaluation process was mainly supported
by the insights collected in the document analysis and weighted through qualitative expert knowledge.
There are limitations associated with exploratory qualitative research design and the inherent
flexibility and adaptability. Validity, reliability, and generalizability [44,46] are limitations of this type
of approach, and were weighed up in the qualitative assessment and discussion of the results, and
when drawing the conclusions.
3. Findings and Discussion of New Frontiers and Paradigms
3.1. Evaluation of the Indicator Challenges and Opportunities
Findings make clear that the analyzed set of SI challenges and opportunities have high relevancy
(Table 1), and are considered a significant priority for action in the literature, e.g., [38] and [47], as
demonstrated by the rationale that supported this evaluation (see the Appendix A for more details).
In all, few of the identified challenges and related opportunities simultaneously received a
classification of high relevancy, feasibility, and societal impact. Most of the current challenges and
opportunities are old and repeated by the literature (see, for example, the limitations and questions
raised in the 1970s by the work of Ott [14]).
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Table 1. Evaluation of the selected sustainability indicator (SI) challenges and opportunities,
according to the three main criteria (Relevancy, Feasibility, and Societal Impacts), ranked in the
following categories.
Selected Challenges and Opportunities Relevancy Feasibility Societal Impacts
#1. Richer selection of case studies  M  H  H
#2. Specific cultural context  
H  M  H
#3. Adequate level of standardization  
H  M  H


















#7. Integrated and systemic and holistic perspective  
H  M  L
#8. Optimum level of indicator aggregation  M  L  H


















#12. Find the best selection criteria  
H  M  H
#13. Institutionalisation process and governance models  
H  M  L
#14. Satellite remote sensing and other observing
technologies  
H  M  L














; Moderate  
M
; Low  
L
.
Overall, they are technically oriented, and are meaningless or too complex for end-users’
understanding, even for practitioners who are non-indicator experts, following the same pattern
identified for SIs themselves and the surrounding discourse, which is often developed by scientists
and expressed in abstruse language [43,48], and mainly useful for the people who designed them.
Almost half of the analyzed challenges have a potential low impact on society, since their opacity
or technicality move them away from users’ perceptions and interests. Therefore, a central topic to
deal with low social understanding and usefulness could be the promotion of societal collaborative
networks, involving decision makers, researchers, practitioners, communities, and individuals, as also
explored by Domingues et al. [35] and Kelly and Moles [36]. These networks could provide mutual
support and learning, and mitigate the low social impact.
Overall, despite the high relevancy, they have low-to-medium feasibility, showing that there will
be great difficulty in implementing them, often due to their inherent complexity and operability, or
the resources needed. The current state shows that it has become necessary to rethink SI priorities
to overcome old and new barriers, and to make future steps toward the Sustainable Development
Goals, as established by the United Nations [31]. Several of the analyzed challenges and opportunities
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remain unanswered or are still in the early stages of development, and are not yet covered by sufficient
theoretical and empirical knowledge and evidence.
Two of the challenges (“#1. A richer selection of case studies” and “#8. Optimum level of indicator
aggregation”) were classified with medium relevancy mainly because, despite their relative importance,
they represent aspects that are already well covered by the existing literature and practice, or their
importance is not confirmed (see Table A1 in the Appendix A).
3.2. Exploring New Frontiers and Paradigms
Despite important progress and the existing vast amount of literature, SIs are still an
underexplored field of study. The analyzed set of indicator challenges and opportunities call for
a critical analysis of some specific challenges. Exploring new frontiers and paradigms of SIs leads to
unanswered epistemological questions, such as “How was the original development of SIs conceived?”
and “Why do serious-minded communities of decision makers and theorists still believe sustainability
can be measured in an objective sense?” [49] (pp. 205).
A crosscutting challenge for SIs is that the lack of an endogenous indicator’s theory hinders the
development of the indicator’s research into an autonomous scientific field and limits indicators to
the ecological, social, or economic fields [50], meaning that researchers can only conduct the study of
indicators within their subjects of expertise. Therefore, SI evolution is often stuck in sectoral frontiers
(ecological, sociocultural, economic, institutional) and facing different barriers, depending on the angle
from which they are viewed. They are often not grounded in effective integrated and interdisciplinary
sustainability studies, which are not just a sum of different parts, and usually do not include the time
dimension and intergenerational equity evaluation, which is a fundamental SD pillar [51,52].
Another central issue to consider in this discussion is related to indicator data, where SIs have
a key part to play in the crisis of truth: “We are in a fight, and we recognize the reality that interests
will always make selective and distorted use of indicators. That is the price we pay for being in the
indicator business” [47] (pp. 553). SIs need to deal with reality, where the value of official data is
in question. Furthermore, some other related drawbacks from the existing indicator approaches are
that oftentimes, and in spite of the investment put into the compilation of SIs and respective data,
stakeholders feel that either the information is not easily accessible or usable, or it is incomplete or
sometimes obsolete by the time it reaches the user [53], and therefore not useful.
SIs should be ready to rethink the “old” and “new” world challenges, and deal with the complexity,
scale, and unpredictability of many of the current SD questions: A multifaceted mix of post-truth reality,
scientific developments, global changes, globalization, social crises (e.g., environment, poverty, and war
refugees), economic growth pressures versus de-growth thinking, and new technological opportunities
and risks. SIs should also be able to respond to non-traditional aspects of sustainability [17,29],
also referred to as a less tangible ”fourth pillar” or ”missing dimension” of sustainability [29,54],
particularly those involving sustainability ethics, culture, esthetics, justice, compassion, mutual help,
moderation, solidarity, and general non-material values, as well as goal and target uncertainty, new
and old limits of natural-human systems, or the blurred distinction between peacetime and wartime,
collaborative learning, voluntary monitoring, and crowd sourcing.
Besides a community perspective, where each community has to develop its individual set of
indicators [55] and be an actor in a multi-stakeholder collaborative network [36], each individual
should play a central role in sustainability assessment [56], being more ambitious than ”simply”
measuring and reporting. Each one should be a pivotal asset, using and assessing their own selection
of Sis and applying them at any desired and feasible scale, from households to ecosystems, following a
stakeholder-driven approach for sustainability assessment [34,35] as previously stressed. This diversity
of concepts, approaches, methods, and frameworks for SIs is usually presented as the root of the
increased difficulty in providing reliable and robust comparisons among different situations. This
should be used as an opportunity to face SD complexities and singularities, improving and developing
the use of tailor-made approaches conducted by citizen volunteers.
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In this context, academia has a paramount role to play [17], including as an example for the rest
of society through its scientific knowledge, independence, transparency, and proactive and facilitating
behavior. Higher education institutions could help stakeholders deal with the new opportunities and
risks of sustainability [57], including teaching and educating for observing, listening, understanding,
and following up the progress toward SD.
The evolutionary stages of adherence between future indicator paths and reality will guide
initiatives in several major areas, as identified in the previous section (see also Table A1 and the
Appendix A). Regardless of the importance of all those topics identified and evaluated, it is proposed
here that indicator progress should particularly address the angles that will impact society, as already
emphasized by other works, e.g., [48,56], and assuming the individual as a central dimension for future
developments in SIs (e.g., using a technological device to collect, upload, and report SIs, tagging and
interacting in real-time word situations, such as noise level, water quality data, urban degradation,
or street poverty and crime). This will be underpinned by an unpredictable changing world of new
technologies and platforms of gathering, sharing, and spreading data and information [53,58,59].
In the context of the current critical perspective and viewpoint paper, and supported by the
evaluation conducted previously, a set of key questions on SIs’ futures are proposed (Figure 1). These
questions aim to represent an integrated view of the relevant challenges and opportunities analyzed,
but are underpinned and observed from a crosscutting angle, represented by the societal role.
•Who needs and who wants SIs?
•Who are demanding changes and pushing for more effective 
sustainability assessments and SIs?
•Who are accessing and using SIs?
•Who is impacting SIs outcomes? 
Who
•What is the society purpose of having SIs?
•What are the implications for end-users of easy, friendly, simplistic 
indicator approaches to assess and communicate sustainability 
limits (physical, ecological and social limits of sustainability issues)?
•What effective changes are SIs driving on daily life of governments, 
organisations, communities, families, individuals? And at what 
levels of decision? Strategies, policies, plans, projects, products, 
activities/operations, behaviours, attitudes?
What
•Where SIs are being more effective for the society and should be 
preferentially communicated? At what spatial and institutional 
scale: local information to local stakeholders? Regional information 
to local and regional stakeholders? Individuals, households? Public 
organisations? Companies? Non-governmental organisations? 
Academia and research institutions? 
•Where SIs information should be provided to improve accces and 
use? Internet webpages? Emails? Postal mail? Newspapers? 
Outdoor monitors? Public audiences?
Where
•When should collaborative SIs be planned, designed, implemented 
and reported to reach higher social adhesion and impact? What are 
the best time stages and time slots to collaborative SIs 
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•How SIs are being reached, viewed, understand and 
used? 
•How reliable or uncertain are perceived the SIs?
•How stakeholders could be effectively engaged to drive 
assessing and reporting sustainability issues for 
incorporation into policy: volunteer collaborative 
contributions to data selection; gathering and 
assessment; and crowd sourcing?
•How indicator selection approaches could improve the 
society utility and validity?
•How and what type of stakeholders are contributing to 
indicator development, including identification, selection, 
data feeding, results assessment, reviewing and 
governance? 
•How individual stakeholders’ views, opinions and values 
shape the self-assessments of SIs, goals and targets? How 
this could be used to critically analyse results of 
sustainability self-assessments conducted by 
stakeholders?
•How to integrate “immaterial societal values" in indicator 
approaches and what SIs should be used for this 
purpose?
•How and what SIs should be developed to allow 
individual citizens to use their “own indicators” as a 
personal tailored-made tool or device to assess 
sustainability? — where each one should be a pivotal 
asset, using and assessing their own selection of SIs, from 
households to ecosystems.
How
Figure 1. Key questions to be addressed by SIs in a societal-oriented approach.
To respond to these questions, significant further work should be conducted based upon
theoretical and empirical research approaches. The SIs community should work on the qualitative
values and societal dimensions of sustainability, trying to minimize the time delay to start dealing
with these challenges and contribute to the truth value of the SIs in place. Transdisciplinary,
community-based, interactive, or participatory research approaches [30] should be major options
to conduct the necessary review of the current sustainability monitoring, assessing, and reporting
systems, and reach the next level of SIs. Also, major indicator guidelines, such as the Bellagio Principles,
now reviewed and renamed the Bellagio STAMP (Sustainability Assessment and Measurement
Principles) [60], in particular, should be considered.
Empowerment approaches in sustainability assessment should be further studied, including the
type of stakeholders to integrate in different SI initiatives [35], which indicators are more suitable, and
what practices could guide the use of SIs. This step can result in a new level of effectiveness and active
engagement, and increase the inclusiveness, transparency, and accountability of SIs.
4. Final Remarks
In the near future, SI researchers and practitioners should be ready to adapt their ways of thinking
and doing. Sustainability assessments must respond to new global and local paradigms, and use
collaborative scientific development and innovation as the foundations for change. Indicators should
evaluate what really matters to track progress toward a sustainable society, and be able to deal
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with new information traps, post-truth reality, and volatile contradictory societal values. The term
”sustainability” and its related topics are wrapped up in a blurred web of contrary meanings, despite
several important events and initiatives, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of
the United Nations as a major SD roadmap at the global level.
The critical review and qualitative evaluation conducted in this research allowed us to trace the
pragmatic profile of the analysed SIs’ challenges and benefits, where the majority of them are still not
implemented or answered, and a significant amount will probably have a low impact on society if
operationalized. Therefore, the need for new developments on SIs to effectively assess and report SD
in a robust and, at the same time, collaborative and open way, has never been so great.
There are limitations associated with this kind of critical review and qualitative evaluation, and
those limitations should be weighed up in the use of the obtained findings, and when drawing
conclusions. However, since a critical perspective and viewpoint paper is clearly assumed as a
particular view on a specific topic of research, where views differ, this should not be considered a major
constraint. The objective was to promote constructive debate around SIs’ possible futures and paths.
As proposed in this research, the individual should have a central role to play in all the SIs’
challenges, in particular the ones related with societal impact dimension. Individual citizens should be
leading actors, collecting, analyzing, evaluating, and communicating sustainability data and related
SI information, from households and daily activities to “upper scales,” including rural and urban
ecosystems. A crowdsourcing mindset for SIs will be a central piece in this process, associated with
tailor-made approaches conducted by volunteer individuals.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Identification of the set of challenges and opportunities and remarks that supported the
value given to each criterion: Relevancy, Feasibility, and Societal Impacts.
Selected Challenges and Opportunities
Summary of Rationale
Relevancy Feasibility Societal Impacts
#1. Richer selection of case studies:
Call for a richer selection of case studies to help
create practical and more useful guidance
regarding sustainability assessment [60]. Allow
the identification of patterns of what works
best and the understanding and designing of
context-specific approaches.
A significant amount of the
existing SI work is related to case
study-based approaches.
Despite their being resource-intensive,
there are several SI systems being
implemented, at national, regional,
local and organisational levels, that can
be used as case studies.
Proximity and visibility to
stakeholders.
#2. Specific cultural context:
Indicators should be placed in a specific
cultural context with a clear understanding of
previous interventions; if indicators are used
without understanding the processes and
people they are relevant to, they may be easily
misused (even if an indicator is good itself) [61].
SIs should not be “context-free.”
The need to understand the
context that will tailor the SIs (e.g.,
the type of decision-making
assessed, the institutional system,
the context of professional practice
and capacity, the territorial context
and their specific natural and
human-cultural aspects).
Requires additional resources to adopt
this approach. Local context data,






#3. Adequate level of standardization:
Identify the adequate level of standardization
for indicator sets versus context-specific
sets [21]. Related to this aspect is the need to
consider the vertical integration between SIs at
different spatial scales (national, regional,
local/organizational), and to examine the




cases and scales, and optimize the
resources to conduct a
sustainability assessment.
The operational process is not
consensual, and the approaches are still
under discussion. Further
methodological development and




governance of different SIs.
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Table A1. Cont.
Selected Challenges and Opportunities
Summary of Rationale
Relevancy Feasibility Societal Impacts
#4. Meta-evaluation:
The evaluation of an evaluation and analysis of
SI experiences [64,65]. Allows us to do a critical
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
the SIs, and draw conclusions about the overall
utility, accuracy, validity, feasibility and
propriety.
Several research initiatives that
show how to accomplish this task
and demonstrate the need and
benefits of adopting
meta-evaluation and reviewing
approaches, with practical and
theoretical implications.
The implementation of a formal
meta-evaluation process could be
technically complex, where the
approaches are still not well established.
Practical difficulties can arise in their
implementation due to the complexity
of prioritizing the implementation of
the “key good-practice factors” and
developing “meta-evaluation
indicators” can also be a hard task [65].
Too technical to be
understood by most of the
stakeholders, in particular
the general public.
#5. Alternatives to move beyond GDP:
Development of alternative indicators, to move
beyond GDP [66,67], to obtain clear and robust
sustainability measures and “achieve measures
of what we really want” [67].
To provide a global SD shared
vision, using new ways of
measuring progress towards new
goals.
Despite several attempts to propose
GDP substitutes with the same
popularity and impact, this is still
ongoing work, and there is no






#6. Data limitations and provision problems:
Overcome the data limitations and provision
problems to better support decision-making
processes, as well as reporting and
communication initiatives, e.g., [68,69].
Access to reliable data or
justifiable proxies for the relevant
themes is a paramount step, as
well as providing open access to
data.
In some cases, this could be difficult to
overcome in a short term, in particular
in territories/institutions that are less
developed. It is a resource-intensive
and complex task, with moving targets.
In an era of “post-truth”
where the value of data
and information is very
volatile, data accuracy and
reliability could be not
perceived or valued by
stakeholders.
#7. Integrated and systemic and holistic
perspective:
Develop a more integrated and
systemic/holistic perspective for SI,
considering linkages, synergies, and
antagonisms between SI, goals and targets [70].
SI integrated sets should include integrated or
interlinkage indicators that cover different
sustainability dimensions, i.e., one single
indicator includes several dimensions, in
particular environmental, economic, social,
cultural and institutional/
governance [51,65,71].
Analyse, understand and report
the integrated/systemic
sustainability views and
perspectives, and avoid a
fragmented assessment, in
particular for indicators that cover
more than one thematic area and
dimension (environmental,
economic, social).
The implementation process is
technically complex, where the
approaches are still not well established.
According to some authors (e.g., [50]),
the interdisciplinary hypostasis of
sustainability that traverses
environmental, economic and societal
issues may be an operational drawback
instead of an advantage. This holistic
approach, which encompasses more
aspects than necessary, orients the use
of indicators to vast collections of
statistics that rarely influence
policy-making.
Despite it being too
technical to be perceived
by stakeholders, the






#8. Optimum level of indicator aggregation:
Raise the optimum level of indicator
aggregation, as discussed in Singh [8]. Help
present complex information in a synthetic way
and at the same time avoid manipulation and
“fake news,” with distorted indicators.
Several authors, e.g. [50], stress
that instead of focusing on the
construction of composite
indicators that cover different
areas of knowledge, we should try
to summarise a complex situation
in a single number (difficult to be
attained in the absence of an
appropriate indicator theoretical
framework); “research should be
focused on the identification of
key indicators that can be linked
together through verbal, statistical,
or mathematical relationships and
equations, contributing to a better
understanding of the linkages
among the different areas of
knowledge that compose the
aforementioned fields . . . ” [50]
(pp. 426).
Despite several attempts to propose the
adequate level of indicator aggregation,
this is still an ongoing work, and there





Support the main indicator
goals of synthesizing
complex phenomena and





#9. Better mechanisms for indicator use
in practice:
Explore the mechanisms for indicator use in
practice, e.g., [48,56,72], and understanding by
different actors, creating opportunities for use
and reporting indicator information.
Approaches and methods need further
development to understand the most effective
ways to influence processes at different levels,
including policy making and organisational
strategies and operations, likewise citizens’
behaviours and attitudes towards
sustainable goals.
As emphasized by
Ronseström [73], good indicators
are of little influence and
importance if they are not used in
any way.
Information can feed back into the
development and presentation
of SIs.
Despite the existence of several works
that explore technical issues of
indicators and how they could support
decision-making processes, few of them
address the how, if, when, and who
questions about indicators. The work of
Morse [48] shows the emergence of
this topic.
The most significant
impact for stakeholders is
when they use the tool that
was developed for them.
#10. Integration or non-traditional aspects of
sustainability:
SIs should cover general non-material values or
non-traditional aspects of sustainability, such
as ethics, culture and arts, aesthetics,
effectiveness of governance, legislation and
norms, spirituality, solidarity, compassion,
mutual help [17,29,54,71], which represent less
tangible dimensions of human society.
Until we have appropriate
indicators to assess these
intangible but fundamental
aspects of SD, they will be
invisible for assessment
purposes [71].
It may be very difficult to use direct
indicators to evaluate these
non-tangible aspects. Qualitative
survey approaches are most likely to
support these indicators, and therefore
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Table A1. Cont.
Selected Challenges and Opportunities
Summary of Rationale
Relevancy Feasibility Societal Impacts
#11. Use of Information tools and systems:
Use of information tools and systems that
condense the huge flows of information to
report SIs, e.g., [74]. SI systems should respond
to the growing access to information provided




and the Internet, are enabling
web-based platforms for
information sharing and
gathering [53,58,59], enabling the
desired stakeholders’ input.
The implementation process could be
technically complex, and the
approaches are still not well established.
These more demanding information
and communication technologies still
face pending challenges that need
further research. Examples of such
limitations comprise data quality, use









data and indicators provide




#12. Find the best selection criteria:
What indicator selection criteria should be used
without compromising credibly and accuracy
and at the same time avoiding redundancy and
complexity. Indicator selection is usually made
by experts and/or through participatory
approaches, in combination with literature
reviews of existing indicator sets, and often
little is known about the robustness of the
selection stage [43].
It is fundamental to evaluate the
indicator selection process,
regarding their utility, accuracy,
validity and feasibility,
e.g., [41,75]. The selection stage
will impact the ability of the
indicator system to be
institutionalised and therefore
used and maintained [76].
Despite various works discussing these
aspects, the implementation process is
technically complex, and the
approaches are still not well established.
When stakeholders are
effectively involved, it could
increase the sense of
ownership, commitment and
improve the evaluation and
communication stages.
#13. Institutionalisation process and
governance models:
SI governance models should be improved and
clarified. Also, SIs need to become
institutionalised in certain governmental
processes to provide stability and
credibility [17].
The management model and
institutional cooperation is a
fundamental component of Sis;
identifying the institution(s) and
their roles and the leadership
structures is essential to an
understanding of the feasibility
and societal influence of the
indicator system [65].
Despite no significant additional
resources being required to implement
this component, an
institutional/political commitment of
the involved decision-makers is a
fundamental step, and in many cases is
difficult to achieve.
Low visibility and usually
not being perceived as a very
important aspect by the
general public and
practitioners – “somebody is
certainly in charge” but few
people really care who is and
what they do.
#14. Satellite remote sensing and other
observing technologies:
New approaches to indicators using satellite
remote sensing and other observing
technologies to evaluate sustainability goals, as
explored by [77].
SIs supported by satellite data
could be an important solution to
mitigate data limitations and
provision, in particular for certain
scales of analysis.
Despite various related works that
explore this field, the use of remote
sensing data for SIs is still relatively
underexplored, e.g., [77].
The value of data and
information is very volatile,
and data availability,
accuracy and reliability
could be not perceived or
valued by stakeholders,
probably even more so in the
case of remote sensing data.
#15. Intergenerational equity information
transfer:
Indicators that capture the effectiveness with
which intergenerational equity information
transfer is taking place and how are pushing
social and cultural evolution. However, several
questions arise: How do we know what future
generations will value? In that respect, how can
one define what is a “fair,” ethical and
“sustainable” thing to do? [61])
One of the SD dimensions should
be “time” [52], when assessing
progress towards sustainability
goals, so consider time
preservation or intergenerational
equity. As noted by ([51]), the time
dimension should be taken into
account where long-term changes
towards sustainability are
evaluated, like global warming,
ecological disruption and social
equity issues
Despite the existence of several
attempts to explore this topic, it is still
an open and complex question, needing
further theoretical and practical
scientific work.
Low visibility and too
technical to be perceived by
stakeholders.
#16. The lack of an endogenous indicator’s
theory
The inexistence of an endogenous indicator’s
theory is an important barrier to the
enhancement of indicator research into an
autonomous scientific field and relegates
indicators to the ecological, social or economic
field [50]
An integrated SI theory could be a
fundamental step to respond to
several of the most important
needs and related challenges,
weakness and limitations, and
reach the next stage of indicator
evolution.
Despite some works that explore this
topic, there is a significant lack of
progress and consensus on how to
approach this complexity.
Low visibility and too
technical to be perceived by
stakeholders.
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Abstract: When developing new indicators for policy advice, two different approaches exist and
may be combined with each other. First, a data-driven, bottom-up approach determines indicators
primarily by the availability of suitable data. Second, indicators can be developed by a top-down
approach, on the basis of political fields of action and related normative goals. While the bottom-up
approach might not meet the needs of an up-to-date policy advice, the top-down approach might
lack the necessary data. To discuss these problems and possible solutions, we refer to the ongoing
development of an indicator system on impacts of climate change on biodiversity in Germany,
where a combination of both approaches has been successfully applied. We describe suitable
indicators of this system and discuss the reasons for the remaining gaps. Both approaches, mentioned
above, have advantages, constraints, and shortcomings. The scientific accuracy of the indicators,
the availability of data and the purpose of policy advice have to be well-balanced while developing
such indicator systems.
Keywords: indicators; climate change; biodiversity; data needs; monitoring; policy advice; Germany
1. Introduction
The task of the ongoing project, presented in this article, is to design and implement an indicator
system that describes the direct and indirect impacts of climate change, on the state and development
of biodiversity in Germany, in a summarized and easily-understandable way, so that conclusions for
the shaping of nature conservation policy and related policy areas can be drawn. The article focuses
on the crucial role of data availability and quality, for the development of such indicators.
The term “indicator” is ambiguous and linked to a number of different meanings, in many different
contexts [1,2]. As a prerequisite for the conceptual design of indicator systems, an understanding of
what is meant by the term is, therefore, necessary. We have based our work on the following definition:
Indicators in the context of nature conservation summarize empirical data from monitoring
programs, in order to depict relevant pressures, states, impacts, or measures related to biodiversity,
in an easily-understandable manner. They show successes and failures in achieving previously defined
nature conservation objectives, provide policy advice, and inform the public [3]. This definition clearly
differs from an older scientific concept of indicators, which is purely descriptive [2]. Our indicators
are designed for policy advice and refer to normative standards that require political legitimacy,
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in advance. Their statements are based on a comparison of target and actual values. The necessary
data and information for setting a target as the assessment standard must indeed be based on scientific
knowledge. However, the decision on the actual target value or direction of development is beyond
the scope of descriptive natural science and is part of a social or political process [2,3].
Data on state and changes of biodiversity provide fundamental information for planning and
decision-making, in modern conservation policy [4]. In recent years, much effort has been spent to
improve the communication of monitoring results, particularly towards politicians and the public.
For this purpose, many different biodiversity indicators and indicator systems have been developed.
The main objective of monitoring programs is to produce precise and reliable information on the state
and trends of different biodiversity components. Reports based on comprehensive indicator systems
are then used to make monitoring results known not only to experts but also to decision-makers and
the public, cf. [3,5]. Such indicators need to reduce complex biological information to simple and
easily-understandable messages of political concern.
Environmentally relevant phenomena can be classified in line with the Driving Forces-Pressures-
States-Impacts-Responses (DPSIR) model (see Section 3) to systematically structure indicator systems
representing an environmental issue, within its social and political context. The single indicators
should measure distinct parts of the issue and represent phenomena of interest on various temporal
and spatial scales. The realization of such an indicator system, however, is often confronted with,
first, the need to select thematically and politically appropriate indicators and, second, an incomplete
database that does not meet the needs of purposeful indicator systems [6]. Regarding biodiversity
issues this is illustrated by current efforts to define the so-called “Essential Biodiversity Variables
(EBVs)” as a set of key variables for detecting major dimensions of biodiversity change, bridging
the gap between biodiversity data and policy reporting needs [7–9]. Schmeller and colleagues [10]
(p. 2970) point out that the “development of indicators and the understanding of the causes of the
documented change do not fall within the EBV framework, but are a logical next step in using the
EBV data”.
When developing new indicators for policy advice, two different approaches exist and must
be combined with each other [3]. First, there is a data-driven bottom-up approach, primarily
determining indicators by the availability of suitable data. By contrast, indicators can be developed
by a top-down approach, on the basis of political fields of action and related normative goals, e.g.,
nature conservation or biodiversity goals, for which meaningful indicators and suitable data, for their
calculation, are sought. Ideally, if a top-down approach is successfully applied, policy advice can use
tailor-made indicators [2,3]. Each of the two approaches, taken individually, is insufficient. While the
bottom-up-approach might not meet the needs of an up-to-date policy advice, the top-down approach
might lack the necessary data.
In the following sections, we outline the requirements for biodiversity monitoring programs and
data (Section 2), as well as for indicators and indicator systems (Section 3). Based on these findings,
we introduce an indicator system on direct and indirect impacts of climate change, on biodiversity in
Germany, as a practical example for the feasibility and constraints of developing an indicator system.
Successfully developed indicators, based on the requirements outlined before, will be presented as
well (Section 4). Finally, we discuss the data-related factors which hampered the development of the
indicator system (Section 5) and summarize the experiences gained (Section 6).
2. Monitoring Data as a Basis for Developing Indicators
In the context of nature conservation, monitoring comprises empirical records (observations,
counts, and measurements) of selected elements of species, communities, habitats, and landscapes
in regular long-term spatiotemporal sequences gained by standardized scientific methods. These
records are designed to achieve reliable data on the state and changes of these elements and are
directed to nature conservation objectives [3,11–13]. In order to enable a regular reporting system,
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consistent, trustworthy, and accessible data are a prerequisite [14]. More precisely, the requirements
for monitoring programs, as a sound database for indicators are [15]:
• permanent surveys in order to enable continuous availability of data from monitoring programs;
• ensured financing of the monitoring programs;
• functional organization of the monitoring (consolidation and analysis of data and transfer
of results);
• sufficient update interval, depending on the variable;
• data series over long periods of time;
• full area coverage or representative sample;
• sufficient resolution which allows for spatially different findings (administrative units like
counties, federal states, etc.);
• differentiation between different sub-issues, e.g., different habitat types, species, etc.;
• standardized reliable survey methods; and
• accurate data.
Regarding the impacts of climate change on biodiversity, there are hardly any specific monitoring
activities. Consequently, a corresponding indicator system has to be based predominantly on data that
were originally collected for other purposes–in our case for biodiversity and climate change issues
separately. Several examples for ongoing monitoring activities or the development of such monitoring
programs concerning different components of biodiversity do already exist, e.g., for bees, locusts,
butterflies, dragonflies, birds, fish, and plankton at the species level, as well as high nature value
farmland and inland and coastal waters at the habitat level. Monitoring of the natural environment in
Germany is carried out by governmental agencies, administrations, or non-governmental organizations
(often in combination with citizen science). These efforts, however, cover, only selected groups of
species and habitats, so far, and the resulting data sets are often incomplete and heterogeneous, e.g.,
in data quality and sampling intensity. Climate data and phenological phases (annually recurring
growth and development phenomena) of plants are gathered within the monitoring programs of the
German Weather Service (Deutscher Wetterdienst—DWD) and provided, e.g., through its Climate
Data Center (CDC) and the German Climate Service (Deutscher Klimadienst—DKD).
3. Indicators and Indicator Systems for Biodiversity—Balancing Information and
Communication Needs
An indicator system for assessing the state of biodiversity and the trends in the development
of its components, caused, inter alia, by climate change, should reflect the impacts of all relevant
drivers on the biological diversity and the associated cause-effect chains, as well as the success of
nature conservation strategies and measures for adaptation to climate change. It is also intended to
provide political advice [2]. To this end, the single indicators as well as the entire indicator system
must meet certain requirements [1,2,14–21], like that of relevance, data sufficiency, and suitability for
policy advice.
1. Relevance: The indicator system must address a representative sample of relevant key topics in
the context of biodiversity changes caused by climate change, which includes direct and indirect
impacts of climate change on biodiversity. The relation between climate and biodiversity change,
as described by every single indicator, has to be evident or of high probability. Consequently,
it is not sufficient to merely represent changes in either biodiversity or climatic parameters,
but the connection between both should also be illustrated. Species and habitats with distinct
sensitivity for climatic changes, such as alpine, marine, and coastal species and habitats, are
particularly suitable for indication, in order to fulfill this requirement. Selecting species and
habitats predominantly sensitive to climate change is crucial for the conception of purposeful
indicators. In our project, scientific literature surveys have validated such choices.
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2. Data sufficiency: This includes different basic requirements of the data used for forming the
single indicators: Availability, stability, and regular collection, based upon scientifically reliable
and standardized methods. To allow for area-covering findings of single indicators and the
indicator system, data should cover Germany’s entire terrestrial and marine territory.
3. Suitability for policy advice: This comprises the following criteria.
• Relation to politically defined targets: The indicators should relate to targets politically
agreed upon, e.g., as laid out in strategies and legal norms, in order to inform about the
degree of target achievement.
• Relation to politically controllable issues: In general, the indicator subject should be
influenceable by policy measures. However, there are indicator subjects which can only
be influenced on a global scale or very indirectly, over long periods of time, such as
phenological changes.
• Comprehensibility and clarity: As soon as an indicator system is designed for policy advice,
the single indicators, as well as the entire indicator system have to be as understandable,
transparent and simple as possible, without simplifying facts in a way that may lead to
misinterpretation or scientific incorrectness.
• The indicators should have a high spatial resolution to allow for the implementation of
specific and appropriate measures in different parts of Germany, at least, at the federal
states level.
4. Developing an Indicator System for the Impacts of Climate Change on Biodiversity
in Germany
Man-made climate change is leading to significant changes in global biodiversity altering the
biosphere in marine, limnic, and terrestrial environments, on large and small scales. Species ranges
are shifting in response to climate change, and species interactions are changing due to climate
driven shifts, in abundance or distribution of species, for example. Consequently, entire ecosystems
are rearranged. Trends that are expected to intensify in the coming decades, for Germany, include
poleward and upslope range shifts, formation of novel ecosystems, decline and extinction of species
and habitats, and expansion of new species [22]. Major losses are expected with respect to freshwater
and marine habitats [23–26]. Climate change is considered to be a critical threat to many components
of biodiversity and is generally expected to have an increased impact on biodiversity, in the future.
Numerous examples from scientific studies have shown complex relationships between climate
change and biodiversity. Campbell and colleagues, as well as Bellard and colleagues, provided a
comprehensive overview on this matter [24,27].
However, there is still a vast need for research in order to obtain a more detailed picture of the
changes and to develop a full understanding of the underlying processes. Since climate change occurs
over relatively long time-scales of several decades and resulting changes in biodiversity also show time
lags, long-term, systematic observation programs of the environment are of outstanding importance.
This has been demonstrated by McMahon and colleagues, for the global scope, and by Dröschmeister
and Sukopp, for Germany [4,28]. For Germany, however, monitoring programs with a long-term
perspective, which aim to provide data on the impacts of climate change on biodiversity, are largely
lacking or cover only selected aspects of biodiversity, at federal or federal state level. Heiland and
colleagues point out this problem and emphasize the necessity of long-term surveys [29].
Among other policy measures, the German government is taking into account the ongoing
biodiversity loss and climate change by the ambitious goals of the National Strategy on Biological
Diversity (“Nationale Strategie zur biologischen Vielfalt”—NBS) [30] and the German Strategy for
Adaptation to Climate Change (“Deutsche Anpassungsstrategie an den Klimawandel”—DAS) [31].
To achieve the goals of these strategies, monitoring programs and indicator systems are required which
are suitable for comprehensively assessing the broad spectrum of climate-change-related impacts on
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biodiversity, as well as the effectiveness of adaptation measures. Indicator systems delivering a broad
picture of climate-change impacts on biodiversity, however, are, so far, largely missing at national
levels, which is also true for Germany.
In 2011, the German Agency for Nature Conservation (BfN) initiated the development of a
comprehensive indicator system on the impacts of climate change, on biological diversity. Hereby,
the BfN aimed at gaining new knowledge on the relation between climate change and biodiversity,
but mainly at an improved editing of already existing knowledge on the issue for policy advice and
decision making. Two consecutive research and development projects have been funded to this end.
The first project (“Indicator system for depicting direct and indirect impacts of climate change on
biodiversity”, FKZ 3511 82 0400, 2011–2015) aimed at developing an expert information system for the
federal level, but also included the calculation and implementation of five indicators for policy advice
(see below). An extensive report explains the reasons why and how indicators could be implemented or
not [21,32]. In the second project (“Further development of indicators on the impact of climate change
on biodiversity”, FKZ 3517 81 1000, 2017–2019), seven indicators from the first project, which could
not be realized then, are currently being further developed, calculated, and implemented, if possible.
During the first project, a systematic structure of the indicator system was developed. It is based
on the DPSIR model (see Section 1) [33] and comprises three indicator domains (Figure 1) with nine
indicator fields (Table 1). The DPSIR model is useful for describing the origins and consequences
of environmental problems and allows for exploring the links between the different elements of the
model. According to the model [33], (p. 6), “social and economic developments exert Pressure on the
environment and, as a consequence, the State of the environment changes, such as the provision of
adequate conditions for health, resources availability and biodiversity. Finally, this leads to Impacts
on human health, ecosystems and materials that may elicit a societal Response that feeds back on the
Driving forces, or on the state or impacts directly, through adaptation or curative action.”
The indicator system to be developed should focus on mapping direct and indirect impacts of
climate change on species and habitats, but also include some pressure, state, and response indicators.
Accordingly, Column 1 in Figure 1 (direct impacts) comprises impact indicators only, Column 2
comprises predominantly pressure indicators, while Column 3 (adaptation of nature conservation
strategies and measures) represents response indicators only. Depending on the context, some of the
proposed indicators may also be interpreted as state indicators.
 
Figure 1. Structure of the indicator system with three indication domains (red color).
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The first indication domain deals with changes of biodiversity, directly resulting from climate
change, and addresses three thematically distinct indication fields: (i) Phenological changes of plant and
animal species, (ii) changes in species distribution areas, populations and biocoenoses, and (iii) changes
of habitats. It is intended to reflect as many changes in biodiversity caused by climate change as
possible and to cover terrestrial, limnic, and marine ecosystems, as well as different groups of species
(plants, birds, mammals, amphibians, reptiles, insects, and possibly microorganisms).
The second indication domain discusses indirect changes in biodiversity due to climate change
and includes indicators addressing pressures on biodiversity caused by sectoral adaptation measures
of different land uses, such as forestry, agriculture, and water management. Indirect climate-change
impacts, including changes in land use, have a major effect on biological diversity. An exact
quantification of these indirect impacts on species and habitats is, however, hardly possible at present,
as the interaction of the various influencing factors is too complex and consequently does not allow for
a clear analytical isolation of each factor.
The third indication domain contains indicators which relate to the adaptation of nature
conservation strategies, measures to climate change, its direct and indirect impacts on biodiversity,
and reflect the success of such adaptations. This indication domain also addresses three thematically
distinct indication fields: (i) The adaptation of nature conservation policies and landscape planning to
climate change, (ii) the implementation of adaptation measures, and (iii) the physical effectiveness of
such measures.
Potentially suitable indicators were either selected from existing indicator systems (e.g.,
the SEBI—Streamlining European Biodiversity Indicators initiative and the Climate Change Indicators
of the European Environment Agency), or were newly developed [21], resulting in a set of forty-four
indicators which have been examined, in depth, for their feasibility at the German national level. Out
of these, five indicators could be fully calculated (“realized” in Table 1) and nine indicators could be
developed as “prototypes”; meaning that they could be fully developed on a conceptual level, but the
necessary data for their calculation have not been available due to different reasons. Six out of these nine
indicator prototypes are currently to be calculated and realized (“prototype in development” in Table 1).
Thirty indicators, due to different reasons (see Section 4.2 and 5 and Reference [21]), could not be feasibly
developed further. Indicator factsheets for all realized indicators and indicator prototypes describe
the indicator and include all relevant information, such as suitability of the indicator, legal references
and existing political targets, calculation algorithms, data sources, spatial and temporal resolution, as
well as graphical and textual representations of the determined indicator values. All newly developed
indicators have been included in the indicator set of the DAS [34] and one of them (phenological changes
in wild plant species) has been added to the indicator set of the NBS [35].
Table 1. Indicators and indicator prototypes for an indicator system on climate-change impacts on
biodiversity in Germany (status: May 2018).
Indicator Name Status
Indication domain I: Direct climate-change-induced changes in biological diversity
Indication field I.1 Phenological changes in species and communities
Phenological changes in wild plant species Realized
Phenological changes in animal species Prototype in development
Indication field I.2 Changes in populations, areas and biocenoses
Temperature index of the bird species community Realized
Changes in the species inventory of high nature value farmland Prototype
Distribution of marine fish species Prototype
Climate-change-induced shifts in plant distribution Prototype in development
Temperature index of the butterfly species community Prototype in development
Changes in the flora on Alpine summits Prototype in development
Climate-change-induced changes in dragonflies Prototype
Indication field I.3 Changes in habitats
No realizable indicators
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Table 1. Cont.
Indicator Name Status
Indication domain II: Indirect climate-change-induced changes in biological diversity
Indication field II.1 Changes in biodiversity due to climate-change adaptations in the agricultural sector
No realizable indicators
Indication field II.2 Changes in biodiversity due to climate-change adaptations in the forestry sector
No realizable indicators
Indication field II.3 Changes in biodiversity due to climate-change adaptations in water management
Restoration of natural flood plains Realized
Indication domain III: Adaptation of nature conservation strategies and measures to climate change
Indication field III.1 Adaptation of nature conservation strategies to climate change
Consideration of climate change in landscape planning (state / district level) Realized
Indication field III.2 Adaptation of nature conservation measures to climate change
Nationwide biotope network Prototype in development
Habitat diversity and landscape quality Prototype in development
Protected areas Realized
Indication field III.3 Successes of climate-change-induced adaptations of nature conservation strategies and measures
No realizable indicators
The assignment of the proposed indicators to the indication domains and fields (see Table 1),
the indicator data sheets with all the necessary information for a transparent documentation of
calculation, the employed data, and the spatial and temporal resolution make it easy to understand the
structure of the system. The graphical and textual representations of the computed indicator values
included in the indicator factsheets are easy to understand and the indicators mainly comply with all
requirements presented in Section 3.
4.1. Successfully Developed Indicators
The five realized indicators listed in the table above have been briefly explained below
(see [21,29,34] for additional information).
4.1.1. Phenological Changes in Wild Plant Species
The newly developed indicator shows climate-change-related changes in the annual entry date of
the phenological seasons, since 1951. The beginning of these seasons is marked by the occurrence of
certain phases in the development of selected native wild plant species. For example, the beginning of
the early spring as a phenological season, is indicated by the beginning of the flowering of the coltsfoot
(Tussilago farfara). The shifts of entry of all ten recognized phenological seasons can be graphically
illustrated by a phenological clock. The nationwide mean values of the entry data and the resulting
duration of each of the ten phenological seasons from a thirty-year reference period (1951–1980) have
been compared with the corresponding current values, which are available for the last thirty years.
In 2017, the comparison shows an earlier entry of the phenological seasons of spring (early spring, first
spring, full spring), summer (early summer, midsummer, late summer) and early autumn [36].
4.1.2. Temperature Index of the Bird Species Community
This index is based on the Community Temperature Index developed by Devictor and
colleagues [37] and has been modified for the purposes mentioned above. The index adds up
temperature indices of eighty-eight common breeding bird species, occurring in Germany, based
on the average temperature in the European breeding range of these species, from March to August.
The index shows the changes in the relative abundances of these species in relation to a reference
year, linking it to the adaptation of the species to a colder or warmer climate. In the years 1990 to
2016, the relative frequencies of bird species have shifted in a statistically significant way in favor of
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species adapted to warmer conditions, consequently, to the disadvantage of species adapted to colder
conditions [38].
4.1.3. Restoration of Natural Flood Plains
This newly developed indicator shows the annual cumulative increase in natural flood plains due
to dike relocations in the main catchment areas of the Meuse, Rhine, Ems, Weser, Elbe, Oder, Danube,
and their direct tributaries, to the North and the Baltic Seas. Land use changes that can be linked to
climate change, include adaptation measures in water management. In addition to technically-oriented
measures, the permanent restoration of natural flood plains is regarded as an effective flood protection
strategy. The re-connection to the water bodies and the restoration of the natural flood dynamics have
created new habitats of high conservation value for a large number of rare and endangered animal
and plant species. Through different restoration measures on seventy-nine rivers, from 1983 to 2018,
4951 hectares of former floodplain area have been reconnected to the natural flooding dynamics of
watercourses, and these areas are now flooded in an uncontrolled way during flood events. However,
these measures were generally not planned, primarily, to adapt to climate change [39].
4.1.4. Consideration of Climate Change in Landscape Planning
This newly developed indicator describes if, how, and to what extent, the impacts of climate
change on biodiversity are taken into account in landscape programs and landscape framework
plans, which landscape plans are at the federal state or at the regional level. The indicator presents
the percentage share of plans addressing climate change in the total number of evaluated plans.
The evaluation of a hundred and seventy-nine plans that were in force, in 2018, showed that that
the impacts of climate change and the resulting planning requirements have not yet been widely
taken into account, as the mainstreaming of climate change issues, in landscape planning, takes its
time, due to the fact that landscape plans are usually updated only every 15–20 years. However,
climate-change-related statements have increased significantly, between 2000 and 2018 [40].
4.1.5. Protected Areas
This indicator assesses the total size of strictly protected areas in Germany. The area of land
designated as nature conservation areas (NCAs) and national parks (NLPs) is expressed as a percentage
of the German land surface. Natura 2000 sites and core areas and buffer zones of biosphere reserves
are included, if designated as NCAs or NLPs.
The area of these strictly protected areas has increased significantly from 1.1 million hectares, in
2000, to 1.6 million hectares in 2016, which is an increase from 3.2% to 4.4% of Germany’s land area.
Even though the designation of new strictly protected areas was not mainly driven by it, it also has
to be assessed positively in terms of adaptation of species to climate change. However, the formal
designation of a protected area is only a first, albeit important, step towards adapting the system
of protected areas to the requirements associated with climate change. In addition to the protection
of suitable areas on a sufficiently large scale, effective management of these areas is an additional
important requirement [41].
4.2. Gaps in the Indicator System
Despite these successes, certain indication fields could not be supported by indicator proposals.
This concerns all indication domains and in particular indication fields, such as “changes in habitats”
and “successes of climate-change-related adaptations to nature conservation strategies and measures”,
which were classified as central to the structure of the indicator system, within the framework of the
projects, and are, therefore, listed as indication fields to be further developed in the future. Tracing
impacts of climate change via indirect pathways in Indication Domain II, turned out to be particularly
difficult and yielded only one appropriate indicator (Restoration of natural flood plains). Against the
background of the ongoing expansion of wind power, changes in biological diversity, as a result of
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energy generation from wind power, and the associated, nationwide-expected considerable impacts on
species groups, such as birds and bats, as well as on marine ecosystems, would have been of particular
interest to the indicator system. However, the lack of data recorded in sufficient update intervals and
gained on a uniform methodological basis, over long periods of time, does not allow for developing an
appropriate indicator on this important issue.
In summary, the gaps in the indication fields are mainly caused by three factors:
• Knowledge deficits on the direct impacts of climate change on biological diversity, at the
habitat level: In this area, scientific knowledge and data from monitoring programs are still
unsatisfactory in many cases [4]. The links between climate change, on the one hand, and
climate-change-induced changes in habitats, on the other, have not yet been sufficiently researched.
The extent to which the natural adaptability of species influences the observable effects of climate
change remains unclear in many areas. Furthermore, it is to be expected that, in certain cases,
effects on habitats will only become apparent after a long time-lag. Therefore, no approach could
be found to translate the effects of climate change on habitats, into a suitable indicator proposal.
• Interaction of climatic effects with other influencing factors: Overall, it has to be considered
that climate-change-induced impacts on biological diversity interact with effects of other factors,
such as land-use changes or the spread of alien species [42]. It should be noted, however, that
these factors are also partly dependent on climate change, but have so far also essentially changed
independently of it. For example, the general changes in land use that have prevailed for a
long time, such as urbanization or agricultural intensification, result in massive changes in
biological diversity, from which direct and indirect impacts of climate change can hardly be
isolated. This is partly due to the fact that, in many cases, the indirect effects of climate change on
biological diversity (e.g., through adaptation of land use to climate change), have so far been little
pronounced and can, therefore, hardly be detected [43]. For these reasons, none of the indicator
approaches discussed, fully meets the requirement to reflect changes in biological diversity that
are predominantly and, above all, clearly attributable to land use adaptation measures to climate
change or climate protection measures.
• Difficulties in monitoring success: At present, it is not possible to assess the success of
adaptations to nature conservation strategies and measures to climate change, as such measures
have hardly been implemented to date and it is very difficult to conduct a corresponding survey
in terms of effectiveness monitoring. For this reason, no indicators have been implemented
for this indication field, to date. However, considerations, such as balancing the decline in
the vulnerability of climate-change-sensitive species or improving the conservation status of
climate-change-sensitive habitats, are worthwhile approaches for developing indicators which,
however, still require further elaboration and cannot be implemented directly. In particular,
it should be clarified whether improvements in conservation statuses or the threat to
climate-change-sensitive protected goods can actually be achieved through targeted adjustments
and the implementation of appropriate nature conservation strategies and measures. Attention
must be paid to the close relationship to other influencing factors, such as changes in land use.
5. Availability and Limits of Data Feeding Indicators
In order to report indicators, permanently, and provide policy advice, the requirements on
monitoring programs and data mentioned in Section 2 have to be fulfilled, as far as possible. This is
often not the case, especially in newly emerging policy and conservation fields—such as, climate
change and biodiversity—in which no regular and systematic monitoring and data gathering could
have been developed so far.
Even if suitable data exist, many other restrictions can appear. Heiland and Schliep discussed
these data-related obstacles in indicator development [44]. Along with content-driven problems,
the lack of appropriate data is a well-known problem in the development of indicators. This is also
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the case within the realm of climate-change impacts on biodiversity, for example, in connection with
indicators relating to animal species [45]. Other problems include:
1. Accessibility: In some cases, appropriate data exist, but are not or are only partially provided by
the data-holding institution.
2. Quality: Existing data are not sufficiently accurate (either in thematic or spatial accuracy) and,
therefore, do not allow reliable statements.
3. Scope: Existing data are not comprehensive or representative, e.g., habitat maps are available
only for some federal states.
4. Heterogeneity: Data of very different quality are collected regionally or with different methods
and different classifications in the federal states and, therefore, cannot be compared nationwide.
This is partly due to the federal structure of Germany, which refers not only to governmental
structures, but also to NGOs and voluntary associations collecting data, e.g., on dragonflies,
in our particular case. It was not possible to use those data as they were based on different,
non-comparable data collection methods, at the federal state level, and as the continuity of data
collection could not be ensured, due to lack of personnel.
5. Frequency: Data are collected, but at intervals that are too long, as is the case, e.g., with
nation-wide floristic mapping.
6. Time span: Data are only available for a short period, which actually does not allow for showing
trends. It would be ideal if the data were also available for past periods of time. This is often the
case, e.g., with digital habitat or land use maps.
7. Frame of reference: Some indicators require the geometric and statistical intersection of different
data sets. This causes further problems:
• Several thematically-related data sets may have different spatial reference units (data set A
e.g., habitat, data set B e.g., district). This means that they can no longer be sensibly blended
together. Examples are official statistical data, which mostly refers to administrative units,
and floristic data, which is captured in regular grids.
• The datasets have different scales, e.g., nationwide data on climate and local floristic data.
• The datasets have different time points of acquisition, e.g., datasets gathered by the federal
states on the same thematic issues, but at different time points.
The mentioned problems can be illustrated by the example of habitat mapping. Habitats are
of crucial importance in the field of climate change, e.g., in the case of shifting distribution areas of
animal and plant species and in the need for networked corridors. For this reason, the data problem
will be described in more detail, using this example. The main requirements of data are, a sufficiently
high-resolution and a full area-coverage. If data are available, they are often not repeatedly updated or
not comparable across the federal states of Germany. Only in some federal states, habitat maps, that
are derived from aerial color-infrared photographs, cover the entire area [46]. These were collected in
the 1990s, for all eastern German states and the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein. However, only a
few states repeated the survey (e.g., Saxony [47] and Brandenburg [48]) after the year 2000. Another
problem is that the mapping units differ from state to state, so that no uniform map can be produced.
Almost all federal states record legally-protected biotopes in a separate mapping (“selective biotope
mapping” [49]). Here, too, the problems are the comparability of the data between the different federal
states and the regularity of the survey.
The only current, regularly updated source on habitats is the High Nature Value Farmland
Monitoring [50], which maps valuable habitats in the agricultural landscape in randomly stratified
sample plots of 1 km2 size. It is representative for the entire agricultural landscape of Germany.
A regular repetition of this survey is secured. At present, a much more comprehensive monitoring
program is being developed and tested in a pilot study. It is carried out on the same sample plots as
the High Nature Value Farmland Monitoring, but covers the whole range of habitat types that are both
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quantitatively and qualitatively surveyed. Habitat types and land use types of the entire landscape
are recorded and assessed as basic units for future ecosystem monitoring. If the test was successful
it could be a possible solution to obtain statistically accurate information on the basis of randomly
stratified sampling if a coverage of the whole area is not possible due to financial constraints.
At the moment, the only valid, full area-coverage data basis for habitats, including all kind of land
uses, are digital land-use data from the official land surveying [51,52]. Advantages are a very high
accuracy of the data, a high topicality and the regular repetition of the recording. However, these data
are not specifically collected for monitoring biological diversity, but for other purposes, such as land
information, spatial, and urban planning, etc. Therefore, the data and information provided on habitats
are not particularly in-depth. Against this background, it becomes clear that compromises have to be
made in the development of indicators between the accuracy of the indicator and the availability of
data, as the latter often have originally been collected for other purposes.
While developing the indicator system on climate-change impacts on biodiversity, we strived for
reaching a balance between the requirements presented in Section 3. Indeed, there were cases where
we could not calculate indicators because the needed data did not exist. This especially applies to
indicators dealing with new and emerging trends, e.g., the effects of renewable energies on biodiversity.
The challenge results from the fact that these trends have not been dealt with before. Consequently,
they have not been monitored before, leading to a lack of appropriate data which can only be collected,
from now on. An indicator on the subject necessarily depends on data which have been collected for
other purposes, before the problem concerned had occurred, and, therefore, are not appropriate, or
are only partly appropriate. To date, however, Germany does not have an established comprehensive
biodiversity monitoring system at the federal level, nor does it have an indicator system regarding
climate-change impacts on biodiversity. In Switzerland, for example, it was possible to analyze
climate-change impacts on biodiversity, ex post [53], as the current Swiss biodiversity monitoring
programs and projects are surveying all important components of biodiversity, at two different spatial
levels [54]. It remains a challenging future task for German authorities, at the national level, to initiate
a nationwide monitoring system that can meet this task.
To sum up, the requirements on indicators and indicator systems sketched in Section 3, turned
out to be a rule of thumb during the development of an indicator system on climate-change impacts on
biodiversity. In the light of only a few, long-term, time-series data, data availability certainly becomes
a key criterion. In one case (community temperature index of breeding bird species communities) the
indicator was taken up because data are available, although the algorithm for the calculation of the
indicator values is quite complex. Other indicator prototypes were put on hold (e.g., Lusitanian fish
species) because it was not possible to find an agreement between data holders and possible users
(BfN), about the use of data. Another indicator prototype (changes in the flora of alpine summits) was
put on hold because it was not clear for a certain period of time if the Global Observation Research
Initiative in Alpine Environments (GLORIA) monitoring program [55], on which the indicator is based
upon, will be continued.
6. Conclusions
Anthropogenic climate change causes substantial changes in biodiversity on the global scale, as
well as in Germany. Indicators can help to illustrate this impact and make it easily comprehensible,
beyond science, for the public and politicians. Worldwide, indicators at the interface between climate
change and biodiversity are still underrepresented in indicator systems.
Thus, first appropriate indicators have been and, are being, developed. For Germany, six indicators
are currently under development, to complement the existing set of five indicators, on the impacts
of climate change on biodiversity, at the national level. However, data availability for indicator
development is still insufficient. Therefore, an improved database is a goal to strive for, in the future.
When developing new indicators for policy advice two different approaches are usually combined.
First, a data-driven bottom-up approach is determined by the availability of suitable data. Second,
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a top-down approach is based on political fields of action and related normative goals, for which
meaningful indicators and suitable data are sought. Both approaches have advantages, constraints,
and shortcomings. The scientific accuracy of the indicators, the availability of data, and the purpose of
policy advice have to be well-balanced while developing such indicator systems. As a matter of fact, in
many cases, data have been collected for certain purposes and are ex post used for other purposes that
have not been considered before.
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Abstract: On 1 January 2016, the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development—adopted by world leaders in 2015—came into force. They build
on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and call for action by all countries to promote
prosperity while protecting the planet. Since the SDGs are not legally binding, governments are
expected to take ownership and establish national frameworks for the achievement of the 17 Goals.
Countries thus have the primary responsibility for follow-up and review of the progress made in
implementing the Goals, which will require quality, accessible and timely data collection. This will
be instrumental for both regional and global follow-up analyses and assessments—several such
major global assessments have already appeared. It might be supposed that the SDGs framework,
including indicators, is conceptually and methodologically well-designed and tested in order to
function reliably and provide guidance for such assessments. However, while it seems that the
current structure of the SDGs has provided a firm policy framework, the Goals and targets have
been mostly operationalized by indicators. We demonstrate and argue that without a procedurally
well-designed, conceptual indicator framework for selecting and/or designing indicators, the results
of SDGs assessments may be ambiguous and confusing.
Keywords: sustainable development goals; Agenda 2030; global indicator framework; sustainability
indicators; SDGs
1. Introduction
After thirty years of sustainable development summits, action plans, and reports, the major trends
in the planetary environment, social equity, and economic sustainability are still going in the wrong
direction, due to slow implementation, lack of public involvement, and inadequate information on
progress. Indicators play an instrumental role in making the concept of sustainable development (SD)
appealing to a wide spectrum of potential stakeholders as well as in assessing the progress [1–3].
Hundreds of different indicators are used in differing contexts for diverse purposes. It is difficult
to assess the impact of these indicators on policymaking and progress towards sustainability since
scientific information—such as that conveyed by indicators—is usually not sufficient to produce
changes in either national decision-making or individual behavior. Thus the most significant effect
of an indicator, particularly early in its adoption, can simply be communication—making a problem
visible, sensitizing decision-makers and the public and expanding the basis for decision-making [4].
In 2015, a summit of heads of state adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) [5].
The SDGs in their recent form are a universal set of Goals, targets, and indicators that UN member
states will use to frame their agendas and policies over the next 15 years. Currently, they comprise
17 Goals, 169 targets, and 243 indicators [6]. It might be supposed that the SDGs framework—including
Sustainability 2018, 10, 1540; doi:10.3390/su10051540 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability116
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indicators—is conceptually and methodologically well designed and tested in order to function reliably.
However, it seems that the current structure and format of the proposed Goals and targets has laid
“only” a policy framework. Being transparent and participatory in character, it is an appropriate way of
designing it provided that Goals and targets would get through thorough expert and scientific follow
up on their operationalization. Without a procedurally well-designed conceptual indicator framework
for selecting and/or designing indicators, the results of SDGs assessment may be ambiguous and
confusing [7].
The goal of this article is to critically review the state of the art in sustainability reporting by the
application of SDG indicators and contribute to setting an appropriate approach in this regard. We have
conducted a comprehensive review of the extensive body of work in this field—starting by reviewing
the theoretical foundations for the operationalization of the sustainable development concept (there is
more on this in the “Conceptualization and operationalization of sustainable development” section)
and then looking into existing practice. We have chosen four major current SDGs assessments to
examine how indicators have been used for the operationalization and communication of the SDGs.
Our analysis focuses, in particular, on their relevance for the intended audience, interpretation of their
results, and complexity of the assessment.
Our starting assumption is based on the original purpose of the SDGs—helping to further
mainstream sustainable development at all levels, integrating economic, social, and environmental
aspects and recognizing their interlinkages, so as to achieve sustainable development in all its
dimensions [8]. Consequently, we have assumed that applying the SDG indicator framework
inconsistently (by one) or uncoordinatedly (by many) in order to measure the same phenomenon,
that is., progress towards the SDGs, may cause serious problems. Such assessments may convey
very different messages that might raise doubts about the concept of SD or on the process of
its operationalization. A worthy long-term global effort for communication of progress towards
sustainability thus may be in vain or seriously undermined.
2. Indicator-Based Sustainability Communication
Despite recent scientific findings on many negative development trends [9], sustainability does
not seem to have become a near-term priority for society [10–12]. In the process of changing this
situation, an important role is given to sustainability communication. Its goal is to enable individuals
and groups to develop the competences to adequately interpret the often contradictory and confusing
scientific, technological, and economic information available to them and then be able to react to and
cope with the resulting long-term and complex societal challenges [13].
Sustainable development, understood as a societal process of exploration, learning and shaping
the future, necessarily involves communication. As global sustainability issues are characterized by
high complexity and uncertainty, effective communication processes between the many actors involved
are crucial to develop a mutual understanding of which actions to take [14]. In all three distinguished
modes of communication—communication about sustainability, communication of sustainability, and
communication for sustainability—sustainability indicators have an important role.
Indicators are by definition communication tools; indices, regardless of their many shortcomings,
are particularly effective for communicating results to executives and the general public. Failure to
communicate makes the indicators worthless. We may observe this in any context since knowledge
production, having received an unprecedented boost in recent years, is no longer the privilege of
an exclusive group of experts but takes place in a variety of constellations of actors. However, in
these inter- and transdisciplinary work contexts, not enough attention has been paid to the
problem of translating and communicating this knowledge in a way that is adequate to its
target groups (e.g., the results of the European research projects POINT (Policy Influence of
indicator (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/89898_en.html)) and BRAINPOol (BRinging Alternative
INdicators into POLicy (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/100577_en.html)); or e.g., [15,16]).
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Targeting sustainability communication is one of the most important steps toward making a
problem visible, and hooking the interest and engagement of the target audience. It means identifying
appropriate addressees and ensuring that the message reaches them. Since sustainable development is
a multi-stakeholder process, indicators must be communicable to a variety of different participants.
In general, sustainability communication moves in a special network of relationships among the three
spheres of science, the public, and practice [17]. In more detail, some users need simple, structured
information (voters—the public, non-specialist media, and decision makers), whereas others prefer an
intermediate level of detail (local governments, policy implementers, non-government organizations,
funding bodies, and industries), while technicians and academics may need more technical and
specialized information. In targeting governments, it is useful to distinguish between politicians (ministers,
political party members, parliamentarians etc.) who make decisions, and policy makers, implementers,
and enforcers (mostly civil servants and experts in various positions with agenda areas such as economics,
social affairs, transportation, environment, etc.) who design policy and regulatory portfolios, evaluate
policy alternatives, analyze indicator results, and so on to provide the groundwork for decisions.
Indicators allow communication between scientists and policymakers, between policymakers
and decision makers/politicians, between politicians and the public, even between scientists and the
public, and so on. Communicating complex issues often presents difficulties since a large number of
indicators complicates communication and imposes a great demand on users’ knowledge capabilities
because of the multidimensional character of sustainable development. Moreover, the problem is not
trivial, it is not just understanding figures and charts (presented indicator results), but people have to
grasp numerous underlying concepts that they are not necessarily familiar with.
A key challenge for sustainability indicators producers and/or promoters is to deliver easily
communicable messages on the progress towards sustainable development and hence to ease the use,
and enable implementation of indicators in the policy process and by citizens [18]. Regardless of the
use and users, we claim the need for the selection and design only of such indicators that fall into a
given measurement concept (a policy goal or objective, a policy measure, etc.) and contribute to its
appropriate operationalization.
3. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Sustainable Development
Before proceeding to the conceptualization and operationalization of SDGs, let us look briefly
at the sustainable development concept. Sustainability is a concept understood intuitively by all but
very difficult to express in concrete, operational terms [19–22]. Brundtland’s seminal definition [23]
serves as a springboard for a variety of interpretations that emphasize the issues of needs, limits
on development, futurity, inter- and intra-generational equity and the simultaneous fulfillment
of economic efficiency, environmental protection, and social justice goals. Although the term is
accompanied by imprecision, ambiguity, and, at times, contradictions, there is a generally accepted
understanding of what sustainable development means.
The pragmatic way to SD definition relates to its “measurement” and includes indicators, as
from the inception of the SD concept it has been clear that information and namely quantitative
indicators will play an important role [24]. Nowadays, there are many SD indicators and indices
already developed and new ones certainly have yet to appear, for example, [25,26]. Regardless of the
truth—whether there is an obsession with numbers stimulating an indicator explosion, or a lack of
indicators limiting humankind’s competence to embark on a sustainable path—many serious efforts
seeking reliable SD metrics have been made so far (the European Commission’s ‘Beyond GDP’, OECD’s
‘Measuring the Progress of Societies’, etc.). This line of thinking was emphasized and supported in the
main Outcome document of the Rio+20 Summit: “We recognize that progress towards the achievement
of the Goals needs to be assessed and accompanied by targets and indicators, while taking into account
different national circumstances, capacities and levels of development” [8].
One basic idea behind the development of indicators for monitoring and performance evaluation
of SD policies is evidence-based policymaking—indicators being viewed as knowledge-agents serving
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the simplification and communication of evidence in a form suited for policy- and decision-makers.
Besides this rationalistic conception of the instrumental role of knowledge for decision-making,
indicator influence has also conceptual and political dimensions (helping to diffuse ideas, alternative
thinking and new concepts rather that leading to political action). There are often trade-offs
between different types of influence and between the roles that indicators play in policymaking.
Indicator providers and promoters should therefore seek clarification for themselves concerning
the types of influence that indicators are expected to achieve in a given policy situation (is the
indicator-based report to consciously influence decision-makers, or is it to influence how policy-makers
think, define problems, or provide new perspectives on problems? Or to provide ammunition
to support the pre-determined position of a user? [18]). Thus, the purpose of the assessment
predetermines the indicator selection to the same extent as the concepts behind the Goals and targets.
We claim that concepts of SD as well as the SDGs and their targets cannot be solely defined by a
pack of statistics and indicators, regardless of how relevant they are and regardless of their use.
Employing indicators on the availability principle is methodologically incorrect and might lead to
distortions in development of policy agendas.
4. The Sustainable Development Goals
In 2015, a summit attended by heads of state adopted the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) [5]. The SDGs, also known as the Global Goals, are a universal call to action to end poverty,
protect the planet, and ensure that peace and prosperity will be enjoyed by all. They are structured in
17 general themes (Goals), 169 more specific tasks (targets), and 244 indicators ( Since nine indicators
repeat under two or three different targets, the actual total number of individual indicators in the
Framework is 232), that is, there are 5–19 targets and 6–27 indicators per Goal (Table 1). Despite the
endorsed Global indicator framework, the work on the entire reporting mechanism is still in progress—data
for the global SDG indicator database must be checked for availability and quality, and storylines for SDG
global reports must be further developed [6]. The major identified weaknesses were the poor alignment
of targets and Goals with existing international agreements and political processes; lack of effective
implementation; conflicts between Goals and targets, non-quantified targets, lack of and/or low quality
data for indicators [27]. And most of all—lack of operationalization of the targets [7].
Table 1. Global indicator framework structure [6].
Goal Number of Targets Number of Indicators
SDG 1 7 14
SDG 2 8 13
SDG 3 13 27
SDG 4 10 11
SDG 5 9 14
SDG 6 8 11
SDG 7 5 6
SDG 8 12 17
SDG 9 8 12
SDG 10 10 11
SDG 11 10 15
SDG 12 11 13
SDG 13 5 8
SDG 14 10 10
SDG 15 12 14
SDG 16 12 23
SDG 17 19 25
Total 169 244
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We agree with Holden et al. [28] that formulating the 2030 Agenda and defining the SDGs
would have been much easier if the world community had already reached a consensus on how
to define and operationalize the concept of SD. We insist that it is still necessary to define each
target, specify the concept behind each target, and describe what is and what is not part of that
concept, and so on. This step will be important particularly for the targets which have a broad,
multi-theme definition (there are majority such defined targets). This is to be followed by elaboration
of clear-cut and detailed formulations of working hypotheses on the measurement of particular
facts (phenomena, objects, processes) [29]. Only proper conceptualization and operationalization
of the targets will transform them from broad, vague, and mostly political/theoretical concepts to
tools which are clearly understandable in terms of empirical observations measurable or describable
by appropriate indicators. It is an urgent task—since the first SDGs reports have already been
published—to apply relevant and reliable indicators communicating global progress towards the
Goals. A task of the same importance is at national level. Each country should seriously pursue the
global SDGs concepts and methodologies and adapt them to national circumstances and conditions.
What does, for example, “equitable and quality primary and secondary education” mean in each
particular country and what policy implications does the underlying concept bring about? Is the
proposed global indicator (Proportion of children and young people at certain grades achieving at
least a minimum proficiency level in reading and mathematics) relevant and capable of capturing
both as a global phenomenon and nation-specific? Do values play any role in it? [30]. Such questions
should be laid and answered before publishing official SDGs reports.
5. Analysis of the SDG Reports
Several major reports monitoring the implementation of the SDGs emerged during the period
2015–2017. For the analysis we identified and selected four SDGs indicator-based assessments at global
or supra-national/regional scales:
• The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2017 [31];
• SDGs: Are the rich countries ready? [32];
• SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2017: International spillovers in achieving the Goals [33]
• Sustainable development in the European Union. Monitoring report on progress towards the
SDGs in an EU context [34].
We used Google Scholar (a widely-used web search engine indexing scholarly literature across an
array of publishing formats and disciplines) that generated these reports based on several searching
criteria. We searched for publicly available documents written in English, which were comprehensive
assessment reports (not journal articles), legitimate (in terms of mandate of the report’s producer or
its capability to conduct transparent high-quality analytical work), and at a supra-national or global
scale (not national reports), that included a combination of keywords “report” and “Sustainable
Development Goals”. It may be that the resulting list of major SDGs reports (November 2018)
is not fully comprehensive but it is very likely they will have an impact on the politicians and
policy-makers—and other users—they target. The reports’ main characteristics are in Table 2.
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In terms of our methodological approach, we applied a comparative analysis. We started with
a description that provided an informative comparison about the reports concerned (the summary
results are in the Table 2). The key feature defining comparative analysis, as understood here, was an
interest in the explanatory question of why the observed similarities and differences between cases
exist. In particular, we tried to find out why the level of SDGs implementation in the same subject
(a country) is assessed differently by each report. The analysis was based on collection of data on all
cases included in the reports. The data was analyzed according to a designed common framework
comprising additional explanatory variables: relevance for the intended audience, interpretation of the
indicators results, and complexity of the assessment.
The relevance of the report—that is, relevance of the contained information—for the intended audience
is a key factor of success. If the Goals are important to and understandable by people, they will ask their
governments to act. Civil society must be able to put pressure on governments to hold them to account for
what they pledge at world summits [32]. However, the main Outcome Documents on SDGs (The future
we want (A/RES/66/288*) and Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(UN A/RES/70/1)) are not very specific about the target audience—all countries and all stakeholders,
acting in collaborative partnership, are to implement the Goals. So it’s a whole society enterprise, with
governments in the broadest sense (ministers, elected politicians, policy makers—state and regional
administration officials, administrators, bureaucrats . . . ) on one hand and civic society components on
another hand (civic society organizations including business and entrepreneurs). A crucial factor for
enhancing particularly the instrumental role and direct utilization of indicators in policy is setting a proper
communication mode for the SDGs. Communication science has already developed to the extent that there
are specific types of communication, and thematically-defined communication mechanisms (sustainability
communication, climate change communication, risk communication etc.); see for example, [35,36].
Here, we focus on indicator-based communication on sustainable development. Based on the
indicator’s characteristics, the communicated information may be either highly composed/aggregated
or detailed; just proxies for main topics or exhaustive; technical or lay-focused, and so on. The typology
of indicators, types of use (instrumental, conceptual, political), and users may be seen in [37–39].
In general, the public requires relatively simple, condensed, and easy to interpret information; it seems
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that just a limited number of indicators are sufficient. By contrast, professionals—policy makers,
statisticians, and administrators need more detailed, disaggregated data and indicators suitable for
further analyses. Politicians are somewhere in between: in terms of what they might be expected to do
with indicators, they are closer to policy-makers (professionals) but in terms of the level of detail they
might be expected to process, they are probably closer to the public. Specific users such as the business
community, media, teachers, and so on then usually require thematically targeted information meeting
their specific needs. Many major reports and assessments therefore publish special overviews and
summaries for politicians, business, NGOs etc. Hence first we explore whether the format—namely
number and type—of reported indicators may affect the intended audience.
The second variable is defined on the assumption that every assessment should have a clearly
specified use (purpose) and audience. Interpretation of indicators results is an important part of
indicator use: alongside their instrumental role, indicators can play a useful role in fostering social
learning, for example, by helping to structure policy problems, build indicator frameworks, and clarify
the various interpretations concerning the information indicators convey. An important aspect is the
use of target values—policy objectives, legislative limits and standards, sustainability reference values
etc. Thus SDGs may be assessed according to a desirable development in time (trend analysis) or
according to relevant target values (distance to target approach) (See more in [40–42]). Since SDGs
reports also employ compound indicators—indices—it is important to keep in mind both the pros
and cons of their usage [43–45]. Lastly, it is necessary to distinguish the statistical use of information
the purpose of which is to describe reality without any interpretation. With indicators the purpose is,
specifically, to evaluate the development of policies and their impact on the state of affairs [34,46].
The last variable—complexity—regards selection of the indicators. Indicators always make
the measured concept (more) complete but it in the case of the SDGs this criterion is of the utmost
importance because of the low level of conceptualization of Goals and targets. To explore this variable,
we look into the link between the employed indicators in each report and the Global indicator
framework [6]. Although the Framework is a dynamic structure that will be probably be refined
and specified to some extent building on experience and new indicator methodologies, we may assume
it will provide firm guidance for both global assessments as well as for conducting national and
thematic reviews of the Agenda 2030 [47]. Therefore, this variable shows to what extent the analyzed
reports employ the framework (i.e., its indicators) assuming that it would secure some consistency
among assessments conducted by different actors and/or at different times. Ideally, metadata
of all used indicators (definitions, data sources, uncertainties, etc.) would be checked across all
analyzed documents to identify sources of differences in results—different data, different indicators,
methodologies, or just different terminology. Despite the importance of such information, it exceeds
the scope of this article; however, we checked consistency among all indicators employed in the four
analyzed reports and in the framework (name and rationale of indicators) (Table 3) as inexplicable
differences in results might raise doubts among statisticians and experts.
Table 3. Consistency check of indicators in the four analyzed reports and the Global indicator
framework (An example of the Goal 11, selected targets 11.1, 11.2, 11.6 and 11.7).
Goal 11 Make Cities and Human Settlements Inclusive, Safe, reSilient and Sustainable












Target 11.1 By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums
11.1.1 Proportion of urban population







Target 11.2 By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by
expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities
and older persons
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Table 3. Cont.
Goal 11 Make Cities and Human Settlements Inclusive, Safe, reSilient and Sustainable
11.2.1 Proportion of population that has
convenient access to public transport, by
sex, age and persons with disabilities
n.a. Access to publictransport n.a. n.a.
Target 11.6. By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality and municipal
and other waste management















11.7 By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons
and persons with disabilities
11.7.2 Proportion of persons victim of
physical or sexual harassment, in the
previous 12 months
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.





Rooms per person Rent burden (%disposable income)
6. Results
This section provides an overview of the main findings based on the three variables defined in
the research framework.
Report: The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2017
The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2017 published by the UN Department of Economic
and Social Affairs (UNDESA) reviews progress towards the 17 Goals in the second year of
implementation of Agenda 2030. It employs 100 indicators to monitor the achievement of SDGs
that are fully based on the Global indicator framework. Selection of indicators is not intended to
represent the SDG targets according to their importance as all Goals and targets are equally important
and will need to be addressed by the appropriate indicators [31]. The first part of the report—an
Overview—emphasizes key global results in all 17 Goals. Clear short messages are accompanied by
simple graphics (symbols, charts, maps). The analytical part of the report then presents more detailed
information in various formats based on data availability—global results or figures disaggregated
by the standard UN country groupings (Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania, Northern Africa and Western
Asia, Central and Southern Asia, Europe and Northern America, Latin America and the Caribbean,
Australia and New Zealand, and Eastern and South-Eastern Asia). The indicators mostly show trend
developments or only the last available year.
Several findings may be drawn from the report analysis: The first regards its communication
power. The report is not very voluminous as it contains concise and condensed information.
The 8-page Overview part is appropriately designed for politicians and the general public (and perhaps
specific groups such as educators etc.). The analytical part seems to be more appropriate for
professionals—policy makers, experts, specialized NGOs etc.). Indicators provide a statistical
description of the state of affairs and a trend analysis over several years or just a simple visualization
of the time development between two times in both global and regional scope. Global objectives for
the Goals are used for the results interpretation when available. Thus, the report is appropriate for a
broad audience interested in global development issues.
Report: Sustainable development in the European Union: Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs
in an EU context
The European Commission—or sensu stricto Eurostat, the statistical agency of the EU—monitors in
this report the “next steps for a sustainable European future and European action for sustainability” [34].
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Progress in all 28 EU member states is assessed by 100 indicators; each Goal has six indicators primarily
attributed to it (Goals 14 and 17 have only five). Forty-one out of the 100 indicators are multi-purpose,
that is, they are used to monitor more than one SDG. The indicators are not based on the Global
indicator framework (despite there are many overlaps) but with a few exceptions they stem from
already existing indicator sets used for monitoring long-term EU policies, such as the EU Sustainable
Development Indicators, the Europe 2020 headline indicators, performance and impact indicators of
the Strategic Plan 2016–2020, and so on. Like the above UN report, the EU Monitoring report offers an
overall picture of the EU’s development (aggregated EU-28 level) but it also looks into disaggregated
data for all member states. Whenever possible (in 16 cases), the calculation of indicator trends takes
into account concrete objectives set in relevant EU policies and strategies. All indicators are interpreted
also by trend—towards or from the objective or desirable path (even for indicators without quantitative
objectives Eurostat has developed a method showing the pace and direction of indicator development).
Besides the main bulky document, a 20-page “Overview of progress towards the SDGs in an EU
context” published separately presents a first statistical overview of short-term trends (five years)
relating to the SDGs in the EU by easy-to-grasp symbols for the same indicators as the main report.
The main report is quite extensive (372 pages) and it is likely to be assigned to policy makers
and professionals. Although the abridged Overview is just a brochure it is still an information-rich
document—the number of indicators is quite large to be read and understood as a whole. In both
publications, figures, charts and symbols create a false impression of even more indicators, orientation and
correct understanding of which is not easy, in particular for lay people. This makes not only complicated
reading but also obscures understanding of the SDGs operationalization. In addition, some indicators
(e.g., agricultural factor income, low work intensity, relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap) are not
intuitively understandable in terms of meaning, interpretation, or relation to other indicators and objectives.
The EU SDG indicator set is the result of the official/political initiative involving a wide
consultation process among Member States’ statistical authorities, European Council Committees,
Commission services, the European Statistical Advisory Committee, members of academia and various
international and non-governmental organizations. Thus, a thorough discussion on all Goals and
targets may be assumed. Despite the EU having its own legitimate priorities for both domestic and
international agendas, differences in operationalization (demonstrated by different indicators and
their interpretation) may be viewed as (i) an inability or unwillingness to come to conclusions on
the definitions of Goals and targets and/or (ii) taking into account “policy relevance from an EU
perspective, availability, country coverage, data freshness and quality”. Policy relevance from an EU
perspective may denote that the employed indicators are related exclusively to the objectives of the
European policies. Then in fact, they would measure only what has been measured in the EU anyway,
meaning unclear. However, the “SDGs implementation” in terms of measurement is supposed to help
to identify the role of European countries in a global effort for sustainability as well as to contribute to
SDGs operationalization by bringing well-elaborated and justified regional perspectives
Report: SDGs: Are the rich countries ready?
This report [34] examines how exclusively high-income countries are currently performing in SDGs
achievement. In total 34 “snapshot indicators”, two per Goal, were selected based on the following
three criteria: (i) Feasibility: Data must be available today in good quality at least for OECD countries;
(ii) Suitability: The indicator should represent the—often multifaceted—Goal in a broad sense like a
headline indicator; there should be a close conceptual fit between Goal and indicator; the indicators should
be appropriate for the particular challenges of economically advanced nations; (iii) Relevance: The indicator
should stand a good chance of becoming an actual part of the SDG monitoring system as currently being
discussed by the Inter-Agency Expert Group for SDGs (In 2015 the United Nations Statistical Commission
created the IAEG-SDGs and tasked it with developing and implementing the Global indicator framework
for the Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda) (IAEG-SDGs).
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The 34 reported indicators have a plausible potential for communication on sustainability provided
there is a thoughtful process of indicators selection. Such “headline indicators” would, by definition,
capture the most important aspects of each Goal but they could not express their full operationalization.
The indicators passing the above criteria (feasibility, suitability and relevance) were selected from a broad
pool of global indicators—the Global indicator framework [6], SDGs monitoring indicators [48], and
Sustainable Governance Indicators (a framework with 136 indicators) [49]. The report offers an overall
“country league” ranking based on each indicator and SDG index (calculated as an unweighted average of
all 34 indicators). The former benchmarks countries’ performance to the five best performing countries
and thus compares each country with the realistically achievable results of their peers. The latter provides
results of the first attempt for an integrated view of countries’ SDGs performance. Lucid visualization
by radial charts for country profiles and bar charts for country rankings provide an evidence base for
policymakers, businesses, and civil society to act.
An indicator selection—although based on three robust criteria—is inevitably an arbitrary decision
always raising conceptual and methodological concerns. Other indicators would likely provide
different rankings, different interpretation, different uncertainties, and so on. Another prerequisite of
the credible indicator-based assessment is full comparability of data and indicators (in terms of sources,
definitions, methodology, and interpretation), in particular for such a scientifically and politically
sensitive task as country ranking (naming and faming—or shaming, is still the usual interpretation of
results). In that regard, some indicators are not methodologically comparable or have low information
value on/for some countries (secondary school attainment), are irrelevant (ocean health), or are not
unambiguously interpretable (indicators using GDP ratio). The resulting numerical ladders look nice
and scientific but they may not be justified by correct numbers.
Report: SDG Index and Dashboards Report 2017
This report was prepared by a team of independent experts of the Sustainable Development
Solutions Network (Sustainable Development Solutions Network is an independent global network
of research centers, universities and technical institutions aiming to mobilize scientific and technical
expertise for problem-solving in relation to sustainable development. It was initiated by the UN
in 2012) and Bertelsmann Stiftung (Bertelsmann Stiftung is a German private operating foundation).
For 83, or 99 resp. (OECD countries have more accurate and better data available across a wide range
of indicators, so 16 additional variables created an Augmented SDG Index for the OECD countries),
of the used indicators, the official SDG indicators proposed by the Global indicator framework are
employed where possible. New data and improvements in methodology are major changes from the
previous year’s report. It strengthens the legitimacy and credibility of the SDGs operationalization;
however, it is not a global multi-stakeholder consensus on SDGs assessment but an expert-based effort.
It seeks to assess in particular the adverse “spillovers” (Positive and negative spillover effects are
called “externalities” in economic literature)—development patterns of the rich countries that may
hinder the ability of poorer countries’ to achieve the SDGs (e.g., high consumption levels, banking
secrecy and tax havens, weapons exports, etc.). The underlying assumption is that traditional SDG
indicators mostly ignore these spillover effects and therefore favor the high-income countries tending
to generate them to a significant extent. Thus, the report identifies and measures three groups of the
most important SDG-related spillovers and misuses of the global commons: environmental spillovers;
spillovers related to the economy, finance, and governance, and security spillovers. Both the SDG
index and dashboard use the same indicators.
The geographical coverage is 157 (out of the 193) UN member states. They can benchmark themselves
against their peers—individual countries or relevant geopolitical regions (OECD countries, Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, East and South Asia, Middle East and North
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa)—as well as against the Goal thresholds (absolute quantitative thresholds
are used when possible, for example, zero poverty, universal school completion, full gender equality).
These thresholds are derived from the SDGs and their targets or other official sources; when no such
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thresholds exist, an average of the top five performers is used. The importance (relevance) of the assessment
is emphasized by comparing the country’s performance on the SDG Index to other common development
metrics: GDP per capita, subjective wellbeing, Human Development Index, Environmental Performance
Index, Global Competitiveness Index and Global Peace Index. The key users of the report results are
governments; besides them, it explicitly aims at other SDG stakeholders such as businesses, civil society
organizations, foundations, universities, media, and others who “have a vital role in turning the SDGs into
practical tools for explaining sustainable development” [33].
7. Conclusions
The current UN Sustainable Development Goals will frame global action until 2030. The SDGs
are already firmly embedded in a policy framework: during the course of their development they
went through a political process and broad political negotiations. For monitoring and assessment
of global sustainability an agreed set of global indicators was designed [6]. If this framework is
used inconsistently, for example, if only arbitrarily selected indicators, additional indicators to some
targets, compounds (indices) created from some indicators, and so on are used, the results will
be commensurately inconsistent, incomprehensible, or even dubious. Despite the fact that SDG
assessments are not intended to replace or compete with other SDG monitoring and indicators, in fact
they do. If they motivated intergovernmental or/and national agencies to develop a suite of monitoring
systems supporting the SDG indicators, such testing and experimenting with various indicators and
indices would be well justified. However, the current inconsistent messages conveyed by the four
analyzed SDGs assessments may be interpreted not as a call for better data and full conceptualization
of all targets but as a rash exercise of researchers and experts almost randomly quantifying any SDG
metric at hand. It is needless to say that it may open room for skepticism concerning the role of
indicators as policy support instruments.
A flagrant example of inconsistent results is the SDG index. Regardless of the fact that the SDGs
indicators have not been primarily designed for this purpose (therefore their authors have not handled
issues of their substitutability, doublecounting, autocorrelations etc.), the SDG index is an attractive
idea. Aggregated indicators, composites, indices and so on have always drawn attention due to their
main advantage—simplifying communication of even complex issues. The real problem occurs when
two similar indices show very different results. In particular, when the indices are named the same, or
similarly assess the same facts or phenomena, they show remarkably distinct results. Only experts
are, in fact, usually aware of the conceptual and/or methodological differences and therefore they
understand the ensuing differences in results. While some results show good consistency of ranking
(e.g., Sweden—1st place, Germany—6th place, etc.), the Czech Republic may serve as a country
where inconsistent results may be politically harmful: One SDG index [32] ranks it in 24th place
in country ranking (out of 34 assessed OECD countries)—that is, among the worst third—while a
similar SDG index [33] places the same country at a very positive fifth place in the global competition
(among 157 assessed countries). Unlike the Czech improvement—or more precisely “positive difference”
of 19 places—the US lost 13 places (29. vs. 42.), Mexico 24 places (24. vs. 58.), and Turkey 34 places
(33. vs. 67.). These differences are not caused just by different country samples—countries are placed
differently since the indices are different. After getting such unclear overall information, assessment of
particular targets also requires careful reading and some knowledge of interpretation. For example,
a Czech reader interested in the topic of poverty (Goal 1), finds out that the global number of people
living in extreme poverty fell significantly while people at risk of poverty in Europe are still numerous
and thus it is moving away from sustainability objectives; however, while the Czech Republic is
currently doing best at this indicator (much better than more affluent Germany or UK) it does not
tell us anything about whether this is at a sustainable rate. Every assessment thus provides an
important piece of the SDG puzzle; however, putting them together and seeing the whole picture it
not a trivial enterprise.
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Sustainability assessment is a tremendously difficult task, see for example, [50,51].
Besides developing new scenarios, models, and indicators it is necessary to assess the existing
ones and account for their strengths and weaknesses, in particular in their role as policy support
instruments—systematic research into that must continue, in particular in scientific journals.
Experimenting with various SDGs rankings and indices may have a clear and acceptable rationale in
terms of context analysis, correlation calculations, sensitivity analysis, and other numerical testing.
We argue that different and inconsistent results published publicly and mostly channeled to the same
audience (mostly politicians and policy makers) may cause serious misunderstanding or doubts on
the capability to assess SDGs implementation: Have countries’ performances improved or worsened
suddenly and inexplicably? Has the methodology changed and measured the same phenomenon
differently? Have the indicators evinced big errors/uncertainties? Etc.
As mentioned above, the SDGs (i.e., Goals and targets) are firmly embedded in a policy framework
and their operationalization has been mostly done by indicators. Because such an approach generates
many caveats [7,52], it is absolutely necessary that the expert community reach full consensus on the
indicator framework and its use. As emerging needs show, the global set of individual indicators should be
complemented by a set of key (headline) indicators while an SDG index raises more doubts than gains so far
(similarly to other sustainability indices mostly having negligible use in policy making). An instrumental
role in this process belongs to the IAEG-SDGs. The UN Statistical Commission foresees the possibility of
yearly refinements to the Framework and of two comprehensive reviews in 2020 and in 2025 [53]. Such a
clear work plan with the strong leadership of the UN gives a chance to replace the “survival of the fittest”
approach (very appropriate in the context of research published in scientific journals) and effectively make
progress in the understanding of the SDGs at global level. In parallel, due to national adaptations of
the Goals, targets, and related indicators many complementary data sets and indicators for national and
regional SDGs assessment will emerge over time.
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Abstract: Sustainable Development Goal 12 (SDG 12) requires sustainable production and consumption.
One indicator named in the SDG for resource use is the (national) material footprint. A method and
disaggregated data basis that differentiates the material footprint for production and consumption
according to, e.g., sectors, fields of consumption as well as socioeconomic criteria does not yet exist.
We present two methods and its results for analyzing resource the consumption of private households
based on microdata: (1) an indicator based on representative expenditure data in Germany and
(2) an indicator based on survey data from a web tool. By these means, we aim to contribute to
monitoring the Sustainable Development Goals, especially the sustainable management and efficient
use of natural resources. Indicators based on microdata ensure that indicators can be disaggregated
by socioeconomic characteristics like age, sex, income, or geographic location. Results from both
methods show a right-skewed distribution of the Material Footprint in Germany and, for instance,
an increasing Material Footprint with increasing household income. The methods enable researchers
and policymakers to evaluate trends in resource use and to differentiate between lifestyles and along
socioeconomic characteristics. This, in turn, would allow us to tailor sustainable consumption policies to
household needs and restrictions.
Keywords: sustainable production and consumption; resource indicator; sustainable development
goals; material footprint; household consumption; microdata
1. Introduction
Meeting the resource demand of a growing global consumer class increasingly affects the
environment and places a burden on climate and ecosystems [1]. Since household consumption
and production for consumer goods are at the core of the present resource-intensive lifestyles, it is
important to analyze the behavior of private households and assist them in transforming their routines
into more sustainable ones. This means providing new technologies, products, and services that
enable, perhaps even stimulate, a resource-friendly life. Production and consumption in this sense form
an interlaced system that can only be thought and developed in an integrated way.
Resource efficiency in the context of sustainable production and consumption is currently gaining
attention on a national and international level. The current trend towards Product Service Systems (PSS)
as an approach for increasing sustainability can contribute to a sustainable way of linking consumption
and production [2–5]. Several attempts have been made to support the development of low-resource
and socially accepted approaches of integrating production and consumption. Examples for this
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are the Consumer Information Program of the 10 Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable
Consumption and Production (10YFP) as well as the European Union with its Ecodesign Directive [6,7].
The Sustainable Development Goal 12 (SDG 12) “Ensure sustainable production and consumption
patterns” integrates a wide range of stakeholders into the process of increasing sustainability in
consumption and production [8]. However, the ambitious SDGs and their subgoals require appropriate
indicators for measuring the status quo and the progress until 2030. There is a lack of indicators
which are able to provide the necessary differentiation for socioeconomic characteristics like sex, age,
or income [9] and fields of consumption like housing or mobility that hampers the process of providing
improved assistance for producers and consumers in implementing more sustainable product-service
systems and production and consumption patterns [10] as advocated by SDG 12.
Germany published its first sustainability strategy in 2002 and reports the progress towards its
goals every four years [11]. This strategy includes different indicators for measuring the development
of sustainability in Germany. The latest update from 2016 adopts the framework of the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). Besides this strategy, Germany implemented a National Program on
Sustainable Consumption that aims to identify the relevant fields of action and adequate measures [12].
It gives five guiding principles for a sustainable consumption policy, for example enabling consumers to
implement a sustainable way of consumption. In this respect, the German Program on Resource Efficiency
(Progress II) demands the implementation of a National Program on Sustainable Consumption in order to
promote resource efficiency in consumption [13]. Therefore the program strives to develop and improve its
set of indicators for a better measurement of the effects of changes in consumption. Behavioral changes in
favor of more resource efficient consumption are still hampered by obstacles such as a lack of information
and personalized feedback applications. The National Program on Sustainable Consumption suggests
providing such information by the use of assisting carbon and resource calculators [12].
Certain routines and social practices in consumption, as well as patterns in production and existing
business models, complicate a change towards a more sustainable behavior [14]. Sustainable consumption
requires sustainably designed product service systems and infrastructures [15]. It is only possible to shape
both together and step by step. Progress or regression, as well as rebound effects, must be visible and
therefore demonstrable. Indicators play a crucial role in setting up goals and measuring progress in this
regard. They simplify the complex cause-effect chains within our societies, economies, and with our
environment. On a national level, indicators can be used to develop pathways for sustainability or to
identify trends. Scenario developers usually use these goals and indicators to define a target corridor
in comparison to a status quo or business-as-usual. They are but a tool for aggregated measurement of
impacts and not their management.
However, indicators can potentially also be a tool to evaluate and inform in a differentiated
way by depicting and sometimes explaining the differences—with the means of modern societies
almost in real time. This would make them relevant not only politically (programmes and measures),
but also in everyday decision-making situations, whether in a company (products, infrastructures)
or in a household (lifestyles). This can be achieved using microdata (e.g., from online surveys) and
combining it with already existing methods.
Recent research has managed to quantify some levels of sustainable resource use. While the
global material extraction has drastically increased over the last four decades (from 26.7 billion tonnes
in 1970 to 75.6 billion tonnes in 2010) [16], material consumption levels in Europe already reached
40 tonnes per capita and more at the beginning of the century [17]. By comparison, Lettenmeier et al.
calculated a sustainable level of only 8 tonnes of a Material Footprint (per person and year) [18],
using the MIPS concept (Material Input Per unit of Service) This means a reduction by the factor
five, which requires an appropriate consumer policy and education for sustainable consumption
patterns [19]. MIPS (developed by Schmidt-Bleek in the 1990s [20]) provides micro-economic indicators
for the resource use of households that include the extraction of materials with and without economic
use (e.g., overburden from mining). Its methodology is based on Material-Flow-Accounting and
compatible with similar input indicators such as cumulated energy demand (ced) or cumulated raw
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material demand (KRA). Its indicator Material Footprint can also be adapted to the currently suggested
SDG 12 indicator with the same name. Recent methodological developments make use of improved
LCA data [21–25].
Further research in the field also allowed us to differentiate between different household types
(milieus) and their resource use, although limited to small samples of selected households using
a diary approach. It could also be shown that the calculation of Material Footprints for households
is compatible with methods for the calculation of Carbon Footprints, thus allowing us to compare
lifestyles with high resource use but low carbon intensity and vice versa [21,26].
Two tools have developed that aim at supporting consumers in transforming their consumption
patterns and are supposed to develop synergy effects by combining them. Buhl et al. [10] developed
a Material Footprint (MF) indicator based on the MIPS concept and microeconomic expenditure data
in Germany. This indicator was already used to analyze the behavior of households in Germany and
the German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and allows for differentiation between
regions (here, the federal states of Germany and Germany itself), socioeconomic characteristics of
households and between categories of consumption. The other method is based on microdata that is
directly obtained from an online tool. The “Resource Calculator” [27] is a free online application that
enables consumers to examine their consumption patterns by calculating their own Material Footprint.
Consumers can also supply information about their socioeconomic characteristics on a voluntary
and anonymous basis (such as age or years of schooling). Thus, the Resource Calculator provides
an anonymized dataset for analyzing the resource use of private households that—in future—could
provide a representative basis for a new indicator of consumption in the future using a consumer
panel. The calculator itself could also be developed further as an interactive tool for real-time decision
making in all-day routines and practices.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the process of examining the consumption patterns of
households and to provide the means for micro-economic SDG indicators. Using the example of
natural resource use, the authors show how environmental indicators can be differentiated for private
household types and categories of consumption. We posit that using microdata is a viable solution to
distinguish between the age, sex, income, ethnicity, geographic location, and other characteristics as
required by national policies in Germany [28–30]. We propose to enhance the present highly aggregated
macro-oriented indicator system for SDG 12 with the help of disaggregating microeconomic data
and indicators.
We hypothesize that a micro-based Resource Consumption Indicator could be an adequate tool to
monitor consumer’s Material Footprint and target achievement (measurement but also management).
Differentiating indicators between arrays of consumption and different consumer groups reveal shifts
and changes between arrays and groups that may otherwise stay undetected and camouflaged by
aggregated macro indicators. Additionally, the online tool based Resource Lifestyle Footprint could
help to facilitate achieving the given targets and address the different types of households and lifestyles
appropriately in this process.
We start by introducing the data and methods that we used in Section 2: the Resource
Consumption Indicator (RCI) and the Resource Lifestyle Footprint (RLF). The results are presented in
Section 3, followed by a discussion of limitations and the derived implications in Section 3. In Section 5
(conclusion), we put the results into the context of research and consumer policies.
2. Methodology
The following section describes briefly the methods and data used for calculating the Material
Footprints of both Resource Consumption Indicator and Resource Lifestyle Footprint. The Resource
Consumption Indicator (1) relates top-down resource-intensities of consumption in a country to
expenditures of consumers. The Resource Lifestyle Footprint (2) models the resources of product-services
and their use bottom up. Both approaches account for the amount of extracted abiotic and biotic materials
from nature and relate them annually on a per person or per capita basis.
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2.1. The Resource Consumption Indicator (RCI)
The first approach is based on tables on international trade (see Reference [31] on multi-regional
footprint analysis). These multi-regional Input-/Output tables (MRIO) allow for the accounting of
globally extracted raw materials (alongside other indicators) for goods consumed within a country
(including imports but excluding exports of an economy). By allocating these goods to the consumption
of households, country-specific resource-intensities are that can be directly linked to country-specific
household expenditures calculated (see also References [32,33]). This top-down model converts traded
monetary value into the physical material use of households, thus linking the macro-economy with
microdata on the level of households. It provides a holistic view of resource consumption and is
consistent when comparing countries with each other. Thus, it can be used to generate representative
data on the resource use of households in countries and to differentiate levels of resource consumption
depending on socioeconomic characteristics in the microdata. Buhl et al. (2016) [10] successfully
applied the resource intensities to household expenditure data for Germany in order to describe the
Material Footprint (sum of globally induced resource extractions) of different households in the federal
state of North-Rhine-Westphalia in Germany itself.
The weakness of this top-down approach is its inability to explain the differences between
household types and their resource consumption sufficiently. The highly aggregated data with respect
to resource intensities based on MRIO tables also does not allow the identification of specific product
and service options for more sustainable measures by households or policies catering towards a more
resource-efficient lifestyle. This is where bottom-up models can help to fill data gaps by focusing on the
most relevant areas of consumption and disaggregating further into different services and products.
To measure private household consumption for the approach of the Resource Consumption
Indicator, data from the German Survey of Household Income and Consumption (EVS) for the years
2003, 2008 and 2013 were used. The EVS is conducted by the Federal Statistical Office, using household
expenditure as a proxy for consumption. The data are structured into eleven main categories and
152 subcategories according to the Classification of Individual Consumption per Purpose (COICOP).
The analysis described here focuses on the eleven main categories. Furthermore, the EVS includes
socioeconomic data and enables a differentiation between different groups of households or individuals,
clustered by characteristics such as age or household net income [10].
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the yearly expenditures of the main categories between
2003 and 2013 in Germany.
Table 1. The overview of selected variables and descriptive statistics of the EVS.
N (Sample Size) Mean Std.Dev. (Standard Deviation)
Variables 2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013 2003 2008 2013
Food and beverages 42,744 44,088 42,792 3634.7 3831.69 3825.74 1933.35 2060.8 2100.27
Clothing 42,744 44,088 42,792 1646.34 1514.8 1577.43 1572.12 1569.62 1665.11
Housing 42,744 44,088 42,792 9449.24 9642.25 10,746.5 6337.31 4900.78 5129.06
Furnishing 42,744 44,088 42,792 1900.51 1624.52 1671.71 4191.31 3805.17 3702.8
Health 42,744 44,088 42,792 1332.44 1438.11 1552.15 3822.46 3694.82 4232.48
Transport 42,744 44,088 42,792 4610.35 4687.23 4628.17 11,824.1 10,489.9 11,369.6
Communication 42,744 44,088 42,792 896.51 833.13 821.45 668.83 527.96 554.92
Recreation and Culture 42,744 44,088 42,792 3807.11 3701.09 3575.99 4002.47 4512.23 4743.77
Education 42,744 44,088 42,792 298.38 292.53 272.98 865.56 1046.73 1070.36
Hotels 42,744 44,088 42,792 1477.48 1654.37 1782.77 1890.12 2143.4 2316.07
Miscellaneous 42,744 44,088 42,792 1379.76 1351.69 1297.62 1892.59 2103.99 1948.51
Household size 42,744 44,088 42,792 2.43 2.28 2.10 1.23 1.17 1.09
NRW 9223 7708 7823 1 1 1 0 0 0
Data: German Survey of Household Income and Consumption, 2003, 2008, 2013. Expenditure data in Euro.
“Household size” and “NRW” (i.e., living in the federal state of NRW in Germany) represent socio-demographics of
the sample.
The expenditures of households in the EVS were related to so-called resource intensity factors
(household resource use per Euro). These factors stem from multi-regional input-output analyses
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(MRIO) of economy-wide material flow accounts and the continuous household budget surveys for
Germany in the year 2005. Table 2 provides an overview of the average resource intensities in the main
consumption categories [34].
Resource intensities allow the measurement of the impact of private consumption on the
environment and can be used to calculate the Material Footprint of consumption. The calculation of
the Material Footprint based on microdata on expenditure (EVS) and respective resource intensities of
the main COICOP categories are described in Appendix A.
The further analysis is based on the differentiation between the main COICOP categories from
“Food and beverages” to “Miscellaneous”. However, Buhl et al. (2016) show an application of the
method that further differentiates within the main COICOP category “Transport” by calculating
resource intensities for specific transport services like local and long distance trains, air travel, or the
use of second-hand cars [10].
Table 2. The resource intensities of private household consumption in Germany.
Consumption Categories Resource Intensity (kg/€)




Restaurants and hotels 1.40
Health 0.60
Education 0.48




Based on Buhl et al., 2016 [10]. Data: Buhl and Acosta 2015 [32].
2.2. The Resource Lifestyle Footprint (RLF)
The “Resource Calculator” tool (see https://www.ressourcen-rechner.de/) provides a footprint
of a household’s lifestyles. It calculates the Material Footprint of products, their services, and usage
directly and over the whole lifecycle of their production, use, and end-of-life (including material
extractions in other countries). It combines quantitative (and often physical) survey data on household
consumption with survey data on socioeconomic characteristics and household attitudes in order to
calculate an individual or lifestyle footprint. This approach allows us to identify drivers and barriers of
resource use and matches socio-demographic characteristics, lifestyle decisions, subjective attitudes or
assessments, social norms, and individual preferences as well as budget restrictions to the individual
footprint or ecological backpack (see References [35,36] on the concept). Resource use can thus be
reduced not only by consuming resource efficient products, but also by improving the service these
products provide. This bottom-up model has been successfully tested in several studies ([18,21,26]) and
is compliant with the Material Flow Accounting (MFA) and Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) methodology.
It is also compatible with generic databases for lifecycle inventories as well as assessments of output
indicators such as carbon footprints (as shown by References [22,23]).
The calculator generates a growing database because of its permanent online accessibility.
Besides questions regarding the most important fields of consumption like housing and mobility,
users can voluntarily and anonymously provide data concerning their socioeconomic characteristics.
This was surveyed alongside other subjective attitudes and norms such as relative household income
in comparison, subjective health or subjective well-being. Table 3 lists the different areas of private
consumption in the Resource Calculator.
134
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4467
Table 3. The description of consumption categories in the Resource Calculator.
Groups of Consumption in Resource Calculator Description of Category
Nutrition diets, food waste, and consumption of foodstuffs and drinks
Housing buildings, heat, and electricity use
Consumer Goods appliances, clothes, furniture
Mobility day-to-day travel with cars, bikes, public transport
Leisure hobbies, sports, cultural activities
Vacation vacation travel and accommodation
The Resource Calculator application was advertised via different channels such as the website of
the Wuppertal Institute, online blogs on sustainable living, and reviews of product testing magazines.
Between the launch on 25 February 2015 and 13 February 2017, 49,037 persons participated without any
incentives. Data preparation and the removal of invalid and implausible responses left a database of 44,514
being analyzed. For a more detailed description, necessary transformations and underlying assumptions
see Buhl et al., 2017 [27]. Table 4 comprehends the most relevant dimensions and variables surveyed by
the Resource Calculator. Socioeconomic, personal, and household characteristics, as well as subjective
assessments and other lifestyle features, complement disaggregated information on the Material Footprint.
Table 4. The overview of variables and descriptive statistics of the Resource Calculator.
Statistic N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Personal characteristics
Female 26,103 0.62 0.49 0 1
Age 24,596 36.00 12.00 18 71
Schooling years 26,118 14.00 3.20 9 21
Occupational status 18,463 3.00 1.10 1 4
Unemployed 18,463 0.14 0.35 0 1
Household characteristics
Household size 44,238 2.20 1.00 1.00 6.00
Number of children 9119 1.60 0.71 1 4
Size of dwelling (m2) 30,482 95.00 47.00 7.00 300.00
Subjective assessments
Subjective health 17,297 1.30 0.57 −1 2
Relative income 22,125 −0.41 1.00 −2 2
Life satisfaction 26,041 7.30 1.80 1 10
Social ties satisfaction 17,690 1.00 0.71 −2 2
Lifestyle
Diet 44,317 2.20 0.84 1 4
Vegetarian 44,317 0.33 0.47 0 1
Hobby hours 44,091 8.00 12.00 0.00 75.00
Days on vacation 44,056 15.00 13.00 0 81
Trips (in km) 44,086 220.00 327.00 0.00 1,800.00
Material Footprints (kg)
Housing 44,068 8722.00 4059.00 45 26,804
Consumer goods 44,068 2859.00 1161.00 2 6936
Nutrition 44,068 5160.00 1323.00 82 9145
Leisure 44,069 446.00 639.00 0 5113
Mobility 43,456 6682.00 6407.00 1 39,447
Vacations 44,068 1525.00 1532.00 0 10,200
Overall Material Footprint 44,068 25,897.00 10,041.00 2.711 76,570
Note: Descriptive statistics include the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (Std.Dev.),
minimum (Min.) and maximum (Max.) of observations. “Trips” is the distance in km for trips and events
during the past month. “Days on vacation” are days on vacation overall in the past year. “Hobby hour” are the
hours overall spent on hobbies on average per month. “Social ties satisfaction” is the personal evaluation on how
often social relations are perceived as satisfying (as the Likert scale). “Relative income” is the assessment of the
household net income in comparison (as the Likert scale).
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3. Results
The following section shows original results as well as results from recent studies on the Resource
Calculator using the methods and data sets described in Section 2.
3.1. Resource Consumption Indicator Based on Microdata EVS and Resource Intensities
The RCF was used to monitor the resource use of private households in the sustainability report
of the Ministry for Environment, Agriculture, Conservation, and Consumer Protection of the State of
North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). One aim was to examine if and to which extent the Resource Indicator
can contribute to the goals and indicators of SDG 12 and how it could be improved. For this purpose,
the EVS data and the resource intensity data described in Section 2.1. were used as a database.
The Material Footprint of private households in NRW accounted for 31 t per capita in 2013.
Using microdata enabled the researchers to further analyze the distribution of the Material Footprint
among households. Figure 1 shows a right-skewed distribution although the 99th percentile was
removed. This implies a relatively strong bias of the average Material Footprint due to relatively few
households being responsible for relatively high amounts of resource use.
Figure 1. The distribution of Material Footprint (years 2003, 2008, 2013) according to Buhl et al., 2016 [10].
The application of the indicator of private household data from NRW revealed three categories
that accounted for the highest shares in resource consumption: housing, food, and transport [32,37].
However, smaller shares on household expenditure do not necessarily lead to lower Material Footprints,
as resource intensities can be very different between categories of consumption.
Figure 2 shows the overall change in resource use of private households in NRW between 2003
and 2013. The environmental impact of these relative changes in resource consumption depends on the
share of the categories in the overall Material Footprint. On the one hand, Communication, for example,
exhibits a strong increase of more than 30%, which might come from rapid innovations in information
and communication technologies. On the other hand, transport, for example, exhibits a decrease in
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the Material Footprint. Buhl et al. (2017) differentiate resource intensities in “Transport” and show
that a decrease in its Material Footprint comes from, e.g., a reduction of gas consumption, reduced car
ownership, and “other” reasons. Due to the relatively high resource intensity of transport, a small
decrease in expenditure for transport cancels out a larger increase in expenditure for communication
services and technologies between 2003 and 2013.
Figure 2. The change in the Material Footprint in NRW 2003–2013 according to Buhl et al., 2016 [16].
Data: Buhl and Acosta 2015 [32].
In sum, the total resource use in NRW remained almost unchanged over the three reporting
periods with a reduction of 3.9% between 2003 and 2013 on a comparable high level of resource use.
It is interesting to note that this small change in total is a result of significant shifts between the different
fields of consumption. This implies that consumption patterns in NRW changed, even though the
overall resource use did not by a large margin [16].
3.2. Resource Lifestyle Footprint Based on Survey Data from an Online Web Tool
The overall Material Footprint of users of the Resource Calculator accounts for 26 t per user
(and year). The distribution of the Material Footprint shows a similar right-skewed distribution as
revealed by the Resource Indicator. This corroborates our findings that the Material Footprint of
private households is strongly biased by high resource use of relatively few households.
Figure 3 shows the six categories presented in Table 3 and their shares in the respective Material
Footprints of the deciles. It is notable that some shares, such as food and vacation, remain nearly
constant from the first to the tenth decile while others, such as housing and mobility, increase strongly.
This allows us to conclude that the potential main drivers of a high Material Footprint appear to be
these categories.
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Figure 3. The Material Footprints for deciles and category shares.
Users have been asked to classify their income in respect to the average household net income
on a symmetric scale from clearly below average to clearly above average. Surveying the relative
household net income makes it easier for users of the calculator to state their net income and to prevent
non-response of users. Again, the results reveal an increasing Material Footprint with increasing
household net income (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. The relative household net income categories and related mean Material Footprint.
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The data was also used by Buhl et al., 2017 [27] to examine the relationship between the Material
Footprint and life satisfaction. As postulated by Buhl et al., 2017, the use of natural resources is not
clearly linked to users subjective well-being (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. The scatter and line prediction plot of the Material Footprint (in kg) vs. life satisfaction
(10-point scale). Confidence band with a = 0.01. Buhl et al., 2017 [27].
To test their hypothesis, Buhl et al., 2017 conducted a stepwise multivariate regression analysis.
They found that the strongest impacts on life satisfaction are measured for subjective health and
for satisfaction with social ties. Real income and gender reveal smaller, but still notable effects.
The influence of age, vacation days, and the Material Footprint is rather weak. Subjective assessments
and norms appear to have the strongest impact on subjective well-being, followed by socio-demographic
characteristics that seem to have less relevance in this context. The Material Footprint has the smallest
impact with a slightly negative effect on life satisfaction [27].
Data from the Resource Calculator allows for the disaggregation of Material Footprints and the
analysis of complex research questions in the realms of empirical consumer research regarding the link
between socioeconomic features and the Material Footprint. In addition, the online web tool approach
allows for a quick and flexible alteration of the variables surveyed and a constant flow of survey data.
4. Discussion
The results presented in the previous sections are based on two methods to analyze the Material
Footprint of private households according to the requirements of SDG 12. Both concepts have certain
strengths as well as potential weaknesses or limitations.
4.1. Resource Consumption Indicator
Regarding the RCI, limitations are the relatively high data aggregation of the main categories and
the restriction to consumption expenditure as a proxy for consumption.
Using aggregated data limits the differentiation ability in regard to the consumption of products
and services. For instance, one euro invested in the construction of a private house cannot be
differentiated from another one invested in maintaining heating. Both are equally subsumed under
“housing”. Due to this, the depth of analysis of resource use related to certain consumption patterns
is restricted. Lifecycle data could be used to extend the current database by disaggregating resource
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intensities for specific products and services. Such an improved disaggregation of data was successfully
conducted by Buhl et al., 2017 for transport and mobility services [37].
Additionally, expenditure data are used as a proxy for consumption. Expenditure data are
available in internationally harmonized, official and representative household statistics, which ensure
continuous surveys and high data quality. There is a proven correlation between expenditure,
consumption and hence resource use. However, there are other factors influencing the measurable
impact on the environment. Disregarding those factors can cause bias. Examples of such factors are
the households’ repairing behavior, their willingness to decide on second-hand goods, and the way
and intensity of using a certain good. Value conceptions may also lead a household to opt for goods
that are more expensive than comparable alternatives, but cause a similar resource use [16].
4.2. Resource Lifestyle Footprint
The method and data limitations of the RLF stem from non-representative sampling on the one
hand and the necessary time efficiency of the survey on the other hand.
Even though the Resource Calculator provides a large amount of user data due to the high usability
and, thus, the acceptance of the calculator tool, the sample includes some bias due to the voluntary
sampling. The share of young female users, vegetarians, and vegans, for example, is disproportionally
high, which indicates a self-selection of pro-environmental users [27]. Future studies should aim for
a more representative sampling when using the Resource Calculator as a survey tool. Adding more
detailed questions regarding personal information about the users themselves could increase the
informative value and the representativeness of the database.
The second limitation of the Resource Calculator relates to the requirement to conduct a survey
within a certain amount of time. This results in a limited set of questions that do not allow us to
analyze every aspect of consumer’s consumption patterns. Many products and services were omitted
from the survey (e.g., compared to the “diary” approach in Reference [26]), because they would
not contribute much to a higher footprint. Other questions were simplified, aiming at helping the
households to complete the survey rather than asking for precise physical values. Finally, even the
most comprehensive bottom-up survey would exclude certain products and could not account for
every variation of the product types. So there is always some part of the Material Footprint that cannot
be related to households individually. Further analysis of the available footprint data could help to
identify the essential questions, e.g., by means of unsupervised learning and by using an average
pedestal of resource consumption for areas of a low importance (e.g., durable goods such as jewelry or
the use of non-living space).
5. Conclusions
5.1. Summary
We introduced two methods for analyzing the Material Footprint of private households based
on microdata. The first method (resulting in the Resource Consumption Indicator) is based on
expenditure data according to internationally harmonized COICOP. The second method (resulting in
the Resource Lifestyle Footprint) is based on survey data from a web tool called Resource Calculator.
Both methods allow us to differentiate the Material Footprint along arrays of consumption like
housing and mobility as well as socioeconomic characteristics like age or income and thus meet
the disaggregation requirement to SDG indicators. The results from applying the two methods in
Germany shows that the Material Footprint ranges between 26 t and 31 t per capita in Germany and its
distribution is right-skewed. The most relevant categories are housing, mobility, and nutrition. When it
comes to disaggregating the Material Footprint along socioeconomic characteristics, we showed that
an increasing household net income leads to an increasing Material Footprint.
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5.2. Methods
Using microdata from the statistical offices for a Resource Indicator offers three main benefits [32].
• First, it enables a representative depiction of private household consumption.
• Second, private household consumption can be examined by looking at differentiated
consumption categories such as energy or food and its shifts and changes for the past decades.
• Third, private household consumption can be examined by looking at differentiated population
groups (disaggregated for example by income or age).
Analyzing consumption by using resource intensities offers a possibility to evaluate its
environmental impact. The concept relies on a representative, internationally harmonized and thus
comparable data according to COICOP that is available in different countries.
The method used for the Resource Lifestyle Footprint (based on the Resource Calculator) provides
new options for consumers to receive real-time feedback and for researchers to collect and gather data
quickly, flexibly, and constantly over time [27]. Further research regarding the impact of socioeconomic
characteristics on resource use could help us to identify appropriate reduction strategies for different
groups of consumers as Lettenmeier 2018 successfully showed [38]. Moreover, we strive to collect more
data from users abroad in order to compare the Material Footprints internationally (e.g., in a current
project on sustainable lifestyles in 7 different countries). So far, the sample of users from abroad is too
small to conduct a proper comparative analysis.
Despite some weaknesses, the presented Resource Consumption Indicator appears to be a good
and expandable method for measuring the resource use of private households according to SDG 12.
However, an improved database is crucial for increased reliability. This issue could be addressed by
collecting lifecycle data.
The Resource Lifestyle Footprint is a promising attempt but should be improved regarding the
aforementioned limitations. Especially, it will be important to focus on improving the database to
receive a more representative sample while condensing the questions about resource use to the most
essential ones. In this regard, the survey instrument that indicates the Material Footprint of private
households could be incorporated into existing representative surveys like the Socioeconomic Panel
(SOEP) or GESIS Panel in Germany or equivalent panels on a European level, e.g., the European
Community Household Panel (ECHB). This way, environmental policy evaluation and research
on sustainable consumption would benefit from the longitudinal design of the surveys and link
environmental issues with an extensive set of socioeconomic predictors efficiently. In any case, it would
be helpful to gather more detailed personal and household information to facilitate differentiation
between them.
Combining the presented tools could address some of the aforementioned limitations and further
improve the usability of microdata for measuring progress towards achieving SDG 12. The Resource
Consumption Indicator offers a possibility to measure this progress over time and the status quo.
The Resource Lifestyle Footprint can provide a new and more differentiated micro-level database for
analyzing consumption-related resource use. The combination of both methods (or similar methods
with microdata for that matter) would also enhance scenario building. As the majority of environmental
scenarios currently focus on technological and economic feasibility, there is a lack of scenario models
that also investigate the social and cultural drivers and barriers of sustainable development [39].
5.3. Policy Making
The Resource Consumption Indicator and the Resource Lifestyle Footprint appear to be promising
tools for deepening the understanding of private household consumption, the interaction of production
and consumption patterns, and detecting unused potentials to increase its sustainability according
to the SDGs. First results from applying the tools already revealed insights about the structure of
the resource use of private households. We conclude that microeconomic data offers an important
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enhancement of the present macro data-based indicator system. Indicators based on microdata are
able to evaluate and inform in a differentiated and disaggregated way, in perspective even in real
time. As such the methods reveal shifts in resource use between different arrays of consumption and
consumer groups that would otherwise stay undetected and camouflaged by highly aggregated macro
indicators. Policy evaluations benefit from a disaggregated perspective on the Material Footprint of
private household instead of evaluating the overall trend in the Material Footprint. Policymakers
may wonder why efforts to reduce the natural resource in mobility does not show a decreasing
overall Material Footprint, e.g., due to indirect rebound effects and shifts of consumption patterns.
For instance, differentiating the Material Footprint along arrays of consumption allows us to evaluate
whether a reduction of the Material Footprint in mobility is offset by an increase in natural resource
use by housing or communications. As such, policymakers may identify which policies in specific
arrays of consumption may be more effective in reducing the Material Footprint since rebound effects
and shifts of consumption are less pronounced.
A more differentiating approach to indicators is not relevant politically (for (inter)national
policies and programs like the indicator framework of SDGs and national programmes striving to
implement them), but also in everyday decision-making situations, whether in the company (products,
infrastructures) or in the household (lifestyles). In fact, the households themselves may evaluate
whether changes in one array of consumption are offset by shifts of their consumption into other
arrays. For instance, private households may reduce their resource use by foregoing resource-intensive
vacations abroad. At the same time, they may become aware that their savings are offset due to
intensified leisure activities.
Indicators based on microdata (or indicator set for different goals) are fundamental for the
implementation of national policies such as the National Program on Sustainable Consumption in
Germany. They allow us to combine efforts for sustainable lifestyles by companies, households and
policymakers alike. Does a product or service contribute to achieving an SDG? Are certain production
and consumption patterns sustainable and to what extent? Which rebounds can be anticipated? Which
trends evolve and do we leave certain groups behind in doing so? Does a policy instrument support
sustainable development or not? This type of evaluation system would—in the long run and combined
with real-time tools—help to manage and measure sustainable development.
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Appendix A. Calculating the Material Footprint Based on Resource Intensities
The Resource Indicator is calculated as the Material Footprint of the consumption of private
households. This Material Footprint is the product resulting from the multiplication of the consumption
expenditure c by the resource intensity r.
Material Footprint = c × r (A1)
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The consumption expenditure for the jth consumption category of k consumption categories in
total is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the consumption expenditure of the ith household out of n








The consumption expenditure is then adjusted for inflation to the base year t by considering the














The consumption expenditure of the ith household is put into the context of the household size h
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(A4)
To enable a differentiation by different subgroups, Buhl et al. introduce a dimension X,
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(A5)
The resource intensity is calculated by dividing the total resource use (indicated by household







The Material Footprint can be expressed as the arithmetic mean of the respective Material
Footprints of the jth consumption category out of k consumption categories in total by inserting
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Abstract: The European Tourism Indicators System (ETIS) is a product of the European Union (EU)
Sustainable Development Strategy, which was formulated with the objectives of promoting economic
prosperity, social equity, cohesion, and environmental protection. In this paper, we present an
analysis of the results of the implementation of the ETIS during the period 2013–2016, in the Italian
tourist destination of South Sardinia. While the implementation of ETIS constitutes a significant
advancement in Italy, and more widely in Europe, our findings reveal that an adaptive management
approach is necessary for achieving the anticipated objectives and adapting these standardized
indicators to different territorial contexts. Difficulties were encountered in both data collection and
stakeholders’ involvement in the implementation process. Insufficient knowledge, and familiarity
with the complex technical aspects of the indicator toolkit among primary stakeholders, was another
constraint associated with its implementation. We believe that the findings of this analysis can
provide guidelines and inputs for other European countries and tourist destinations that are currently
in the process of implementing the ETIS toolkit or similar methodologies. In particular, the pioneering
sustainable tourism performance measurement system (STPMS) can be adapted to meet local needs.
Keywords: tourist destination; sustainable tourism; indicators; European Tourism Indicator System
(ETIS); Visit South Sardinia
1. Introduction
In recent decades, sustainability has emerged as a primary goal in tourism-related decision
making [1]. Stakeholders in the tourism sector, including tourists and host communities, are now
considerably more aware of the importance of sustainable development in tourism than they were
in the past [2]. Nonetheless, the concept and nature of sustainability remain vague, especially in the
absence of their operationalization using tools that enable the planning, management, and monitoring
of the impacts of tourism on the target destinations [3–5]. Apart from the necessity of formulating
quantitative measures for sustainable tourism relating to its social, economic, and environmental
dimensions (i.e., indicator systems), a methodology is required for implementing these operational
tools. There have been relatively few studies on indicator systems and associated methodologies for
their implementation. This study, which was aimed at developing a procedure for operationalizing
indicator systems to measure sustainability, seeks to address this gap. In general, the process of
selecting an indicator system entails multiple stages. Firstly, a literature review is conducted to analyze
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potentially suitable indicator systems developed by international organizations. Secondly, in light
of the findings of this review, a specific indicator system is selected. Thirdly, individual indicators
are chosen and working groups are established to discuss these indicators with tourism stakeholders.
Fourth an implementation process is developed at the municipal level. Lastly, the results are presented
and discussed in the tourist destination with concerned stakeholders in tourism and related sectors.
We conducted a case study to assess the process of implementing the European Tourism Indicator
System (ETIS) for sustainable destinations designed by the European Commission (EC) [6]. The selected
case was the project of “Visit South Sardinia” (VSS) destination management organization (DMO) in
Italy. This project has been promoted by public sector stakeholders in Southern Sardinia, with the aim
of managing and marketing the above destination in collaboration with the private sector and other
primary stakeholders in tourism. The project was developed to assess and implement a pioneering
sustainable tourism performance measurement system (STPMS) in collaboration with the University
of Cagliari, with the subsequent involvement, too, of the University of Milano-Bicocca.
In 2013, VSS became an early adopter of the Global Sustainable Tourism Council (GSTC)
criteria and indicators program). The GSTC is an international organization endorsed by the United
Nations (UN), the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP). As the acknowledged global authority in this field, its sustainability
standards relating to the travel and tourism industry are definitive. VSS was one of 10 international
destinations selected to demonstrate pioneering initiatives, and progress in sustainable management.
During 2013 and 2014, it participated in the first pilot phase of implementing the ETIS, the objective
of which was to define a comprehensive tourism monitoring system for European destinations,
with the objective of maintaining Europe’s standing as “the world’s number one tourist destination” [7].
Whereas implementation of both programs, GSTC and ETIS, in Southern Sardinia demonstrated high
levels of sustainability relating to communities and the environment. They also highlighted the need to
improve methods of managing and monitoring tourism impacts. Lessons learned from implementing
the STPMS were applied in policy making and management by organizations in the public and private
sectors. Their enhanced awareness of sustainable development of tourism served as a strategic lever,
motivating their decision-making processes. For example, since 1998, Capo Carbonara, which is
situated in the municipality of Villasimius on the east coast of the VSS site, has been designated as a
marine protected area. In 2018, a new marine protected area, Capo Spartivento, located within the
municipality of Domus de Maria, was established on the west coast. Through its recognition by VSS
primary stakeholders, STPMS evidently contributed to the development of environmental policies and
practices in the destination area.
This paper is organized as follows. Further details on the background of VSS are provided in the
Section 2, and a review of the literature on sustainable tourism indicators is presented in the Section 3.
The study methods and results are discussed in the Sections 4 and 5, respectively, and conclusions are
offered in the Section 6 of the paper.
2. Background on the Case Study Destination
The case study examined in this paper is the VSS project, under which the Gulf of Angels
destination in Southern Sardinia, including the city of Cagliari, Sardinia’s capital, is managed (see
Figure 1). The project also encompasses four coastal municipalities, while private sector interests are
represented by four consortia.
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Figure 1. Map of the Province of Cagliari in Sardinia, including Cagliari and the other four
municipalities included in the “Visit South Sardinia” (VSS) project.
The island of Sardinia is a well-known Mediterranean tourist destination that receives more
than 3,100,000 tourists annually, with a recorded figure in 2017 of 14,386,000 tourist nights and an
average length of stay of 4.59 nights [8]. The island’s official accommodation comprises a total of
212,751 beds. In 2017, Cagliari Province received 758,487 tourists, and figures for tourist nights and the
average length of stay were 3,308,011 and 4.36 nights, respectively. The total number of beds available
for tourists during this year was 43,717. The Sistema Informativo di Raccolta ed Elaborazione Dati
(SIRED) [8] of the Region of Sardinia reported that the five municipalities included in the VSS project
received a total of 572,372 tourists in 2017, and recorded 2,453,641 tourist nights and an average length
of stay of 4.28 nights.
VSS is actively engaged in sustainable tourism initiatives, and its progress over time can be
tracked using internationally recognized standards. In the spring and summer of 2013, VSS was
included in the GSTC international program for assessing sustainable tourism. An on-site evaluation
was conducted by a third-party organization, Sustainable Travel International. The assessment was
based on 40 criteria and 81 indicators related to the four pillars of tourism sustainability: (1) Destination
management, (2) social and economic benefits, (3) cultural heritage, and (4) environmental protection.
Following its launch in early 2013, VSS also took up the challenge of implementing the ETIS
for sustainable destinations [6]. Accordingly, VSS participated in the first pilot phase of ETIS
implementation and remained involved in the initiative from 2013 to 2016. The initial ETIS pilot
project implemented by VSS in 2013 included 27 core and 40 optional indicators relating to four
domains: (1) Destination management, (2) economic value, (3) social and cultural impact, and (4)
environmental impact. In 2016, based on the findings of the two pilot phases (in 2013 and 2014) in
destinations across Europe, the ETIS was revised, with inputs provided by the ETIS pool of experts
(PoE) [9]. The principal difference between the ETIS and the GSTC program is that the former monitors
ongoing developments relating to sustainability, whereas the latter measures the current status of
sustainable tourism management.
In 2016, VSS was awarded the European Sustainable Destination prize associated with the first
joint ETIS and Accessible Tourism Awards disbursed by the EC. This prize was awarded to the VSS
project in recognition of its effective combination of UN and EU indicators of sustainable tourism in
destination management and monitoring resulting from its involvement in the GSTC assessment and
in the ETIS pilot phase.
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3. Literature Review
In recent decades, the literature on sustainable tourism has largely focused on: Clarifying the
evolving meaning of sustainability in the context of tourism; identifying the methods and tools deemed
valid for measuring sustainability; verifying the models proposed; and scrutinizing the indicators
whose implementation has progressively advanced at international, national, regional, and local levels.
A brief overview of the sustainability literature relating to the purpose of this study is presented below.
According to Reference [10] and other authors, key issues in the interpretation of sustainable
development are the role of economic growth in promoting human well-being, the impacts of
human population growth, the existence of environmental limits to growth, the substitutability
of natural resources, the role of new technologies, the degree to which a systems (ecosystems)
perspective should be adopted, and the importance of maintaining the functional integrity of
ecosystems [11–13]. Some studies focusing on the sustainability of the tourism sector have highlighted
initiatives aimed at satisfying current needs without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs [14,15]. From this perspective, balancing economic growth, conservation
of environmental resources, and development is critical at local destination levels [16–26]. However,
several examples of tourism destination management, discussed in the literature, have fallen short
of adhering to the principles of sustainability [27–29]. The following topics are highlighted in this
literature: The relationship between residents and tourists [30]; the environmental implications of
tourism; the development and preservation of the culture, inheritance, and artistic values of local
communities [31,32]; support for the local economy; engagement of local communities in discussions
between stakeholders and residents; and managing tourism development through the creation of clear
and transparent policies for involving all local players, increasing tourism education and training,
and improving the services offered [33–35].
Following the above clarification of the meaning of sustainability in the context of the tourism
sector, determining whether sustainability can be measured at the local systemic level in the destination
becomes an important task. Measurement of sustainability first requires the identification of its
dimensions, followed by the determination of tools capable of measuring these dimensions [36].
According to Reference [37], three integrated dimensions, namely, economic growth, environmental
sustainability, and social equity constitute the basis for the measurement process [38].
Several sets of indicators have been proposed for measuring sustainability in relation to
tourism [39–41], with the aim of operationalizing “sustainable tourism” and facilitating its
implementation [42–46]. Most indicator sets refer to criteria such as involvement of local communities,
sustainable use of resources, tourism planning, and promoting information and research [36,47].
Indicators are considered the best tools for controlling and measuring progress toward sustainable
tourism [14,48–52]. In one study, indicators were defined as the biophysical, social, managerial,
or other conditions that concern people in a given situation [3]. Conversely, Reference [3] suggested
that indicators are helpful for measuring and framing management objectives in quantitative terms and
for specifying appropriate levels or acceptable limits for tourism’s impacts. According to Reference [53],
a longstanding objective has been to develop quantitative indicators of sustainability for the tourism
sector [14,16]. The most difficult aspect entails establishing environmental accounting measures, so this
remains a research priority. The measurement and management of all types of tourism impacts are
growing in importance.
In addition to discussions of indicator sets, there have also been some attempts to measure
the interconnections among different dimensions of sustainability and to conduct cross-analyses, as
revealed in the literature. One such attempt is the “prism of sustainability” developed in [53] as a
holistic framework entailing four interrelated dimensions of sustainability: Environmental, economic,
sociocultural, and institutional. This holistic model has been adopted by several researchers as its
indicators are suitable for dynamic modeling. Consequently, it is suitable for assessing the sustainability
of different policies and strategies. The use of indicator sets for controlling and measuring the multiple
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dimensions of sustainability within the tourism sector has become widespread, although not all
researchers agree on their importance and effectiveness [4,53–55].
In 2003, the EC adopted guidelines that focused entirely on sustainable development in the field
of tourism, titled “Basic orientations for the sustainability of European tourism.” Three years after its
inception in 2004, the Tourism Sustainability Group adopted the “Action for More Sustainable European
Tourism, 2007.” In the same year, the EC approved an “Agenda for a sustainable and competitive
European tourism.” In 2010, the EC defined four strategic priorities: (1) Encouraging competitiveness
within the tourism sector; (2) promoting sustainable, high-quality tourism; (3) strengthening Europe’s
image as a tourism destination; and (4) improving EU financial policies and instruments.
The EC’s continued focus on the sustainability issue culminated, in 2013, in the formulation
of a European system of indicators [6] for the EU’s sustainable development strategy, based on the
objectives of achieving economic prosperity, social equity, cohesion, and environmental protection.
Twenty-one actions were derived from the four priorities, including the ETIS for sustainable tourism.
The ETIS was launched in Brussels on 22 February 2013. It was designed, on behalf of the EC,
by a consortium of organizations led by the University of Surrey, and tested in a selected number
of European destinations, including Saint Tropez in France, Florence in Italy, Alqueva in Portugal,
and Brasov in Romania. Two pilot phases, implemented across Europe in 2013 and 2014, led to the
updating of the ETIS and related tools in 2016. As noted by [56], the ETIS “is designed as a locally
owned and led process for monitoring, managing, and enhancing the sustainability of a tourism
destination,” and “it has been developed as a result of lessons learned from previously existing
indicator system initiatives.” The ETIS provides all of the specific tools necessary for developing
local-level tourism impact monitoring mechanisms at the tourist destination.
Seven steps are required for facilitating the implementation of the ETIS toolkit, which is
aligned with the most commonly applied international standards, such as those of the UNWTO
and GSTC. The first step of raising awareness is particularly important for advancing understanding
of sustainability among stakeholders. The second step defines and creates a profile of the destination.
In the third step, a working group comprising stakeholders is formed, which plays a fundamental role
in tourism destination management. The fourth step entails assigning roles and responsibilities within
the working group during its consultations. Data collection and analysis are key aspects constituting
the fifth and sixth steps of the ETIS. The final step entails the formulation of an action plan and strategic
management for long-term improvement.
There are few applications of the ETIS reported in the tourism literature. Examples include “ATL
del Cuneese” in Italy [57]; Malta [58]; and Brasov County in the Romanian Carpathians [59]. However,
only the Brasov case study provides details relating to the challenges and difficulties encountered in the
implementation of the ETIS in a tourist destination. The development of an innovative decision-making
support system for tourist destination management based on the ETIS has been proposed [60]. In this
context, the present case study of VSS, considered as a successful model of sustainably developing an
island destination in the absence of conflict between tourists and residents [61], is in line with recent
studies focusing on municipalities [5].
4. Materials and Methods
The VSS project is the only example entailing the testing of two international systems relating to the
impacts of tourism, namely the GSTC program and the ETIS in the Mediterranean region. Several other
destinations in Italy, such as Cuneo Alps, Abano Terme, and Terrae Anio Iubensanae, and within
Europe, such as Broceliande (France), the province of Barcelona (Spain), Podgorica (Montenegro),
Ljubljana (Slovenia), Birmingham (UK), Dark Sky Alqueva (Portugal), and Uzundure (Turkey),
have been involved in the ETIS testing phases. However, none of these destinations participated in the
GSTC Early Adopter Program.
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In Sardinia the pioneering STPMS was the outcome of a step-wise procedure, coordinated by the
University of Cagliari. First, the primary stakeholders group (PSG), comprising key stakeholders was
established and a VSS sustainability team (ST) was subsequently formed. The next step comprised
tourism data collection, followed by an assessment of indicators through PSG discussions. A software
survey platform (SSP) was used to store tourism data. The final three steps entailed quantifying the
selected indicators, analyzing the results, and presenting and discussing lessons learned with the PSG.
The VSS project commenced in February 2013 and continues to be operational. The main project
partners include the University of Cagliari, which coordinates activities in the destination areas and is
the project’s liaison; the municipality of Cagliari, which leads the project; the municipalities of Domus
de Maria, Muravera, Pula, and Villasimius; the Area Marina Protetta Capo Carbonara; the consortia
of tourism enterprises, namely Consorzio Costa Sud, Consorzio Turistico di Villasimius, Azienda di
Promozione Turistica, Muravera, and Consorzio Costiera Sulcitana; and the Regione Autonoma della
Sardegna, which supervises the project.
The PSG that was initially formed comprised mayors and tourism councilors from the five
municipalities. During the second phase, it was expanded to include the presidents of the tourism
enterprises consortia. One of the objectives of the VSS project was to combine public and private sector
representatives, which proved to be a strategic lever for the initiative’s success. Moreover, the PSG was
responsible for relating to the university coordinator and for implementing the STPMS. In the third
phase, the group was further expanded to include key representatives of public organizations (e.g.,
the port authority and labor agency), associations, single enterprises, media representatives, and other
representatives from the private sector. Most members of the expanded PSG owned or had access to
data that was relevant for developing the STPMS.
The ST, coordinated by research assistants under the supervision of the University of Cagliari,
was established following the PSG’s creation. Initially comprising four student interns from a
professional graduate program in tourism, its composition subsequently changed with the addition
of 20 student trainees from a university undergraduate program in tourism. The two primary
responsibilities of the ST are to identify all tourism stakeholders possessing relevant data in the
destination area and to collect these data through ETIS surveys. The PSG was involved in the
implementation of the STPMS and in the assessment and discussions on which indicators should be
included for each of the four aspects of sustainability.
In our project, data were collected through face-to-face interviews and self-completed
questionnaires. LimeSurvey software version 2.55.2 (LimeSurvey GmbH, Hamburg, Germany) was
used to set up an SPSS v. 25 for the data analysis.
By the end of 2014, the VSS project had implemented the entire ETIS toolkit. The principal aim was
to evaluate all of the indicators suggested in the EC toolkit, published in 2013. The 27 core indicators
and 40 optional indicators (the complete list of indicators is listed in Table A1 of Appendix A) were
aggregated into the following four categories: (1) Destination management, (2) social and cultural
impacts, (3) economic value, and (4) environmental impacts.
During the first phase of the investigation, to prevent duplication of efforts, the ST explored the
main available statistical information sources providing relevant data on ETIS indicators at the local
level in Italy. Table 1 shows the results of this first phase. The data sources that the ST decided to use
to calculate all of the indicators in VSS are listed in this table, which indicates a lack of statistical data
sources, especially at the municipal level. To bridge this gap, we conducted four separate surveys
covering the principal stakeholders of VSS: Residents, tourists and daily visitors, enterprises, and local
public actors. We decided to employ the questionnaires contained in the ETIS toolkit produced in
2013 [62].
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Table 1. Data sources used to calculate the European Tourism Indicator System (ETIS) during the
implementation of the VSS project.
Data Sources Classification Source
Reference Number of
ETIS Indicators
Publicly available data from
official sources
“Occupancy of tourist accommodation
establishments“ and “Capacity of collective tourist
accommodation“ ISTAT census surveys
B.1.1; B.2.1; B.2.2; C.1.1; C.1.1.2
Italian Institute for Environmental Protection and
Research and Italian Ministry of the Environment,
Land and Sea (http://www.minambiente.it/).
D.3.1; D.3.1.1; D.9.1
Ad hoc surveys realized by VSS
Residents survey A.1.1.1C.1.1.1; C.4.1.1.







B.2.2.1; B.3.1.1; B.3.1.2; B.4.1;
B.5.1; B.5.1.2;
C.2.1; C.2.1.1; C.2.1.2; C.3.1;
D.2.1; D.3.1.1; D.4.1.1; D.5.1;
D.5.1.1; D.5.1.2; D.6.1; D.6.1.1;
D.6.1.2; D.7.1.1





The ETIS questionnaire, which was administered to a sample comprising 590 residents from the
five municipalities included in the VSS project, was aimed at evaluating the indicators for measuring the
impacts of tourism on the local community. Random sampling was performed to recruit representative
participants from the resident population. Respondents were selected through random quota sampling
according to sex and age as well as the population size of the municipality. We set the sample size at
1% of the target population that we evaluated based on information furnished by the Italian Statistics
Institute (ISTAT) in 2014. Questionnaires were completed through face-to-face interactions conducted
in public areas (e.g., on the street and at public events) from May to September 2015.
A survey of tourists and same-day visitors was also conducted from May to September 2015.
Again, the questionnaire was administered directly, face-to-face, among Italian and foreign tourists
who were present in the VSS territory. In determining the survey sample, we applied time location
sampling (TLS) in light of the particular characteristics of the population. The specific TLS for
tourism-focused surveys entailed a two-stage stratified sampling design with unequal selection
probabilities for first-stage units and constant selection probabilities for second-stage units. The
first-stage units comprised a combination of places, days, and hours (i.e., venue-day-time units). The
second-stage units comprised (non-resident) Italian and foreign tourists visiting the VSS municipalities.
Our aim was to collect relevant direct information for the entire period spent in the tourist destination.
Following the approach, described in Reference [63], and using the ISTAT official data on tourist
arrivals, we selected a random sample characterized by unequal probabilities (proportional to the
estimated tourism flows for each combined unit comprising the month, place, and tourist typology).
The final dataset comprised 514 units.
The survey of enterprises was conducted from July 2015 to February 2016, using the
computer-assisted web interviewing technique. Given the low response rate for this survey,
companies were solicited through emails and direct phone calls. Ultimately, even though a large
number of enterprises visited the website on which the questionnaire was posted, only 25 of them
partially or fully answered the questionnaire.
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In addition, the ETIS toolkit contained a questionnaire tailored for local administrators and aimed
at gathering information concerning the 10 indicators listed in Table 1. Questionnaires were provided
to the boards of the five municipalities involved in VSS: Cagliari, Villasimius, Pula, Domus De Maria,
and Muravera.
5. Results
In light of our objective of assessing the implementation of the ETIS, in this section we identify
the main problems that we encountered during the phase of evaluating the indicators. In some cases,
missing data affected the reliability of the indicators and in others, it was difficult to contact the
respondents who had not completed the entire questionnaire. Below, we elaborate on our experiences
in collecting the data that we used for calculating the indicators.
5.1. Official Relevant Statistics for the Evaluation of ETIS Indicators
ISTAT, which conducts two monthly surveys on tourist accommodation capacity and occupancy,
respectively, is the official and principal source of tourism data in Italy. Data on numbers of tourists
who stay in registered accommodation, obtained from this source, were used to calculate the following
four indicators in the system: Number of tourist nights per month (B.1.1); occupancy rate in commercial
accommodation per month and the average for the year (B.2.2.), number of beds available in commercial
visitor accommodation per 100 residents (C.1.1.2), and the average length of stay of tourists (nights)
in commercial accommodation per month (B.2.1). In addition, access to databases created and
managed by the Italian Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (the Italian Institute
for Environmental Protection and Research is part of the national system for environmental protection
network; comporising of 21 territorial environmental protection agencies established in accordance
with regional laws), enabled the calculation of the following indicators: Waste volume produced in
the destination (D.3.1), level of contamination per 100 mL (fecal coliforms, campylobacter (D.9.1),
and number of days beach/shore closed due to contamination (D.9.1.1).) Because the separation
of different types of waste is mandatory in Italy, it was possible to estimate an optional indicator:
Percentage of tourism enterprises separating different types of waste (D.3.1.1). Accessibility to official
data ensured that the information obtained for these indicators was complete, reliable, and valid for
the analysis.
Table 2 shows the values of the eight indicators that we estimated for the year 2015. These values
clearly reveal the strengths of the DMO in terms of sustainability. This DMO has one of the highest
values for the tourism dimension in Italy (about 174 miles of tourist nights per month, and an
occupancy rate of 50% of the available beds, that is, 15.1 per 100 residents’ beds in the area for
commercial accommodation), and the high quality of the surrounding sea is remarkable.
Table 2. Indicator values estimated on the basis of publicly available data from official sources
(* yearly average).
Indicator Code Indicator Value
B.1.1 173,426.58 tourist nights per month
B.2.1 * 6 days
B.2.2 * 49.4%
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5.2. Survey of Residents
The face-to-face modality of survey administration that we selected for the residents in the DMO
proved to be highly effective. The number of surveyed residents corresponded to the preset sample
size and respondents answered all of the questions. The data in the collected questionnaires enabled us
to calculate the following ETIS indicators: Percentage of residents satisfied with their involvement and
their influence in the planning and development of tourism (A.1.1.1), percentage of residents who have
positive views on the impacts of tourism on destination identity (C.4.1.1), and percentage of residents
who are satisfied with tourism in the destination per season (C.1.1.1). Given the comprehensiveness
of the information obtained through the residents’ survey, the calculated values of these indicators,
which were assessed in the analysis, were considered reliable and valid. Table 3 shows the values
of the indicators estimated using data collected through the residents’ survey. The results indicate
that seasonality affected the satisfaction level relating to tourism among residents in VSS. Specifically,
we found that respondents were highly satisfied in the peak season but were highly dissatisfied in the
off-season. Moreover, although most residents felt that tourism helps to strengthen the distinctiveness
of the VSS destination, and to enhance its local identity, culture, and heritage, they felt that their
involvement in tourism planning and development was minimal.
Table 3. Values of indicators estimated from data obtained in the residents’ survey.
Indicator Code Indicator Value
A.1.1.1 35.6%
C.1.1.1 (in summer) 75.5%
C.1.1.1 (in winter) 25.9%
C.1.1.1 (in autumn) 30.7%
C.1.1.1 (in spring) 60.9%
C.4.1.1 60.8%
5.3. Survey of Tourists and Same-Day Visitors
We administered the questionnaire to tourists and same-day visitors, applying the face-to-face
modality, and did not experience any particular difficulties in collecting the preset number of
questionnaires. Nonetheless, contrasting with respondents in the residents’ survey, some of the
respondents in this survey did not answer all the questions. Table 4 shows the indicators that we
calculated using the responses obtained from surveyed tourists and daily visitors and the percentage of
missing data affecting the corresponding answers. On average, missing data in the responses amounted
to 4.4%. Specifically, missing data for questions on the core questions averaged 2.6%, whereas missing
data for optional indicators averaged 6%. Given the low percentage of non-responses for individual
questions, we overcame the problem using the donor technique, which entails replacing missing
values with values obtained from a “similar” responding unit. After applying the abovementioned
correctional procedure, we obtained estimates of the indicators, listed in Table 4. The compiled
responses revealed that almost all tourists and same-day visitors (92.2%) were very satisfied with
their overall experience at the VSS destination, and more than a half of the respondents (56.2%) had
visited it at least once during the last previous 5 years. Considering the lack of data on the local
economic impacts of tourism, the average daily spending of same-day visitors (37 €) and that of
tourists (56 €) were considered two of the most important evaluated indicators. It is noteworthy that
with reference to the indicators that most related to the degree of sustainable development, only 39%
of the surveyed respondents were aware of efforts to promote sustainable destinations (indicator
A.4.1), and slightly more than 50% of the tourists were satisfied with the destination’s accessibility for
those with disabilities or specific access requirements (indicator C.3.2.1). The assessment of indicators
relating to the environmental dimension revealed that 44.8% of respondents used different modes of
transport to reach the destination (indicator D.1.1), but only 40.1% used local/”soft” mobility/public
transport services to travel around the destination site (indicator D.1.1.1). On average, tourists traveled
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1,160 km to and from home (indicator D.1.2), whereas same-day visitors traveled 90 km to and from
the destination (indicator D.1.2.1).
Table 4. ETIS indicators evaluated on the basis of data obtained from the survey of
tourists/same-day visitors.




B.1.1.3 10.5 37.38 €
B.1.2 1.9 56.02 €




D.1.2 0 1160 km
D.1.2.1 11.4 90 km
5.4. Survey of Enterprises
As discussed in Section 4, because of the high number of enterprises and their dispersion across
the VSS territory, we applied a computer-assisted web interviewing technique for surveying the
enterprises. Only a very small percentage of the contacted subjects answered the questionnaire,
resulting in invalidation of the sample randomness. Moreover, because of the incompleteness of some
of the answers, we were unable to obtain a stable and reliable estimate for the indicators listed in
Table 5. This table shows the percentage of missing data affecting the corresponding answers for each
indicator. Evidently, the percentages of missing data range from a minimum of 12% (for the D.6.1.1
and D.3.1.1 indicators) to a maximum of 52% (for the core indicator, C.2.1), with an average value of
30.13%. In this case, it was not possible to apply any technique to overcome the issue of missing data.
Therefore, we did not calculate this group of indicators. The lack of data received from enterprises was
discussed during PSG meetings, with the objective of increasing awareness among tourism enterprises
on the importance of sustainability practices relating to their customers, and of strengthening the
involvement of the private sector in implementing the STPMS.
Table 5. Evaluation of ETIS indicators based on data from the surveyed enterprises.
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5.5. Survey of Local Public Actors
The ETIS toolkit included a questionnaire that was tailored to local administrators, with the aim of
gathering information relating to the 10 indicators listed in the last row of Table 1. Questionnaires were
provided to the boards of the five municipalities involved in the VSS project: Cagliari, Villasimius,
Pula, Domus De Maria, and Muravera.
Table 6 shows the estimated values of the indicators. The local administrators evidently
demonstrated different degrees of interest in realizing the system of indicators. For instance,
repeated requests elicited a limited response from the local administration of Cagliari. This is partly
attributable to the fact that data for the capital city are distributed across a large number of locations.
Moreover, the attitude and involvement of the PSG in the implementation of indicator systems can
change over time. Some of the indicators showed strongly contrasting values for the municipalities.
Although all of the municipalities confirmed that they had implemented a public policy for sustainable
tourism management (A.1.1. and A.1.1.2), their situations relating to accessibility (C.3.1.1) and landscape
and biodiversity protection (D.7.1 and D.7.1.2) differed.
Table 6. ETIS evaluation based on data obtained from surveyed local administrators.
Indicator Code
Indicators Values for Each Municipality of the Destination Management Organization (DMO)
Pula Domus de Maria Villasimius Cagliari Muravera
A.1.1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
A.1.1.2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
B.1.1.1 - - 90% - 50%
B.1.1.2 - - It is not possible to know - It is not possible to know
B.2.1.1 - - 12 h - It is not possible to know
C.1.1.3 206.9% 181.0% 120.2% - 150.6%
C.3.1.1 21.6% 100% 100% - 21.4%
D.7.1 94% 96% 100% - 27%
D.7.1.2 16% 6.4% 58% 23%
D.8.1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5.6. An Overview of the ETIS in VSS
Table 7 shows the percentages of indicators that VSS estimated for each category of the ETIS. For the
categories of destination management, social and cultural impacts, and economic value, the calculated
indicators were more than 50% of the complete list of indicators. Only 35% of the indicators of
environmental impact were calculated, with the majority of these indicators associated with the
enterprise survey that reflected serious problems relating to missing data and sample representativeness.
Table 7. Percentages of ETIS indicators calculated in the VSS project for each category of the ETIS.
Category %
Destination management 67
Social and cultural impacts 50
Economic value 50
Environmental impact 35
The overall analysis of the ETIS showed that VSS could be considered a sustainable destination.
Despite the extensive tourism in this area, residents did not perceive tourism as an intrusion into their
personal lives; on the contrary, they believed that tourism helps to enhance the distinctiveness of the
destination, strengthening its local identity, culture, and heritage. The tourists were very satisfied with
their experiences in this destination, with more than a half of them returning within a 5-year period.
In general, the high quality of the sea and territorial environments was confirmed using each of the
environmental indicators.
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Several insights emerge from the implementation of the ETIS in the VSS tourist destination.
The first is that the different sources used to calculate the ETIS complement each other. For example,
the official statistics did not reveal unregistered tourism supply, which could be explored using
information provided by the municipalities on second/rental homes. Moreover, some indicators were
objectively difficult to calculate in relation to missing data (e.g., when queried on the distance traveled
in kilometers to and from a destination, a visitor would need to respond, and could decide whether or
not to answer to the question). In addition, the surveying technique applied influenced the availability
of respondents; whereas a survey administered personally allows for direct contact with respondents,
it entails high costs and covers a limited area.
5.7. Conclusion of the Process of Implementing Indicators
A final sequence of PSG meetings, which was aimed at critically analyzing best practices in
sustainable management and identifying areas for improvement, marked the conclusion of the VSS
project. The GSTC indicators were first employed, followed by the ETIS indicators for assessing best
practices relating to the environmental and social dimensions of sustainability. An environmental
concern relating to the indiscriminate use of plastic bottles in the destination area was highlighted and
discussed. The lack of tourism data on the economic dimension of sustainability (e.g., the contribution
of tourism to the GDP) was also considered. Last, the PSG recognized that while the ETIS and similar
methodologies promote responsible management, monitoring, and marketing of the tourism industry
at the sub-national level, the key role of the destination coordinator in implementing the indicator
systems cannot be neglected.
5.8. Highlights
From the onset of the implementation of the ETIS across Europe, the VSS PSG demonstrated an
enduring commitment to pursue the EC initiative under the coordination of the University of Cagliari.
Active and fully-fledged engagement within the ETIS entailed participation in events, meetings,
and working groups, as shown in Table 8. The objective of this paragraph is to first demonstrate
and subsequently explain the most important events in terms of outcomes that can be useful for
strengthening awareness of the level of involvement that is needed for replication of the STPMS in
other destinations.
Table 8. VSS events, meetings, and working groups associated with implementation of the ETIS.
Event Place Date Content Results
1 Bruxelles 22 February 2013 Launch of the ETIS Knowledge on the ETIS
2 Cagliari 13 March 2013 Sustainable Tourism conference




3 Bruxelles 19 April 2013 Expert Meeting
First discussions at the EU level on
the problems that destinations
encountered with the ETIS toolkit





24 July–5 August 2013 PSG working group discussion
Discussion on the utility and
availability of environmental, social
and economic indicators based on
GSTC criteria and indicators Early
Adopters program
5 Cagliari 30 November 2013 Press release organized by PSGand University of Cagliari
Presentation of GSTC
implementation and results





organized by Lazio Region,




Results from VSS and Cuneo Alps
ETIS first pilot phase
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Table 8. Cont.
Event Place Date Content Results
7 Bruxelles 4 July 2014
WORKSHOP—European
Tourism Indicator System.
The results of the first pilot
testing phase: Exchanges
of experiences
Presentation of the results of the 1
ETIS pilot phase from 6 selected
destinations and presentation of the
document of the overall results
from the EC and ETIS PoE
8 Oristano 9 March 2015 Presentation of VSS projectand STPMS
Involvement of PSG and students in
ETIS data collection through
2015 surveys
9 Villasimius 29 April 2015
VSS DMO promotion with the
participation of tourism
enterprises
Presentation of ETIS surveys to PSG
and distribution of the ETIS
enterprise survey: Request
of collaboration
10 Bruxelles(videoconference) 25 June 2015 ETIS pilot phases
Discussion between EC, ETIS PoE
and destination representatives
11 Bruxelles(videoconference) 29 October 2015 ETIS pilot phases
Discussion between EC, ETIS PoE
and destination representatives






EC release of the ETIS toolkit 2016.
Presentation of VSS implementation
of GSTC and ETIS indicators,
difficulties and challenges.
13 Bruxelles 22 April 2016 ETIS Award
ETIS ceremony.
Decision of the ETIS winners to
continue their experience and share
results through the establishment of
the ETIS Destinations Network
(EDN) leaded by VSS
More than 350 delegates from European countries participated in Event 1, which was organized
by the EC. The ETIS was launched by the EC on 22 February 2013, and this initiative concluded
on 22 April 2016 with the bestowal of the ETIS award. Whereas the 2016 ETIS toolkit has been
implemented in specific destinations in Croatia, the UK, Italy, Spain, France, and other countries,
without the coordination of the EC, its implementation at the level of Europe as a whole is still pending.
Event 2 can be considered as foundational for the VSS STPMS. International standards and
indicators, such as GSTC and ETIS, were introduced to VSS mayors participating in the event.
Tourism indicators were considered a means for acquiring and/or systematizing tourism data required
for decision making. The plan was for the VSS project to be included in the GSTC Early Adopter
initiative. However, at that time, fragmented modalities were being applied by VSS municipalities in
an uncoordinated manner to compile tourism data.
Event 3 was the first to include exchanges among representatives of the EC and agencies at the
tourist destination interested in ETIS implementation. At the inception of the ETIS, the system and
toolkit were only available in the English language. This was emphatically viewed as a strong limitation,
given that not all stakeholders at local levels may be conversant in English. Two key questions
concerned the costs of ETIS implementation. The first concerned financial support provided by the
EC and the second related to the implementation cost incurred at the destination. These questions
were motivated by the generally limited resources available to municipalities for collecting tourism
data. The ETIS pilot phases were developed on a voluntary basis in the selected destinations, with
costs dependent on the implementation level of the ETIS system.
Event 4 was at the core of the overall STPMS. The focus of PSG meetings was contingent on the
locations and special features within each municipality. Discussions held on economic indicators in
the Cagliari municipality revealed a lack of relevant economic data related to tourism, which was
also confirmed by the representative from the statistics office of the region of Sardinia. The PSG
highlighted the need for collection of economic data at the municipal level and the use of indicator
systems to achieve this objective. In the municipalities of Domus de Maria and Muravera, the meetings
of the PSG focused on enterprises based on tourism and related sectors, and on the public sector.
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The importance of utilizing indicators from the perspective of tourism enterprises was discussed.
Enterprises acknowledged the need for data compilation, but in some cases, they observed that the
implementation of sustainability practices constrained their business development. Discussions in the
municipality of Pula focused on the social aspect of sustainability and related indicators, whereas those
in the municipality of Villasimius focused on environmental indicators and their utility for the marine
protected area. During PSG meetings held in 2013, primary stakeholders suggested new indicators
that better fitted with the information needed for the management of the tourist destination and more
accurately reflected its characteristics.
Event 5 involved the Sardinian media and press, whose attendance was required for broadcasting
the results of the STPMS derived from the GSTC assessment. The EC produced a video highlighting
the importance of the ETIS for sustainable destinations and the implementation of the Visit South
Sardinia project.
Events 6 and 7 enabled sharing of the methodology for implementing the VSS project used during
the first year (2013–2014) of ETIS implementation. In the absence of a dedicated office in the destination
area for gathering tourism data relating to the construction of indicators, it was proposed, first of all,
to restrict the level of implementation selectively to a limited number of geographical areas at the
destination. Second, it was recommended that the number of indicators collected should be limited,
starting with those that were easily available. After a period of testing the usefulness of the compiled
indicators, it would then be possible to gradually extend the number of indicators collected and the
areas of collection at the destination.
Events 8 and 9 were aimed at strengthening the PSG’s awareness regarding a new 2015 ETIS
phase, termed EC GROW ETIS (The term GROW derives from the name of the EC Directorate General
(DG) GROWTH for Internal Market, Industries, Entrepreneurship and SMEs that was responsible for
the ETIS in 2015) to enable collection of all data related to ETIS indicators through the administration
of the ETIS surveys provided in the ETIS toolkit.
During Events 10 and 11, the EC and agencies at the destination site shared their experiences
and suggested improvements relating to the indicators and the toolkit. Destinations that had not
established a ST requested overall simplification of the system and a reduction in the number of
indicators. VSS, following the implementation of the 2015 ETIS surveys, shared the finding that
administration of the ETIS survey of residents took just 5 min per respondent, while surveying each
tourist required 10 min. Nonetheless, in the absence of a ST, and insufficient human resources and
knowledge of indicators at local levels, it is not possible for destinations to administer the preset
number of questionnaires for achieving the objective of compiling the impacts of tourism impacts for
decision making.
Considering the results of events 7, 10, and 11, and in light of the inputs of the pool of experts, the
EC released the new ETIS 2016 toolkit at Event 12.
Event 13 marked the conclusion of the EC’s commitment to the ETIS. During the award-giving
ceremony, the EC representatives encouraged the VSS project to assume a leading position as an ETIS
destination. Following the EC encouragement, the ETIS Destination Network (EDN) was established as
an informal network in 2016 with the following two objectives: (1) To promote exchanges and augment
experiences of measuring and monitoring sustainable tourism performances at the destination level
through the use of a common methodology and tools, such as ETIS and/or other recognized European
and/or international schemes; and (2) to benchmark and compare destinations. A final EDN-facilitated
meeting was held at the University of Cagliari on 28 June 2018 in collaboration with the University
of Surrey.
6. Conclusions and Discussion
The experience of implementing the ETIS in the VSS project within an Italian tourism destination
provides insights on several critical issues. Firstly, it is objectively difficult to obtain statistical data
at local levels in Italy. Statistical data are often not collected, and when they are, the methodologies
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usually differ, even for geographically proximate destinations. There is no codification of the methods
used to collect statistical data at local levels. Another important constraint concerns the time taken to
collect data. The delay in collecting statistical data concerning tourism performance, such as occupancy
rate, the average daily rate, and the yield rate, is usually at least six months, and sometimes longer.
For management purposes, this is a significant limitation that reduces the efficiency of the system.
In sum, statistical data are not collected by following codified methodologies, which means that they
are often not comparable, and they are not generated in a timely manner. The main consequence at the
local level is the high cost of collecting statistical data, both in terms of time and financial resources.
Such data should be collected periodically, but this requires an efficient system that has not yet been
established in Italy, as demonstrated in the VSS case study.
Secondly, only a few of the surveyed enterprises completed the questionnaire (partially or fully).
This finding suggests the need within future investigations for strengthening the involvement of the
private sector in implementing the STPMS. Similarly, local administrators demonstrated different
degrees of interest in realizing the system of indicators, revealing another area for future research.
Thirdly, as a consequence of the above two limitations, it was not possible for the VSS project to
develop a governance system at the local level to promote more sustainable destination management
using only the ETIS indicators toolkit. To achieve this aim, it proved necessary to implement the
pioneering STPMS. This is an important finding, indicating that the ETIS should not be perceived
merely as a statistical instrument. It should be an important driver for reducing gaps among
different stakeholders, particularly at the local level, to create a shared vision of sustainable tourism.
This requires the creation of a system for regulating destination management. In the case of the VSS
project, the ETIS fulfilled its scope as an instrument with the capacity to bring and keep together
different tourism stakeholders, but this was only possible through the use of the STPMS to ensure
their cooperation.
Fourthly, the VSS experience highlights the key role of the destination coordinator, for the success
of the project. The destination coordinator must perform more activities than those foreseen by ETIS.
Because local stakeholders do not have the tools, not even the organizational ones, to continue the
project independently. This represents a great weakness of the whole ETIS system. For this reason,
it is important that ETIS projects are supported by institutions (such as universities, research centers,
etc.), that they are able to raise funds, train staff, etc., as local stakeholders cannot implement indicator
systems independently.
The above findings reveal the importance of working with stakeholders within a territory
to simplify the indicators toolkit and improve the statistical culture and implementation of joint
procedures, supported by new technologies that facilitate the collection of statistical data.
At the EU level, it is necessary to facilitate the implementation of standard indicator systems
to increase sustainability policies and facilitate planning processes. The indicator systems must also
encourage the development of practical methodologies that support the simple use of indicators.
Only through the development of appropriate methodologies it is possible to optimize the results
obtained from the implementation of indicator systems. We recommend simplifying the ETIS in
consideration of the organizational characteristics of local stakeholders.
The use of recognized and relatively simple indicator systems allows comparability between
different local experiences. Comparability is an essential prerequisite for the adoption of best
practice at local, regional, national and international levels. The implementation of best practice,
through evaluation of indicator systems, can be a significant support for both public and private
planning processes.
The VSS experience shows that the lack of reliability and timeliness in the collected data may
undermine the quality of some indicators. This is important in ETIS, having been conceived as a tool
to implement and monitor sustainable policies at local level with respect to the objectives proposed by
the EU.
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To be effective in planning policies at the local level, it is essential to have reliable and accurate
indicators. This requires the investment of considerable resources for data collection which are not often
available locally. The lack of resources therefore makes the indicators less reliable and consequently
less used, which may be to the detriment of local planning policies
In an area where data gathering can be problematic, indicator systems can still afford significant
insight into public and private planning, although in the absence of sufficient hard data, caution must
be exercised in the interpretation of these indicators. We recommend the continuity of the project so
that, at the local level, both public and private actors can obtain valid insights into the local planning
processes via the evaluation of indicator systems.
In summary, when implementing the ETIS, the VSS project relied on the STPMS to achieve the
expected results. Following the revisions made to the ETIS in 2016, it would be advantageous for
the EC to improve the indicator toolkit in light of the results of the implementation of new voluntary
pilots in destinations across Europe. However, it is essential to first improve data collection techniques
and procedures.
Any destination seeking to implement the ETIS toolkit or a similar methodology should be
cognizant of the associated challenges. The lessons from this case study are of particular relevance
at the municipal level. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the ETIS as a globally
recognized standard for developing best practices in monitoring the impacts of tourism. Though it
clearly has great potential, this instrument is not yet sufficiently developed to achieve tangible outcomes
reflecting the enhancement of sustainable cultures at local levels.
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Appendix A
Table A1. ETIS indicators. Note. Adapted from Reference [6].
Section A: Destination Management
A.1 Sustainable Tourism Public Policy
A.1.1 Percentage of the destination with a sustainable tourism strategy/action plan, with agreedmonitoring, development control and evaluation arrangement
A.1.1.1 Percentage of residents satisfied with their involvement and their influence in the planningand development of tourism
A.1.1.2 Percentage of the destination represented by a destination management organization
A.2 Sustainable Tourism Management in Tourism Enterprises
A.2.1
Percentage of tourism enterprises/establishments in the destination using a voluntary
verified certification/labelling for environmental/quality/sustainability and/or Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) measures
A.2.2.1 Number of tourism enterprises/establishments with sustainability reports in accordancewith the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
A.3 Customer Satisfaction
A.3.1 Percentage of visitors that are satisfied with their overall experience in the destination
A.3.1.1 Percentage of repeat/return visitors (within 5 years)
A.4 Information and Communication
A.4.1 The percentage of visitors who note that they are aware of destination sustainability efforts
A.4.1.1 The percentage of businesses that communicate their sustainability efforts to visitors in theirproducts, marketing, or branding
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Table A1. Cont.
Section B: Economic Value
B.1 Tourism Flow (volume and value) at Destination
B.1.1 Number of tourist nights per month
B.1.1.1 Relative contribution of tourism to the destination’s economy (% GDP)
B.1.1.2 Number of ‘same day’ visitors in high season and low season
B.1.1.3 Daily spending per same day visitor
B.1.2 Daily spending per tourist (accommodation, food and drinks, other services)
B.2 Tourism Enterprise(s) Performance
B.2.1 Average length of stay of tourists (nights)
B.2.1.1 Average length of stay of same day visitors (hours)
B.2.1.2 Percentage of ten largest tourism enterprises involved in destinationmanagement/cooperative marketing
B.2.2 Occupancy rate in commercial accommodation per month and average for the year
B.2.2.1 Average price per room in the destination
B.3 Quantity and Quality of Employment
B.3.1 Direct tourism employment as percentage of total employment in the destination
B.3.1.1 Percentage of jobs in tourism that are seasonal
B.3.1.2 Percentage of tourism enterprises providing student internships
B.4 Safety and Health
B.4.1 Percentage of tourism enterprises inspected for fire safety in the last year
B.4.1.1 Percentage of tourists who register a complaint with the police
B.5 Tourism Supply Chain
B.5.1 Percentage of tourism enterprises actively taking steps to source local, sustainable, and fairtrade goods and services
B.5.1.1 Percentage of the destination covered by a policy promoting local, sustainable and/or fairtrade products and services
B.5.1.2 Percentage of tourism enterprises sourcing a minimum of 25% of food and drink fromlocal/regional producers
Section C: Social and Cultural Impact
C.1 Community/Social Impact
C.1.1 Number of tourists/visitors per 100 residents
C.1.1.1 Percentage of residents who are satisfied with tourism in the destination (per month/season)
C.1.1.2 Number of beds available in commercial visitor accommodation per 100 residents
C.1.1.3 Number of second/rental homes per 100 homes
C.2 Gender Equality
C.2.1 Percentage of men and women employed in the tourism sector
C.2.1.1 Percentage of tourism enterprises where the general manager position is held by a woman
C.2.1.2 Average wage in tourism for women compared to average wage for men (sorted by tourismjob type)
C.3 Equality/Accessibility
C.3.1 Percentage of commercial accommodation with rooms accessible to people with disabilitiesand/or participating in recognized accessibility schemes
C.3.1.1 Percentage of destination served by public transport that is accessible to people withdisabilities and people with specific access requirements
C.3.2 Percentage of visitor attractions that are accessible to people with disabilities and/orparticipating in recognized accessibility schemes
C.3.2.1 Percentage of visitors satisfied with the accessibility of the destination for those withdisabilities or specific access requirements
C.4 Protecting and Enhancing Cultural Heritage, Local Identity and Assets
C.4.1 Percentage of the destination covered by a policy or plan that protects cultural heritage
C.4.1.1 Percentage of residents who have positive or negative views on the impact of tourism ondestination identity
C.4.1.2 Percentage of the destination’s biggest events that are focused on traditional/local cultureand assets
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Table A1. Cont.
Section D: Environmental Impact
D.1 Reducing Transport Impact
D.1.1 Percentage of tourists and same day visitors using different modes of transport to arrive atthe destination (public/private and type)
D.1.1.1 Percentage of visitors using local/soft mobility/public transport services to get aroundthe destination
D.1.2 Average travel (km) by tourists to and from home or average travel (km) from the previousdestination to the current destination
D.1.2.1 Average travel (km) by same day visitors from and to destination
D.2 Climate Change
D.2.1 Percentage of tourism enterprises involved in climate change mitigation schemes—such as:CO2 offset, low energy systems, etc.—and “adaptation” responses and actions
D.2.1.1 Percentage of the destination included in climate change adaptation strategy or planning
D.2.1.2 Percentage of tourism accommodation and attraction infrastructure located in“vulnerable zones.”
D.3 Solid Waste Management
D.3.1 Waste volume produced by destination (tonnes per resident per year or per month)
D.3.1.1 Percentage of tourism enterprises separating different types of waste
D.3.2 Volume of waste recycled (percent or per resident per year)
D.4 Sewage Treatment
D.4.1 Percentage of sewage from the destination treated to at least secondary level priorto discharge
D.4.1.1 Percentage of commercial accommodation connected to central sewage system and/oremploying tertiary sewage treatment
D.5 Water Management
D.5.1 Fresh water consumption per tourist night compared to general population waterconsumption per person night
D.5.1.1 Percentage of tourism enterprises with low-flow shower heads and taps and/or dual flushtoilets/waterless urinals
D.5.1.2 Percentage of tourism enterprises using recycled water
D.5.1.3 Percentage of water use derived from recycled water in the destination
D.6 Energy Usage
D.6.1 Energy consumption per tourist night compared to general population energy consumptionper person night
D.6.1.1 Percentage of tourism enterprises that have switched to low-energy lighting
D.6.1.2 Annual amount of energy consumed from renewable sources (Mwh) as a percentage ofoverall energy consumption
D.7 Landscape and Biodiversity Protection
D.7.1 Percentage of destination (area in km2) that is designated for protection
D.7.1.1 Percentage of local enterprises in the tourism sector actively supporting protection,conservation, and management of local biodiversity and landscapes.
D.7.1.2 Percentage of destination covered by a biodiversity management and monitoring plan
D.8 Light and Noise Management
D.8.1 The destination has policies in place that require tourism enterprises to minimize light andnoise pollution
D.8.1.1 Percentage of the destination and percentage of population covered by local strategy and/orplans to reduce noise and light pollution
D.9 Bathing Water Quality
D.9.1 Level of contamination per 100 mL (fecal coliforms, campylobacter)
D.9.1.1 Number of days beach/shore closed due to contamination
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